DIVIDING THE DOMESTIC
DIVIDING THE DOMESTIC

Men, Women, and Household Work in Cross-National Perspective

Edited by Judith Treas and Sonja Drobnič

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ERIN CECH is a doctoral candidate in Sociology at the University of California (UC), San Diego. Her research examines the cultural and structural processes that reproduce occupational gender inequality, particularly in engineering. She is the recipient of a UC Labor and Employment Research Grant and is key personnel on a number of National Science Foundation–funded projects. Her chapter on the gender schemas of women engineering students appears in Gender in Engineering: Strategies and Possibilities (edited by I. Welpe, B. Reschka, and J. Larkin, Peter Lang Press, 2007).

MARIA CHARLES is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She specializes in the comparative study of social inequality. Much of her research focuses on international differences in women’s economic, educational, and familial roles, and the cultural and structural forces underlying such differences. Her book, Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men (coauthored with David Grusky, Stanford University Press, 2004), received the Max Weber Award for Distinguished Scholarship in 2005.

LYNN PRINCE COOKE is Senior Lecturer in Social Policy and Sociology, and Director of Graduate Studies for the School, at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Her research combining historical–comparative policy analyses with statistical analyses of large-scale datasets has been published in American Journal of Sociology and Journal of Marriage and Family, and she is currently completing her first book, Equality for Some, for the Routledge Gender Perspective series.

SHIRLEY DEX is Professor of Longitudinal Social Research at the Institute of Education, University of London. She is an economist and sociologist recognized for her analyses of the labor market, in particular gender differences in parents’ paid work and care, careers and occupational mobility,

Sonja Drobnic is Professor of Sociology at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Honored as a Visiting Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University in 2001–2002, she is recognized as an expert on the labor force participation of married women, bringing a sophisticated longitudinal methodology to the cross-national comparison of couples’ work and family arrangements. Her research interests include gender inequalities in the household and in the labor market, gendered social capital, issues in social stratification, and quality of life and work. Her publications include *Careers of Couples in Contemporary Societies: From Male Breadwinner to Dual-Earner Families* (with Hans-Peter Blossfeld, 2001, Oxford University Press).

Marie Evertsson is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI) at Stockholm University. She is also an Associate Fellow of the Center for Research on Inequalities and the Life Course at Yale University. Her research focuses on gender inequalities in the home and in the labor market in Sweden as well as in a cross-national comparative perspective. Her publications related to the division of domestic work include articles in *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *European Sociological Review*, *British Journal of Sociology*, and *Social Politics*.

Claudia Geist is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Utah. Her research examines the intersection of work, family, and gender in comparative perspective. Her main interests are the context and the gendered labor market consequences of marriage, the social construction of gender and family, and domestic labor in comparative perspective. Her previous work on housework was published in the *European Sociological Review* and the *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*.

Daniela Grunow is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and Associate Fellow at the Center for Research on Inequalities and the Life Course, Yale University. She is recognized for her cross-national comparative research on gendered employment careers and on changes in the domestic division of housework. Her PhD
dissertation, *Convergence, Persistence and Diversity in Male and Female Careers*, was awarded summa cum laude and published in 2006 (Barbara Budrich Publishers).

Sanjiv Gupta is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is known for his research on the effects of changes in marital status on the division of domestic labor in the United States, and on the relationship between women’s earnings and their performance of housework. This work appears in *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *Social Science Research*, *Feminist Economics* and *Gender and Society*. His current research interests include socioeconomic disparities in the allocation of unpaid time.

Johannes Huinink is Professor of Sociology at the University of Bremen, Germany. He is recognized for his research on life course issues, family formation, and social structure. Since 2004, he has been the Project Director of the Priority Program “Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics in Germany” of the German Science Foundation. Together with Alexander Röhler, Huinink published *Liebe und Arbeit in Paarbeziehungen* ([Love and Work in Intimate Relationships], 2005).

Magnus Nermo is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, Sweden. His main research interest is gender stratification and segregation in western societies. Publications include studies of occupational gender segregation and the gendered division of paid and unpaid labor in *European Sociological Review*, *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *European Societies*, and *Work and Occupations*. He is a fellow of the Stanford Center for the Study of Poverty and Inequality.

Birgit Pfau-Effinger is Professor of Sociology and Co-director of the Centre for Globalisation and Governance at the University of Hamburg. She is recognized for her comparative research on family policies, gender arrangements, women’s labor force participation, and child care and elderly care in European societies. She had a leading role in several European research programs and received research grants from the European Science Foundation, the European Union, and the German Research Foundation. Her publications include 14 books and more than 90 scholarly chapters and articles in journals such as *British Journal of Sociology*, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, *Environment and Planning A*, *European Societies*, *Journal of Social Policy*, and *Work, Employment and Society*. 
**Karl Alexander Röhler** is research fellow at the Gender Studies Program, University of Aachen, Germany. His research focuses on work and gender, emotions, and qualitative methods. He is particularly interested in the division of housework and interaction processes in couple relationships. With Johannes Huinink, he published a comparative study *Liebe und Arbeit in Paarbeziehungen* ([*Love and Work in Intimate Relationships*], 2005), which examined the interrelation between love and housework in married and unmarried couples in Germany.

**Liana C. Sayer** is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Ohio State University. She is an expert in gendered time use, with recent work focusing on cross-national and historical variation in women’s and men’s time use patterns, subjective perceptions of time, and how time use influences individual and family well-being. Her research has documented narrowing gender differences in employment, housework, and child care time, but widening gender gaps in the availability and quality of leisure time. Sayer’s work has been published in *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *Social Forces*, and *American Journal of Sociology*.

**Judith Treas** is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for Demographic and Social Analysis at the University of California, Irvine. She is widely recognized for work on gender, families and the older population. With the support of the National Science Foundation, her research in recent years has addressed gender inequality in couples’ lives, particularly their division of household labor and outsourcing of domestic chores. In addition to *The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of the Family* (coedited with Jacqueline Scott and Martin P.M. Richards, 2005), she has published more than 80 chapters and articles in *American Sociological Review, Social Forces, Journal of Marriage and Families*, and other journals.

**Tanja van der Lippe** is Professor of Sociology of Households and Employment relations at the Department of Sociology and Research School (ICS) of Utrecht University. Her research interests are in the area of work–family linkages in Dutch and other societies, for which she received a number of large-scale grants from the Dutch and European Science Foundation. She has published extensively on the division of labor between spouses, time use, and time pressure in a comparative way, and labor market positions of men and women in western and eastern European countries. Her publications include *Women’s Employment in a Comparative Perspective* (with Liset van Dijk and Aldine de Gruyter, 2001) and *Competing Claims in Work and Family Life* (with Pascale Peters, Edward Elgar, 2007).
CARRIE YODANIS is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. She uses qualitative and quantitative methods to study gender and inequality. Her most recent work examines the institution of marriage across cultures and examines how dominant marital beliefs and practices shape women’s status and well-being within and outside of marriage. Her research appears in a variety of journals including *Gender & Society*, *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *European Sociological Review*, and *European Societies*. 
CHAPTE R ONE

Why Study Housework?

Judith Treas

To understand how married people divide the household work, a wealth of research has examined the characteristics of the husband, the wife, and their household. A keyword search for housework in Sociological Abstracts yields a remarkable 1736 scholarly publications. These studies, however, have focused on single-country cases and usually on the United States. The research has had little of the cross-national comparison that enlivens and informs so much of contemporary sociology. Because “traditional” gender relations and the balance of work–family activities are being challenged to varying degrees from country to country, the time has come to examine how national context affects the very organization of intimate family life. In this volume, leading international scholars take a path-breaking turn away from single-country studies, extending a rich area of inquiry to show how people’s domestic lives are shaped by the country in which they live. The ambitious research by our contributors bridges the micro and macro levels of analysis to demonstrate how social institutions and national cultures penetrate the most intimate aspects of our private lives.

Why study who does the housework? At one time, housework was of little scholarly interest outside the field of home economics, a pragmatic branch of academia dedicated to bringing the scientific efficiency of modern industry to the household (Ehrenreich and English 1978). The study of housework gained broader legitimacy when labor economists observed that men divided their time between market work and leisure, but women also spent time in “home production” (Mincer and Polachek 1974). Whether they produced tidy homes or polite children or buttered biscuits, their household labor contributed to the well-being of their families. Under the banner of the “New Home Economics,” neoclassical economists applauded husband–wife differences in household responsibilities for bringing the efficiencies of economic specialization to the family (Becker 1981). Sociologists also found much to admire in a system that saw men largely in the labor force and women mostly in the home. The most honored American sociologist of
the mid 20th century, Talcott Parsons, argued that the wife’s expressive role within the household complemented the husband’s instrumental one in the market; taken together, they were the cornerstone of a functional equilibrium in the family (Parsons and Bales 1955).

Feminists, however, have long denounced these differences in gender roles as the linchpin of a patriarchal system of inequality that disadvantages women not only at home, but also at work, in politics, and in the broader culture of the society (Budig 2004). For their part, some contemporary social demographers point to women’s “double shift” of housework and paid employment as explaining why so many women think two children are too many (Cooke 2004; McDonald 2000; Torr and Short 2004). Even when employed full-time, wives spend many more hours doing housework than husbands, and they perform the more tedious tasks (Blair and Lichter 1991; Dex 2004). Compared with husbands, wives are more likely to “scale back” their career to prioritize family demands (Becker and Moen 1999; Bielby and Bielby 1989). Although both women and men say that they would like to spend more time with family, it is largely the women who want to work fewer hours (Treas and Hilgeman 2007). Wages are depressed by time spent in child rearing (Budig and England 2001) and in housework (Hersch and Stratton 2002)—or, at least by time spent on “female” chores (Noonan 2001). Family-accommodating careers lead to lower earnings even at midlife (Velsor and O’Rand 1984). The imbalanced division of housework has consequences for health and well-being, too. Perceiving the division of household labor as unfair raises the risk of depression (Glass and Fujimoto 1994). Dissatisfaction with a partner’s contributions to housework decreases marital quality, and it increases marital conflict and thoughts of divorce, particularly for women (Pina and Bengtson 1993; Suitor 1991; Ward 1993).

Couples choose how they will divide the chores, starting from the point when they choose to live with one another (Gupta 1999). Most theorizing about domestic decision making has centered on the way in which the characteristics of husband, wife, and their household shape this decision making (Coltrane 2000). One guiding assumption has been that partners arrive at rational decisions about who will mind the children, cook the dinner, and pick up the dry cleaning. One keen consideration has been whose time is regarded as too valuable for this sort of unpaid work. This determination has usually favored the man, whose job prospects—for a variety of reasons—have exceeded the woman’s. With his valuable time devoted to earning a living, his hours left over for diaper changing and dusting were limited, and this work fell largely to his wife. This general argument is often called the “time availability” explanation for the division of household labor (Shelton and John 1996).

A bigger home may increase the amount of housework required (van der Lippe, Tijdens, and de Ruijter 2004), but it is the arrival of children that
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tends to scuttle any egalitarian intentions and press couples into even greater
gender specialization (Baxter, Hewitt, and Haynes 2008). These consider-
ations point to what has been widely referred to as “demand” (for house-
work) explanations of who does what around the home—albeit a gendered
demand conditioned on cultural ideals about the relation of mothers and
their children. Of course, fertility everywhere has fallen, presumably lower-
ing one source of demand for housework—although the time children them-
selves require does not seem to have declined (Bianchi 2000; Sayer 2005). In
addition, as the value of women’s time in the labor force has increased, they,
too, are working for pay and have less time to mind the house. The upshot of
changes in demand for housework and time availability has been a number
of accommodations. In various countries, these include not only the wife
doing a lot less housework and the husband doing a bit more (Bianchi et al.
2000; Gershuny 2000), but also couples outsourcing more chores to hired
helpers and commercial establishments (Bittman, Matheson, and Meagher
1999; de Ruijter, Treas, and Cohen 2005; Treas and de Ruijter 2008; van
der Lippe, Tijdens, and de Ruijter 2004).

Although rational decision making in the face of shifting opportuni-
ties and constraints is a big part of the story, there is another significant
consideration—namely, personal preferences. Individuals’ attitudes and val-
ues lead them to prefer some sorts of domestic arrangements over others.
Researchers have stressed a distinction between those whose values support
“traditional” versus “nontraditional” gender roles, although, as some of our
contributors suggest, this broad-brush description of preferences is an over-
simplification. Studies show that gender role attitudes tend to line up at least
loosely with the actual allocation of housework (Coltrane 2000), but “tra-
ditional” attitudes are clearly losing ground (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004;
Scott, Alwin, and Braun 1996). There is even some evidence that gender
ideology matters less to housework decisions than it once did (Crompton,
Brockmann, and Lyonette 2005). Furthermore, partners do not necessarily
share the same preferences (Greenstein 1996), which means some element of
bargaining and negotiation enters into decision making about the household
division of labor (Bernasco and Giesen 2000; Breen and Cooke 2005; Youm
and Laumann 2003). In any case, many sociologists regard preferences as
social products that depend to some degree on institutional structures and
cultural traditions.

Gender poses one complication to the tidy logic of rational choices and
predictable outcomes. The outcome of bargaining has long been argued to de-
pend on the comparative clout of the partners, as epitomized by the “relative
resources” explanation for the division of labor in the household (Coltrane
2000). These resource discrepancies may manifest in relative earnings, the
economic dependency of the homemaker on the breadwinner, how credible
divorce threats seem, one’s subjective sense of entitlement, and a host of other
considerations (Baxter and Kane 1995; Breen and Cooke 2005; Brines 1993; 
Major 1993). When it comes to household negotiations, women do tend
to be at a bargaining disadvantage with respect to most of these factors. In
fact, disadvantage compounds from level to level so that gender inequality in
the broader society undermines whatever bargaining power over housework
is derived by the woman from employment-based resources (Fuwa 2004).
Of course, some women make more money than their husbands, and their
numbers are growing (Raley, Mattingly, and Bianchi 2006). Despite their re-
source advantage, these women appear to pay a price, because the husbands
out-earned by their wives defy rational predictions. Rather than doing more
housework so the wife can spend more time in breadwinning, these husbands
have sometimes been seen to do less (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1993).

Although the significance of relative earnings has been questioned
(Gupta 2005, 2007), the paradox of husbands doing less housework when
wives do more paid work brings us to an important idea. Clean laundry,
accomplished children, and savory meals are not the only things produced
in the home. As Sara Berk (1985) famously pointed out, the household is
a gender factory. What economists have called *home production* includes
the manufacture of gender through everyday heterosexual interaction (West
and Zimmerman 1987). In other words, women do housework and men es-
chew housework, in part, to show off the feminine or masculine competence
desirable for their gender. Known variously as the “gender construction”
or “doing gender” explanation, this perspective offers an account of the
relative income paradox in that men who fall short as dominant breadwin-
ners can reassert their masculinity by avoiding “women’s work” around
the house. Gender construction could also explain women's tendency to do
more housework when living with an adult of the opposite sex than when
living with a same-sex adult or alone (Gupta 1999; South and Spizte 1994).
Because gender identity is central to personal identity, it is hardly surprising
that gendered domestic arrangements continue to subvert the most egalitar-
ian impulses. Despite the drudgery, women find things to like about doing
housework and even resist handing off some of this responsibility to men
married women see a 50/50 division of housework as optimal (Thompson
1991). In fact, most wives are quite satisfied when their husband shows he
cares by providing token help with the “woman’s work” around the house
(Sanchez and Kane 1996).

The discussion of what women (or men) want begs the important ques-
tion of why we want what we want. Theorizing in the social and behavioral
sciences has moved beyond paradigms that view us as merely the passive
products of socialization. We are no longer assumed to be captives of our
social roles. Rather, we are seen as reflective individuals capable of resisting imperatives and exercising our human agency to change our lives and re-make our environments. This is a nuanced view that makes explanations of behavior more contingent and problematic, even if there is no denying that we are shaped by our experiences. Take the example of childhood socialization. Growing up with a working mother is associated with more egalitarian housework arrangements in one’s own marriage, but only, it seems, under certain conditions, such as coming from a two-parent family (Cunningham 2001; Gupta 2006).

Certainly our environment constitutes the frame that influences how housework is organized, because it constrains the set of options that are available and, indeed, imaginable to us. “Who washes the dishes” is not just an idiosyncratic, personal arrangement. The behavioral options we perceive are limited by a force field of normative expectations and societal structures that channel domestic activities in predictable directions. This observation points outward beyond the immediate household, because it acknowledges the influence of the broader context in which we live. Although this context surely includes the examples of parents and peers, it also includes pervasive cultural models and taken-for-granted assumptions about men and women, parents and children. These ideals offer handy prototypes for our lives. Studies of housework have only begun to grapple with a host of structural factors that suppress options or make conscious decision making largely irrelevant. Focused on the husband, wife, and household, studies of the division of household labor have only rarely addressed the broader context within which preferences are formed and housework arrangements are worked out. Remedying this omission is the objective of this book.

The contributors to this volume are among the scholars at the forefront of new comparative scholarship on the division of household labor. Indeed, the contributors figure prominently in a representation of this field, which includes Batalova and Cohen (2002); Baxter (1997); Bittman et al. (2003); Cooke (2006); Crompton, Brockmann, and Lyonette (2005); Davis and Greenstein (2004); Evertsson and Nermo (2007); Fuwa (2004); Geist (2005); Gershuny (2000); Hook (2006); Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006); Pfau-Effinger (2004); Treas (2008); and Yodanis (2005).

In Dividing the Domestic, the authors embrace the broader social context to advance our understanding of the division of household labor. Leveraging on country-to-country differences in domestic organization, they systematically relate these country differences in the division of housework to national differences in welfare regimes, social policies, employment structures, cultural expectations, and more. Their chapters not only draw on existing theories of gender, culture, and the state, but they also introduce novel conceptual frameworks for understanding why the household remains
a traditional bastion of gender relations, even as massive social forces of globalization, welfare state retrenchment, and individualism call into question existing relations between citizen and state, worker and employer.

Their frameworks integrate contemporary sociological perspectives, including some seldom applied to the study of domestic arrangements. Feminist critiques, social policy analysis, labor studies, the sociology of culture, and principles of social psychology all find a place in these chapters. Cross-national comparisons demonstrate that the causes of gender specialization in the household cannot be understood without looking beyond the home. As the contributors demonstrate, a full accounting of “who does the housework” includes the complicity of trade unions, state arrangements for children’s schooling, new cultural prescriptions for happy marriages, and other factors specific to particular countries. By identifying the critical conditions that promote or impede gender parity in the family, cross-national comparisons of household labor can also inform policies to advance equality between men and women in society.

This necessarily brief introduction to the previous research on the division of housework sets the stage for a preview of the substantive chapters that define this volume. Drawing on time diaries, cross-national sample surveys, official statistics, comparative policy data, and qualitative interviews, these chapters offer timely empirical descriptions and fresh explanations for the variation in domestic practices observed across countries.

In “Trends in Housework” (Chapter 2) Liana C. Sayer leads off by charting changes in time use for men and women in nine countries in western Europe and North America. Although there are certainly country-to-country differences in the onset and size of changes, time diaries going back 40 years confirm that women have been doing less housework and men have been doing more. In most countries, men are actually doing more of the cooking and cleaning chores that make up the “routine” drudgery of daily life. Despite the remarkable increase in female labor force participation, however, women continue to do the lion’s share of work around the house in all nine countries. Also complicating the picture is the fact that the increase in housework for men has stalled in a number of nations. On the basis of these trends, it is too early to say to whether the gender convergence in time use heralds the dawn of gender equality or the remarkable persistence of female domestic disadvantage.

Marriage, parenthood, and paid employment dictate the demand for household labor, gender-specific domestic norms, and time available to keep house. Thus, as Sayer notes, these three status markers are usually taken as good predictors of the amount of housework someone will do. To be sure, marriage and parenthood increase women’s housework time, and their housework is more sensitive than men’s to being married or a parent. At
At least in some countries, however, these effects and differences are weaker than they once were. Historically, paid employment decreased household labor more for women than men. Recently, the association of housework and employment has become more similar for men and women in four of the nine countries. In Sweden, whether one is a paid worker is now unrelated to housework. In short, not only has time use generally converged between men and women, but there is also evidence that men and women have become more alike in terms of the factors determining their housekeeping efforts. Showing that marriage, parenthood, and employment continue to matter more for women’s housework in conservative countries than in the liberal states and Nordic social democracies, Sayer ushers in chapters that explore the significance of this broader social context for gender and household labor.

Tanja van der Lippe takes up the issue of cross-national differences in female labor force participation with “Women’s Employment and Housework” in Chapter 3. Although female labor force participation has increased across a diverse set of countries, there continue to be marked country-to-country differences in the number of hours women are in paid work. Part-time jobs are common in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, for instance, but not in the United States or southern European countries. Existing theories emphasizing available time, the relative resources of husband and wife, and gender ideology all agree that a wife’s full-time job will decrease her time spent on domestic duties. Prior theorizing on how the institutional context affects the organization of domestic work is less well developed—a fact that motivates this volume.

Building on the Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare regime typology widely used to characterize nations, van der Lippe takes the first step in the direction of theorizing context. As her multilevel analysis of data from the International Social Survey Program confirms, women everywhere do fewer hours of housework when they do more hours of paid work. Whatever their personal circumstances, however, wives in egalitarian Nordic countries (i.e., the social–democratic welfare regimes) devote significantly less time to domestic duties than their counterparts in conservative welfare regimes such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Switzerland. This is consistent not only with Sayer, but also with van der Lippe’s other findings—namely, wives in countries characterized by higher enrollment in child care facilities, higher gender empowerment, and higher gross domestic product spend less time on domestic work. There is much more variation in housework hours within countries than between them, but this analysis leaves little doubt that country context matters for women’s (and men’s) housework.

Although van der Lippe points to systematic differences between welfare regime types, Lynn Prince Cooke (Chapter 4) takes aim at the policy
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differences within regimes that give rise to distinctive divisions of domestic work. National education systems, tax codes, and labor laws may seem far removed from the dishpan or the laundry hamper, but Cooke’s “The Politics of Housework” offers a convincing analysis of how they influence the balance of women’s and men’s time in the home and the workplace. By reinforcing women’s domestic roles, restricting their access to paid employment, or limiting their ability to form independent households, state policies shape the context in which rational decision makers opt for relatively traditional gender relations.

We might expect Australian, British, and American couples to take similar approaches to dividing household labor, because they all reside in English-speaking, liberal regimes emphasizing market solutions over the state’s responsibility for welfare. Cooke’s tour of three liberal countries, however, reveals that they each have distinctive policy packages. Australia buttresses men’s advantages in paid employment, Great Britain encourages women’s responsibility for unpaid household work, and the United States hones to the liberal tradition of minimal state involvement. Not surprisingly, women are twice as likely to work full-time in the United States as in Australia, with Britain falling somewhere in between. In all three countries, women cut back similarly on housework in response to their employment, but nowhere do men truly pick up the slack. Anticipating the chapter by Gupta and colleagues, Cooke links gender inequality with class inequality, observing that husbands and wives with higher incomes have greater parity in their division of household labor.

Lynn Prince Cooke makes a persuasive case for state policies fostering the gendered division of household labor. If policies can sustain the gendered division of housework, can public policies also eliminate this domestic inequality? Chapter 5, “Can State Policies Produce Equality in Housework?,” is the provocative analysis by Shirley Dex. She asks whether equalizing housework is a feasible or even a particularly desirable policy goal. Dex takes the Swedish “Daddy Leave” policy—providing new fathers time off work—as a model with obvious implications for household labor. While endorsing the policy’s strategic focus at a point in the life course when partners may be more open to renegotiating their roles, she nonetheless describes how modest the effects of this state policy intervention have been. Part of the problem is that state policy is only one of many institutional and cultural forces sustaining a gendered division of household labor, a message of complexity that squares with other chapters in this volume.

According to Dex, the best way to equalize household labor between men and women is to equalize their wage rates. This would certainly reduce the incentive for men to specialize in breadwinning while leaving women to manage the home. Compared with the family-friendly initiatives for paren-
tal leave, public child care, and child allowances, governments have shown little interest in bringing men’s and women’s earnings in line with one another. The benefits of women’s higher wages may be evident—higher household income, less economic dependency for women in marriage, protection against impoverishment in divorce, higher old age pensions, and, at least in the United States, health insurance coverage. However, Dex argues, many women—a majority in many countries—are highly invested in their domestic and caring responsibilities. They are apparently content with low-paid, part-time employment, which offers few advancement opportunities, but allows them to meet family responsibilities without major changes in who does the laundry. Dex acknowledges that this may not be the worst situation. Citing time diary studies, she points out that the total hours of paid plus unpaid work are nearly the same for men as for women. In line with the conclusions presented by Liana Sayer, she also observes the gradual convergence in housework time seen for many countries—a growing equality in domestic life that has transpired largely in the absence of state policy interventions.

Chapter 6, “Economic Inequality and Housework,” is a fruitful international collaboration among Sanjiv Gupta, Marie Evertsson, Daniela Grunow, Magnus Nermo, and Liana C. Sayer. Their analysis pioneers a new research agenda on household labor by asking about the socioeconomic inequalities in the housework that women do. Their studies reveal substantial differences between women at the top and the bottom of the earnings distribution in Germany, Sweden, and the United States. This economic inequality in women’s time in housework is greatest in the United States, where women in the bottom 10 percent of the earnings distribution spend a full hour more each day on household chores than women at the top of the distribution. Disadvantaged in so many other ways, low-income women face a more onerous burden in keeping up home and family. Because earnings inequality is also greatest in the United States, this three-country comparison raises the intriguing possibility that macrolevel economic inequality contributes to inequalities in the burden of domestic work. Together with Cooke’s finding that higher income couples in Australia, Great Britain, and the United States achieve a more equitable division of housework, the link between domestic gender inequality and class inequality emerges as an important new direction for research.

Birgit Pfau-Effinger invites a culture turn with Chapter 7, “Cultural and Institutional Contexts.” She advocates using cultural schema to provide a fuller understanding of cross-national differences in the organization of households and, particularly, caring work. Focusing on women with small children in eight European countries, she identifies three dominant patterns based on women’s employment and the use of formal child care. To explain
these behavioral patterns, she turns to four cultural models that embody the prevailing values about gender, children, and relations between the public and private spheres. Welfare state typologies alone fall short of explaining female employment and child care arrangements. For example, we might expect high full-time female employment and high usage of formal child care to characterize the Nordic social democratic states, which excel at public provision of child care. Yet, this pattern characterizes Finland, but not Norway. It also characterizes France, a conservative regime that we would expect to have limited child care usage and mostly part-time work. What unites Finland and France (and postsocialist East Germany, too) is the “dual-breadwinner/external care provider” cultural model wedded to a societal appreciation of gender equality. Although housework differs in some important ways from child care, the cultural approach that Pfau-Effinger develops holds promise for understanding both kinds of work. As she observes, a “servant culture” tradition, which legitimizes using paid housekeepers, offers southern Europeans ways of organizing domestic life that would not sit well with many Scandinavians, whose egalitarian values conflict with hiring low-paid employees to do their dirty work.

Like Birgit Pfau-Effinger, Maria Charles and Erin Cech examine the influence of culture in their “Beliefs about Maternal Employment” (Chapter 8). They are interested in the ideologies of motherhood and the cultural beliefs about children that sustain ideals of full-time maternal care for children in the home. Drawing on surveys for nearly three dozen countries, they demonstrate the cross-national variation in public opinion regarding maternal employment. In Denmark, only 2 in 10 women believe mothers of preschool children should stay home to care for their youngsters, as opposed to 6 in 10 in New Zealand. Even among women who share similar social and demographic characteristics, there are marked country-to-country differences in attitudes. The familiar welfare state typologies help account for some important cross-national differences in women’s attitudes about what mothers should do. In conservative welfare regimes, for example, there is more support for mothers staying home full-time than in social–democratic countries. But analyses also reveal much attitudinal variability within regime types. This within-regime variability maps to differences in national child care provisions and other gender-relevant policies not typically considered by mainstream welfare state scholars. Following Cooke and Pfau-Effinger, the insights of Charles and Cech lend further support to feminist critiques that have called for greater attention to how specific family policy provisions help shape cultural beliefs about gender roles and family patterns.

While the chapters by Pfau-Effinger and by Charles and Cech both focus on culture and motherhood, Carrie Yodanis directs our attention to the
cultural ideals for marriage in Chapter 9, “The Institution of Marriage.” According to Giddens (1992), contemporary marriage is founded on pure, albeit fragile, relationships that champion personal fulfillment and individual gratification. This philosophy represents a radical departure from traditional views of marriage as a practical arrangement for raising children, husbanding resources, and gaining the respect of the community. Although the 20th-century ideal of companionate marriage may have emphasized the institution’s emotional rewards, it deviated from pure relationships, because it also called on partners to subjugate personal desires to the common interest and to a fairly conventional division of labor. Yodanis uses survey data to rank countries on the importance placed on intimacy in marriage. The Americans, Swedes, and Chileans believe intimacy is important to marital success. The Russians, Japanese, and Portuguese are unconvinced. As Yodanis reports, cultures that value closeness and communication in marriage are countries that have greater gender equality in the division of housework. Carrie Yodanis gives us a lively account of the cultural changes undermining the constraints of marriage as an institution while promoting gender convergence on the domestic front.

Johannes Huinink and Alexander Röhler also point to cultural changes in marital ideals. Chapter 10, “Pair Relationships and Housework,” draws from the social psychological literature on pair bonding to construct a typology that relates couples’ emotional ties and their housework arrangements. In affectual–traditional relationships, traditional gender norms determine household behavior. In affectual–associative relationships, partners reject strict gender roles to share housework equally. Last, in highly individualized affectual–pragmatic relationships, housework is organized to advance one’s personal preferences with little or no concern for justice or equality. Huinink and Röhler draw on qualitative data from West and East Germany in a thoughtful comparative analysis of the ways in which a unique historical legacy and contemporary circumstances shape the domestic lives of heterosexual couples.

Important differences emerge between East and West. The egalitarian affectual–associative type is more common in western Germany, especially among highly educated persons. The affectual–traditional type is more widespread in eastern Germany, where it is found in all socioeconomic groups, in contrast with West Germany, where it is mostly a working-class phenomenon. The East–West differences reflect, in part, the postunification persistence of the communal versus individualistic orientations in the two societies. The couple differences are also linked to the practical demands in East Germany, where wives under socialism were expected to work full-time, where postunification hardships continued to require their
employment, and where there was less room than in the West for gender ideology to determine who does the dishes. Ironically, it is the affectual–traditional East Germans, not the affectual–associative West Germans, who display the most egalitarian sharing of housework. As Charles and Cech point out with respect to maternal employment, the differences between East and West Germans demonstrate that social policy regimes can have enduring normative effects.

In Chapter 11, “Men’s and Women’s Reports about Housework,” Claudia Geist turns to cross-national survey data to examine the extent to which men and women agree on how much housework each does and how fair the domestic arrangements are. Research in the United States has observed that married men report doing more housework than women credit their husbands with doing (Kamo 2000). Whether reporting discrepancies hold in other countries is an unexplored question with important methodological implications for cross-national survey analyses. Focusing on the gender gap in reporting, Geist seizes the opportunity to consider gender inequality from a new angle. As she shows, there is an almost universal tendency for men to report more housework hours than women think that their partners do. Women’s own housework reports both exceed and lag behind their partners’ estimations, varying substantially across countries. In countries where the sheer volume of domestic work is high, men tend to underestimate their wife’s housework hours (or women report doing more than they actually do), but women also tend to underestimate their husbands’ hours (or men exaggerate their contributions). Like Huinink and Röhler, Geist considers self-interest in household labor. If, however, men and women inflate reports of their efforts and downplay their spouse’s to gain a strategic advantage in household negotiations, why would this be linked to the volume of work? One possibility is that men are simply less aware of what women do in societies where the burden of housework is the greatest, perhaps because gender roles are more specialized (and hence partner’s responsibilities are poorly understood by the other gender). Or, maybe much housework goes unobserved by the husband when it more closely approximates the adage that “women’s work is never done.”

Rounding off these substantive chapters is the concluding essay by Sonja Drobnič (Chapter 12). To her falls the important task of integrating the research in this volume, and she makes clear that the book is more than the sum of its parts. Focusing on several overarching themes, she demonstrates how they are informed by the research reported in particular chapters. She also points out the new research findings that emerge from the cross-national study of the division of household labor. As our book makes clear, housework remains a strategic site for the study of gender inequality, micro/macros linkages, and cross-national differences.
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The pervasive stylized fact that, across the world, women do more housework than men obscures substantial national differences in gender inequality in housework. Comparative studies indicate the—at first blush—immutable relationship between gender and housework is deeply conditioned by a country’s gender ideologies and opportunity structures (Breen and Cooke 2005; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005). These factors differ because of macrocultural orientations regarding the appropriate interrelationship of family, market, and state (Sainsbury 1999). Recent comparative work indicates that gender differences in housework have diminished over time (Gershuny 2000; Hook 2006), but little is known about cross-national differences in the timing and level of trends in gendered housework and how these are related to economic, demographic, and normative shifts.

Second demographic transition trends, such as delays in union formation and parenthood, narrowing gender differences in education and employment, and eroding cultural support for the once-dominant separate spheres ideology, are evident throughout the western world (Lesthaeghe 1995; McLanahan 2004). These shifts appear to have reduced gender differences in housework. Both country-specific and cross-national trend studies indicate a widespread pattern of men doing more housework and women doing less (Geist 2005; Gershuny 2000; Hook 2006). Nonetheless, conflicting interpretations of whether change among men is meaningful—and whether housework remains emblematic of gendered behavior despite transformed demographic, economic, and ideological environments—have generated vigorous debate.

Proponents of the thesis that women and men are slowly but steadily marching toward androgynous time use emphasize the extent of change rather than contemporary levels of gender inequality in housework. These scholars predict further attenuation of gendered housework because second demographic transition trends mean younger cohorts with more equivalent resources, and expectations of symmetry in adult roles are replacing
older cohorts characterized by more gender-specialized resources, expectations, and time patterns. Continued behavioral change among individuals at all stages of the life course should also occur because of technological advancements and economic disruptions (Gershuny and Robinson 1988). Hence, dissimilarities in women’s and men’s housework should continue to narrow.

In contrast, other scholars juxtapose women’s rapid movement into paid work and continued responsibilities for domestic work against the stubbornly low amounts of men’s housework. These studies posit that the gender revolution in household labor is “stalled” or even reversing, especially when viewed in tandem with plateaus in employment, wage, and occupational gender equality (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2004; Hochschild 1989). The reasoning is that progress toward gender equality is thwarted by the deeply intertwined nature of gendered family processes with extramural gendered institutions that together mutually reinforce the gender division of housework.

The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, because of the pervasive effects of gender within families and societies (Risman 2004). Women’s and men’s housework time is affected both by microlevel characteristics (in particular, family structure, employment, and education) and by macrolevel factors (such as access to education, employment, and political institutions). Hence, gender figures into identities, family interactions, and societal norms and opportunity structures, but the extent of this configuration varies both temporally and spatially. Existing comparative research is limited in shedding light on gender differences in housework, because most is restricted to couples and assesses relative measures of which partner typically does housework tasks, which may be affected by social desirability and introduce bias into comparisons across countries. Research that examines the changing effects of microcharacteristics on housework for all women and men can begin to discern whether trends are the result of alterations in compositional characteristics or cultural swings. Furthermore, demographic trends mean a much greater proportion of women’s and men’s lives are spent living alone, and gender affects individuals whether partnered or solo. Hence, to understand how the gendered division of housework affects other aspects of gender equality, research needs to examine all women and men.

In this chapter, I use nationally representative time diary data spanning four decades from nine western industrialized countries to analyze trends and gender differences in housework. Countries included in the analysis are the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. These comparison countries have diverse time-related outcomes, varied policy environments, and trend data on time use. They can also be grouped into distinct welfare state regimes (Castles...
and Mitchell 1993; Esping-Andersen 1999), with the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia representing liberal, English-speaking, market-oriented states; Germany, France, and the Netherlands representing conservative European states; and Norway and Sweden representing socially egalitarian Nordic states. An extensive literature documents that the welfare regime typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) does not correspond exactly to cross-national variation in gender inequality (see Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1999). However, distinctions among welfare states generally reflect the extent to which policies and programs regulate working hours and promote or inhibit gender-differentiated time allocation and thus offer an appropriate framework for this chapter (Castles and Mitchell 1993; Gornick and Meyers 2003).

The chapter begins by documenting greater similarity in women’s and men’s housework time resulting from declines in women’s and increases in men’s housework. Results point to anomalous patterns of change across welfare state regimes that have produced greater similarity in women’s and men’s housework. However, the data also reveal a consistent cross-national stall among men and continued greater investment of women in housework. Furthermore, the factors that influence the absolute amount of women’s and men’s housework are distinct from those that influence the gender gap in housework. Absolute levels of both women’s and men’s housework appear to flow more from cultural standards of housekeeping and feedbacks between microlevel characteristics and specific state environments, whereas the gender gap in housework appears to be associated more with regime-related work and family policies, and support for gender equality.

A NOTE ON CHILD CARE

An examination of child care time is beyond the scope of this analysis because the focus is gender differences between all men and all women, rather than among parents. Still, child care and housework are clearly related because children add to cleaning, laundry, and meal preparation demands, and child care activities themselves may reduce time available for housework. Studies of trends in mothers’ and fathers’ child care activity time point to two notable findings. First, across western industrialized countries, parents’ primary child care time has increased since 1965, although trends were nonlinear in some countries, such as the United States and France. Second, gender differences in parental child care time have narrowed, because of substantial jumps in fathers’ child care time coupled with smaller increases in mothers’ child care time (Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006; Bittman 1999; Gauthier, Smeeding, and Furstenberg 2004; Gershuny 2000; Sayer, Bianchi, and Robinson 2004). Mothers appear to have preserved child care
Overview

time by reducing housework time, whereas fathers have reallocated time from sleep and leisure to child care activities (Gauthier, Smeeding, and Furstenberg 2004; Sayer 2005). The extent of parents’ reallocation of time to child care activities may be understated, because time diary trend data are activity based, meaning they do not assess time parents spend supervising or monitoring children, nor do they include time with children. The wide-ranging shift upward in parental child care time suggests extensive reconfiguration of cultural standards of parenting toward time-intensive practices (Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006; Gauthier, Smeeding, and Furstenberg 2004). Nonetheless, the magnitude of increases in child care time vary across countries, likely because of diverse work–family policy environments, sociodemographic characteristics of parents, and cultures of motherhood and fatherhood. As discussed later in this chapter, these same contextual and individual factors figure heavily in the story about trends and gender differences in women’s and men’s housework.

Background

Two theoretical explanations of the gendered division of housework predominate in the literature: the economic perspective and the gender perspective. The first emphasizes rationality and the reasons men’s and women’s housework should have changed in response to new economic, demographic, and normative conditions. The second instead emphasizes the resiliency of the gender system and elements that work against change. Scholars who posit additional attenuation of the gender housework gap favor economic/social exchange theoretical explanations; those that emphasize a stalled gender revolution generally favor the gender perspective.

Economic Perspective

Economic models of time use posit that households rationally and efficiently allocate resources to optimize their outputs and utility, commonly through specialization of one partner in paid work and the other in unpaid work. Specialization in certain types of activities is more efficient because it yields greater output, and women generally specialize in unpaid household labor and men in paid market labor because of human capital and biological differences that generate comparative advantages for each in their respective concentrations (Becker 1991). A variant of the economic model is the “time availability” perspective that employment demands—in particular, hours of paid work—affect how much time is “left over” for housework. According to this perspective, employment reduces housework because it sets parameters on time available for other activities (Coverman 1985).
Bargaining models, which are grounded in social exchange theory in sociology and applications of game theory in economics, are based on similar propositions but incorporate the role of power differentials between men and women in determining the division of labor (Lundberg and Pollak 1996). In this view, men’s higher resources from education and employment allow them to get out of housework, not because it is more efficient for them to do market work instead, but because of their bargaining power. Women are generally more dependent on resources provided by men as a result of societal gender stratification and thus may be less able to opt out of less prestigious and perhaps less rewarding unpaid work (Howard and Hollander 1997; Sabatelli and Shehan 1993). Nonetheless, bargaining models assume a gender-neutral process in which either partner, male or female, can use resources to negotiate favorable outcomes.

Historically, women have done more housework than men because socialization practices and physiological differences linked to childbearing worked together to maximize returns to women’s specialization in household work and men’s specialization in market work. Second demographic transition trends—older age at marriage, higher levels of cohabitation and divorce, lower levels of marital fertility—have reduced the benefits and increased the costs of women’s specialization in housework. Women’s increased educational attainment and employment levels should also have strengthened their ability to leverage resources into more favorable bargains about the division of labor. Cultural ideologies have also evolved toward promoting men’s involvement in household labor, further reducing their ability to opt out of housework entirely. Hence, according to the economic perspective, dissimilarities in women’s and men’s housework should continue to narrow.

**Gender Perspective**

In contrast to economic/bargaining models, the gender perspective contends that the division of labor is based on demarcating “men’s” time from “women’s” time (Twiggs, McQuillan, and Ferree 1999). The premise is that the purpose of the gendered division of housework is not efficient production of household goods and services, but the creation and justification of unequal power relations between women and men (Thompson and Walker 1995). In essence, women’s performance of housework is a display of subordinate status whereas men’s avoidance of (most) housework is a display of their structural and cultural power (Brines 1994). Moreover, women’s and men’s socialization, human capital investments, and gendered identities and cultural mores about appropriate adult roles of women and men are embedded in historically and geographically specific gendered contexts.
Overview

An emerging literature using a variety of methods, measures, and samples documents that context matters. Furthermore, the theoretical mechanisms emphasized in the two theoretical perspectives function in tandem. In other words, contextual factors condition both expectations of gendered behavior and gendered processes related to acquisition of human capital and other resources, as well as factors that determine time availability. Gendered assumptions about how employment and household work should be divided between women and men are particularly salient in influencing welfare state variation in the gendered division of housework.

English-speaking or liberal welfare states are characterized by low levels of state support for maternal employment, child care programs, and early-childhood education. State programs are generally need based and residual in nature, and the market provides the majority of family services, such as nonparental child care. Furthermore, the gendered division of labor is thought of as an individual—not a state—concern. There are salient distinctions across English-speaking countries, however, regarding the extent to which each conforms to the prototypical liberal ideology; support for the male breadwinner model; and levels of support for maternity, paternity, and parental leave; child care; and early-childhood programs (Gornick and Meyers 2003).

Conservative welfare states are characterized by the principle of subsidiarity, meaning social support is deemed a family or community responsibility rather than a state responsibility, and entitlements to social assistance are linked to earnings and occupation. Strong norms that young children require in-home maternal care have resulted in modest maternity leave policies for employed mothers of young children, ranging from 12 to 16 weeks of leave at full pay. Conservative countries have inclusive, accessible early-childhood programs, but entitlements to the system are available only for children 2 years of age and older.

Nordic welfare states are characterized by universal and comprehensive state-supported family programs, often created with an explicit goal of reducing gender differences in employment and caregiving. Entitlement programs are linked to social rights, and family and child services are universal, providing cash benefits, paid and job-protected parental leaves, and child care. Nordic countries also have the most generous employment benefits for mothers, and fathers’ care work is promoted by offering specific benefits to them that are not transferable to mothers. These “use or lose” aspects of Nordic programs have increased the rate at which fathers take advantage of these benefits, but their take-up rate remains considerably lower than mothers (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Subsidized child care programs are widely available and accessible. Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, also provide stronger regulations of employment hours and part-time work that
are explicitly motivated by desires to reduce tensions between workplace and family obligations; in contrast, “family-friendly” workplaces policies in conservative regimes are motivated more strongly by concerns with declining fertility (Gornick and Meyers 2003).

Historically, levels of inequality in housework time have varied across western industrialized countries, with less equal housework time in states that favor male breadwinner, female caregiver work and family arrangements (e.g., Germany), and more equivalent time in states that favor either dual-earner arrangements (e.g., the United States) or dual-caregiver arrangements (e.g., Sweden) (Baxter 1997; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Geist 2005).

The effects of marital and parental status, employment, and education also vary cross-nationally. Marriage and children increase the demand for housework because of higher standards of cleanliness and meal preparation. Children also increase laundry loads and the need to tidy up the house more frequently. Historically, marriage and children increased women’s and decreased men’s housework. Currently in the United States and the Netherlands, marriage still increases women’s and decreases men’s housework, whereas in France, marriage increases housework for both women and men, although effects are typically larger for women. Children also increase gender specialization in housework in some countries (France, the United States, Australia), but decrease it in others (the Netherlands) (Bittman 1999; Sayer 2005). One cross-national trend study of men’s housework reports that men do more housework in countries with high levels of maternal employment and availability of parental leave for men, but less housework in countries with long maternal leaves (Hook 2006).

Across countries, more time in employment reduces women’s and men’s housework, because of less available time and more income available to outsource, albeit effects are typically stronger for women. Research reports mixed results about how employment effects vary cross-nationally. Fuwa (2004) reports that women’s employment has a more equalizing effect on housework time in liberal welfare states whereas Geist (2005) finds that employment has more equalizing effects on housework division in conservative countries. Both analyses use International Social Survey Program data, but slightly different specifications of housework, which may account for the different findings. One study also reports that women’s full-time employment has stronger effects on shrinking the gender gap in housework in more egalitarian countries (Fuwa and Cohen 2007).

In sum, research provides support for the economic perspective in that marital and parental status and employment influence women’s and men’s housework time. Research also strongly indicates that the effect of these microlevel characteristics is conditioned on macrolevel factors such as women’s
access to employment, political and economic power, and societal norms about roles for women and men. Discovering how the gender division of housework has changed across welfare state regimes and whether the effects of marriage, parenthood, and employment on housework have attenuated within and across regimes are questions to which this analysis now turns.

DATA

Data are from surveys archived in the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) from the mid 1960s to the early 2000s. The MTUS provides harmonized data files on time spent in paid work, unpaid work (housework, child care, and shopping), personal care, and leisure, with further disaggregations available in some categories. This study focuses on three measures of housework time, each in minutes per day: routine housework (cooking, cleaning, and laundry), nonroutine housework (general house and yard maintenance and repairs, care of adults, pet care, and household paperwork), and the summed time in routine and nonroutine housework. The analytic sample for this study is limited to women and men ages 20 to 49, because of age restrictions in some of the earlier surveys archived in MTUS. Given their prominent role in differentiating historically women’s and men’s time use, the associations of marriage, parenthood, and employment status with housework are of primary interest in the multivariate analyses.

Each study includes a time diary that collects information about all activities that occur in a 24-hour period, when the activity began and ended, where the activity occurred, who else was doing the activity, and, in some countries, other activities that were occurring concurrently. The time diaries were administered using different methods across countries and over time. Studies were administered in different years in most decades, which complicates comparative trend analysis. This chapter takes the tack of reporting data for all available time points and noting when trends track different spans. Methodological differences in sample design and survey administration also raise the possibility that data are not entirely comparable across countries, and scholars differ in their interpretation of whether these differences compromise conclusions about country-level differences in time use (Folbre et al. 2005; Gershuny 2000). In general, methodological studies indicate that recall diaries (such as those used in Canada and the United States) underreport activities of short duration, and hence brief periods of some household activities may be missed. However, estimates of activities that occur on a routine basis, such as cooking and cleaning, have been found to have high validity across different types of survey instruments and methodologies (Juster 1999). The latter type of activities comprises the majority of
housework time and there is no indication that methodological differences vary systematically by gender. Hence, methodological differences should not be a source of significant bias in this analysis. Additional technical details on sample populations and survey administration across the various countries are available online at the MTUS data archives (www.timeuse.org).

**Results**

Table 2.1 shows trends in women’s and men’s routine, nonroutine, and total housework by country. The four liberal countries are presented (the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom), then the three conservative countries (Germany, France, and the Netherlands), followed by the two Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden). Discussion focuses first on change over time in women’s housework, then turns to trends in men’s housework, and then to how the housework gender gap has changed over time and across countries. Results indicate three key findings. First, women’s housework has declined and men’s housework has increased (except in Sweden, where data are available only for the 1990s and 2000s), but the timing and level of change reveal intraregime as well as interregime variation. Second, the gender gap in housework has attenuated, but at high levels. Third, factors influencing absolute levels of women’s and men’s housework are different than those influencing relative levels of housework.

Across all countries, the time women devote to housework has declined. For example, between the 1970s and early 2000s (the time span featuring the largest number of countries), decreases in housework range from about 40 minutes (the United Kingdom, France, and Norway) to 70 minutes (the United States, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Australia is distinct, with a much smaller 21-minute-per-day decline. Contemporary Australian women spend the most time in housework across countries, devoting 219 minutes compared with French women’s 173 minutes and Swedish women’s 100 minutes, the lowest amount of housework of the nine countries. Estimates for the mid 1970s also indicate that Australian women did more housework than other women at earlier time points (but sample and methodological differences between the 1974 and 1997 surveys complicate drawing firm conclusions about Australian trends). Cooke (Chapter 4, this volume) suggests Australian women’s higher housework time results from the combination of the high cost of outsourcing, vestiges of historical employment discrimination against women, and high paid work hours among well-educated men. Furthermore, Australian women’s high housework time is closer to levels in Germany (197 minutes), a conservative state, than to the other liberal states. Canadian, British, Dutch, and Norwegian women spend...
### Table 2.1

Trends in women’s and men’s average daily minutes of housework by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Routine Housework</th>
<th>Nonroutine Housework</th>
<th>All Housework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>156</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>16</td>
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**Note:** Comparing across survey years within gender, estimates in columns with different letter subscripts are significantly different, for example, estimates of nonroutine housework for American women in 1975 and 1985 are significantly different whereas estimates in 1985 and 1998 are not significantly different. Comparing within year, all gender differences are significant except nonroutine housework in the United States 1965, Germany 1965, and the Netherlands 1980, 1990, and 2000.

**Source:** Multinational Time Use Studies, versions World 5.3.2 and World 5.0.0.
about a 1.5 hours per day in housework, with the former two representing liberal states and the latter two representing a conservative and a Nordic welfare state, respectively.

Women shed time in routine cooking and cleaning more than in non-routine household tasks, such as household repairs, animal care, and yard care.Sharper declines in routine compared with nonroutine housework are not surprising, because the majority of women’s housework is spent cooking and cleaning. In France and the Netherlands (both conservative countries), nonroutine housework time also fell 10 to 20 minutes between the 1970s and 2000s. However, in liberal states, nonroutine housework increased about 10 minutes, with higher levels in Australia. The latter is theoretically unexpected and may reflect the higher rates of “singlehood” and thus less availability of a household man to take care of these chores.

Table 2.1 also reveals substantial variation across countries in the timing of women’s declines in housework that reveals as much within-regime as between-regime variation. For example, in Canada and the United Kingdom, two of the liberal countries, steeper declines occurred prior to the mid-1980s, and average housework minutes from the most recent time point are virtually identical to those from the 1980s. In contrast, between the 1980s and 2000s, American women’s housework declined an additional 27 minutes, Norwegian women’s declined 21 minutes, and Swedish women’s declined 67 minutes. Dutch women shed housework in smaller but steady increments (between 8 and 26 minutes each five-year interval), but this pattern could be the result of the closer spacing of the Dutch surveys compared with the longer time spans between surveys in other countries.

Turning to trends for men, their housework time increased between 1965 and 2000, in all countries except Sweden, for which data are available only for the 1990 to 2000 period. Swedish men’s housework declined from 99 minutes per day to 71 minutes per day, with drops in both routine and nonroutine housework. Declines in Swedish men’s—and women’s—housework during the last decade are interesting, because they occurred after technological improvements that reduced time demands for labor and policy tweaks designed to encourage men’s involvement in household labor. Consequently, decreased standards or increased outsourcing may play a larger role in Sweden than in other countries, or women and men in Sweden may be investing domestic time in children more so than in housework.

Increases in men’s housework are more substantial in the liberal and two of the conservative countries—20 to 30 minutes in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France; and 50 minutes in Australia—compared with modest increases of about 10 minutes in the Netherlands and Norway. However, the smaller increase in Norway needs to be examined in light of higher levels of men’s housework there. For example, Norwegian men
Overview

devoted 87 minutes to housework in 1981 and 93 minutes in 2000, compared with Canadian men’s 73 and 86 minutes at roughly comparable time points. Similar to women, contemporary Australian men devote the most time to housework, clocking in at 110 minutes, and Swedish men the least time, at 71 minutes per day (closely trailed by Dutch men at 74 minutes). The current cross-national variation in men’s housework time is starkly different from the historical picture of similarity. For example, in the mid 1970s, men in both conservative and liberal countries alike spent only about an hour a day doing housework. Unfortunately, data earlier than 1981 are not available in the MTUS for the Nordic countries, so whether men there also spent comparable time in housework in the mid 1970s cannot be ascertained.

Historically, men’s housework time was disproportionately spent in the more discretionary, less time-consuming nonroutine tasks (e.g., repairs and yard work). Their lack of involvement in daily cooking and cleaning was interpreted to symbolize greater male privilege in households. Table 2.1 indicates this pattern has reversed in six of the nine countries. In Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Norway, men now spend more time in routine housework than in nonroutine: about 45 minutes versus 30 to 38 minutes in the liberal and conservative countries, and 61 minutes in Norway. In addition, Australian and Swedish men spend about the same time in routine and nonroutine housework: 52 and 58 minutes in routine and nonroutine, respectively, in Australia; and 35 and 36 minutes in Sweden. Increases in men’s housework time were concentrated in routine housework in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Norway, whereas both routine and nonroutine housework increased in Australia and Canada. In Germany, with 1992 as the latest data available through MTUS, men continue to spend more time in nonroutine tasks, but the difference has narrowed from 40 minutes in 1965 (53 minutes in nonroutine compared with 13 minutes in routine) to 19 minutes in 1992 (55 minutes compared with 36 minutes). Hence, more recent data might show more equal investments in routine and nonroutine housework. In the United States, however, the trend data indicate that in 1985 and 1998, U.S. men devoted more time to routine than nonroutine tasks (27 minutes in 1985 and 54 minutes in 1998); but, in 2003, this pattern reversed, with men spending 45 minutes in nonroutine and only 36 minutes per day in routine housework. It is not possible to determine whether this reversal indicates a real change or instead reflects methodological differences between the 1985, 1998, and 2003 U.S. surveys (earlier surveys were conducted by the University of Maryland with smaller samples, the 2003 survey was conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau with much larger samples). Critics of the hypothesis that gender differences in housework have attenuated have pointed to men’s lack of involvement in routine chores as a sign of continued gender inequality, because men were
selectively investing time in more rewarding tasks, leaving women to tend to the less pleasant, routine chores. Excepting the United States and Germany, for which data limitations preclude firm conclusions, results in Table 2.1 suggest that men are relinquishing some male privilege and getting more involved in daily cooking and cleaning. Future analyses of data from the late 2000s on U.S. and German men’s housework should clarify trends in these countries, particularly whether U.S. men are moving against the tide in terms of the gender equality in routine housework.

The sanguine trend of men’s greater involvement in housework belies the fact that the increases have stopped in most countries. In Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—all countries with data spanning the 1980s to 2000s—men’s housework time has not budged significantly since the 1980s, with current levels at about 80 minutes a day. Increases in Norway between 1981 and 1990 were significant but not substantive, with men’s housework moving from 87 to 95 minutes per day. Moreover, in the United States, after topping out at 94 minutes a day in 1998, men’s housework fell to 81 minutes in 2003, only slightly higher than the 76 minutes men devoted to household work in the 1980s. As noted earlier, in Sweden, men’s housework declined 29 minutes (99 minutes to 71 minutes) during the past decade. Hence, men’s greater time in routine housework appears to have come from a reallocation of time from nonroutine housework instead of additional time being spent on household chores.

How have trends in men’s and women’s absolute housework time affected the gender gap in housework? Across countries, women still do more housework than men, but the gap has attenuated substantially. This is shown in Figure 2.1, which presents ratios of women’s to men’s housework minutes by decade and country.

Generally, during the 1970s, women did more than 3.5 times as much housework as men, whereas during the late 1990s and early 2000s, they devoted 1.5 to 2 times as many hours. Unlike absolute levels of women’s and men’s housework, which point to anomalous patterns within regimes, the gender housework gap during the 1990s and 2000s corresponds closely with the welfare state regime typology. It is smallest in the Nordic countries and largest in the conservative countries, with English-speaking countries arrayed in the middle. In 2000, the ratio of women’s to men’s housework time is the same in Norway and the United States, with women doing 1.6 times as much housework as men, compared with a ratio of 2.1 in France and the Netherlands. In Sweden, thought to be the most egalitarian state, the housework ratio is the lowest at 1.4.

In sum, trends shown in Table 2.1 indicate that women’s and men’s absolute levels of housework vary as much within regime as between regime. Among women, housework levels are highest in Australia (a liberal country)
Overview and France (a conservative country); they are lowest in the United States and Sweden, a liberal and Nordic country, respectively. In addition, Australian women spent as much time doing housework in the late 1990s as women in the other three liberal countries did in the 1960s and 1970s, and trends in Norway are more similar to those in the Netherlands than they are to those in the Sweden. Among men, although historical data indicate low housework levels across regime types, contemporary data show that Australian and Norwegian men’s levels are most similar. Furthermore, the largest difference in contemporary levels is found when comparing Australian men with their counterparts in the other liberal states, because Australian men perform the most housework. In contrast, the relative gender gap in housework tracks regime type closely, because it is smallest in the Nordic countries and largest in conservative countries. These results suggest that absolute levels of housework are influenced more by cultural housekeeping standards and country-specific feedback loops between individual and state characteristics, whereas the gender gap may be influenced more strongly by a regimes’ collective embrace of gender equality in time use.

To explore determinants of housework more closely, I estimated a series of ordinary least squares regression models separately for women and men in each country. Pooled models tested whether the associations of marriage, parenthood, and employment with housework changed over time (results available from author). Model coefficients were then used to derive regression-adjusted housework minutes for women and men by country, marriage,
Parenthood, and employment. Results not shown indicate that marriage and parenthood increase women’s housework across regime types, but in three of the nine countries (Australia, the United Kingdom, and Germany), positive effects of both have attenuated. In addition, marriage increases housework less today than in the 1970s in Canada, and parenthood has a smaller effect on women’s housework in the United States. Among men, married men do more housework than single men, except in Australia and Sweden, where marriage is not significant, but effects are modest. Parenthood, however, increases men’s housework only in Sweden.

Figure 2.2 shows regression-adjusted housework minutes by employment status and country for women (the first two sets of bars) and men (the last two sets of bars). The figure shows that, in contrast to marriage and parenthood, which continue to increase women’s housework more strongly than men’s, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, employment reduces women’s and men’s housework time in similar ways in four of the nine countries—the U.S., Australia, Norway, the Netherlands—and, in Sweden, employment has no effect on either women’s or men’s housework. In the United States and Australia, employment depresses women’s and men’s housework by about 70 minutes, whereas in Norway and the Netherlands, employed women’s and men’s housework is about 30 minutes less compared with their nonemployed counterparts.

Figure 2.2. Regression adjusted housework time by employment status and country, 1990s to 2000s.
Results not shown indicate that, historically, employment affected women’s housework more strongly than men’s in the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway (albeit the attenuation of employment effects for U.S. and Norwegian women is not significant). In the remaining countries, employment continues to decrease women’s housework more strongly than men’s. In Canada and the United Kingdom, employed women do about 62 minutes less housework than nonemployed women, compared with the 30-minute or so decline among Canadian and U.K. men. In Germany and France, employed women do about 70 minutes less housework compared with nonemployed women, but German employed men reduced their housework by only 42 minutes and French men by about 28 minutes. Employment exerts less downward pull on Canadian, U.K., German, and French women’s housework in later decades compared with the 1970s in Canada and the United Kingdom, and the 1960s in Germany and France.

Conclusion

In sum, when cross-national changes in women’s and men’s absolute housework time are evaluated, there is less concordance with the liberal, conservative, and Nordic welfare state regime, but when the relative gender gap in housework is assessed, the correspondence is much closer. Data also indicate that levels of housework and timing of women’s declining housework vary cross-nationally. Women in Germany and Australia spend more time doing housework compared with women in all other countries. Germany and Australia have historically favored male breadwinner, female caregiver family arrangements, and housework trends suggest gender specialization in paid and unpaid work remains relatively strong. Housework levels are more similar in the liberal regimes of Canada and the United Kingdom, and Norway, a Nordic welfare state, at about 160 minutes a day, than they are when compared with the United States (133 minutes), the other liberal welfare state, and when compared with Sweden (100 minutes), the other Nordic state. Norwegian men have consistently spent more time doing housework than men in liberal and conservative states, but in 2000, they also spent about 20 minutes more than men in Sweden. Moreover, data from 2000 indicate fairly similar housework allocations among men in the English-speaking countries, France, and Norway, and far less time among Dutch and Swedish men.

Nonetheless, the housework gender gap is smallest in the more egalitarian Nordic countries and largest in the conservative countries, with the gap in English-speaking countries at intermediate levels. The positive association of marriage and parenthood, and the negative association of employment with women’s housework—as well as the gender difference in effects—is
Trends in Housework

generally stronger in conservative countries compared with Nordic and liberal countries. For example, the ratio of women’s to men’s housework is the largest in Germany, with women doing more than twice as much housework, and the smallest in Sweden, with women doing 1.4 times as much housework as men. Multivariate results also indicate that parenthood and employment affect Swedish women’s and men’s housework in more similar ways than their effects in the other countries, in particular when compared with Germany. In addition, although marriage increases Swedish women’s housework and has no effect on Swedish men’s housework, the positive association of marriage on women’s housework is smallest in Sweden. Among the English-speaking countries, marriage, parenthood, and employment are more strongly associated with women’s housework, vis-à-vis men’s housework, in Australia and the United Kingdom, compared with Canada and the United States. Historically, the United Kingdom and Australia have promoted gender differences by instituting regulations and programs that encourage a strong male breadwinner, female caregiver model, whereas Canada and the United States have tilted toward encouraging an earner–caregiver model. Hence, the closer clustering by welfare state regime of the relative levels of women’s and men’s housework (e.g., the gender gap in housework within country) suggests that gender differences in housework are influenced more strongly by work and family policies, and aggregate levels of gender equality. Although exploring policy effects on housework is beyond the scope of this analysis, results point to the importance of policies meant to encourage women’s employment and, perhaps, encourage men to do housework. In contrast, cultural standards of cleanliness and country-specific cross-level interactions between microcharacteristics and macroenvironment may play a larger role in influencing women’s and men’s absolute levels of housework.

In sum, the overall picture is of greater similarity in women’s and men’s housework time, with more progress made on equalizing time investments in Nordic countries. However, trend data also indicate that movement toward comparable time investments in housework has stalled in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway. Women’s housework did not decline significantly and men’s housework did not increase significantly after the mid 1980s in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Women’s housework time decreased through the 1990s in Canada and Norway, but men’s housework did not change significantly after the 1980s. Only in France and Sweden do the data suggest further convergence in women’s and men’s housework time, and if data from the 1980s were available from France, a different conclusion about convergence might be in order. The lack of three time points for Germany and Australia preclude assessing whether further convergence will occur there.
Technological advances, such as dishwashers, clothes dryers, microwaves, and prepackaged food, and increases in the prevalence of “eating out” do appear to play a part in the reduction of women’s unpaid work time in western industrialized countries (Gershuny and Robinson 1988). Data presented here suggest that sociodemographic changes matter, such that declining levels of marriage and later age of marriage and smaller family size have reduced the demand for housework at the same time that increases in women’s employment and education have reduced their available supply of housework time. The environmental context in which microcharacteristics are embedded is also salient. The lack of change in recent decades in English-speaking and conservative countries suggests that further reductions in women’s housework may not be possible without threatening the production of household goods and services necessary to maintain a sanitary, healthy home environment and personal appearance. Thus, additional normative shifts in gender relations that would work to increase men’s housework are necessary. Moreover, although men’s greater involvement in routine housework indicates they have relinquished some of the perks that accrue from “being the man of the house,” trend data suggest all but Swedish men may be reluctant to ratchet up housework to levels equivalent to women’s time investments. Hence, in liberal and conservative states, the gendered nature of marriage and parenthood work together with extrafamilial gendered institutions to mutually reinforce women’s greater and men’s lesser time investments in housework. Although to a lesser extent than the 1970s, gender is still the most potent determinant of who’s doing the housework.

REFERENCES


Overview


PART II

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF HOUSEWORK
At the beginning of the 21st century, women are more likely to have a paid job than to be housewives in almost all industrialized countries, a statement one could not imagine just after World War II. The increased participation of women in the labor market has had clear implications for family life and work at home (Moen 2003; van der Lippe and Peters 2007). Women’s time spent on domestic duties is related to their involvement in paid work, as many studies have shown (Bianchi et al. 2000; Shelton and John 1996). It is likely that men are also affected by the change in labor force participation of women in society, but studies are less conclusive on the effect of women’s working hours on the involvement of men in the household (Davis and Greenstein 2004; Shelton and John 1996).

Despite the overall increase in levels of women’s employment, large differences exist between countries, as has been illustrated in many Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other comparative reports (European Commission 2006; OECD 2006). Given the variety of employment experiences, is the effect of employment for men and women on domestic duties the same in all countries? Although individual characteristics have been shown to be important for hours of domestic work, men and women make their domestic work-related decisions in the country where they live, with its own economy, policy regulations, and culture. For instance, the availability of child care facilities, the economic regime, and the gender culture might influence household decisions of men and women. Although many studies have been performed in single countries, comparative studies of the relation between employment and housework are scarce (Geist 2005) and seldom test the influence of the macro context (Davis and Greenstein 2004). In this chapter we aim to get more insight into the relation between work hours of women and housework hours of both men and women.

The chapter starts with an overview of women’s employment in OECD countries: their participation rates, wage differences, and occupational segregation (including in management positions). After this macrolevel overview,
we continue with an explanation of the influence of women's employment on housework. Both microlevel and macrolevel explanations are combined in one model. Hypotheses are tested using International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data with information on household labor in 33 countries. Institutional data offer a test of whether the effect of women’s employment on household work differs for countries that differ in terms of welfare regime, child care policies, and gender culture.

**Women’s Employment**

The most common indicator used to describe and compare women’s positions in the labor market is the female economic activity rate. Nordic countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, have had higher levels of female labor force participation than other western countries for a long time, as Table 3.1 shows. The Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States and the United Kingdom were runners up, whereas in Italy, only half the active female population had a paid job in 2006. The Netherlands has had a low level of women’s employment for a long time, but recently the number of working women increased sharply. As a result of their communist regimes, which promoted universal employment, the female labor force participation rate in eastern European countries in the 1970s was high compared with western countries, and it remained stable until the transition from socialism. Activity rates of both men and women decreased in these countries, as can be seen in Table 3.1, and they are now among the lowest in Europe. In Japan and Korea, female activity rates have been increasing, but to a lesser extent than in the European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Female activity rates in Mexico remain at a low level. In contrast to women, activity rates of men have remained high and stable during the past 35 years and are fairly comparable between countries.

Despite the overall increase in the level of women’s employment, there are considerable differences between countries when it comes to the number of hours per week that women work for pay. Although part-time work for women is common in European countries such as Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, employed women in Greece, Spain, and Portugal more often work full-time, as can be seen in Table 3.2. In eastern European command economies, part-time work simply did not exist before the political turnover. Almost 20 years later, full-time work is still the rule in the postsocialist countries (van der Lippe and Fodor 1998). Between the Anglo-Saxon countries, differences exist in the part-time rates of women. In Australia, part-time rates are high, whereas in the United States, part-time work for women is an exception. In Japan, many working women appear to have a part-time job. Working part-time is an exception for men
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\begin{array}{lccccccccc}
\text{Country} & \text{1970} & \text{1980} & \text{1990} & \text{2000} & \text{2006} & \text{1970} & \text{1980} & \text{1990} & \text{2000} & \text{2006} \\
\text{Denmark} & 89.5^a & 87.1 & 87.1 & 84.4 & 83.4 & 63.4^a & 75.2^a & 77.6 & 75.9 & 76.7 \\
\text{Finland} & 82.0 & 79.3 & 70.6 & 76.5 & 76.2 & 62.2 & 69.4 & 73.5 & 72.0 & 73.3 \\
\text{Norway} & 80.9 & 84.3 & 83.4 & 84.8 & 81.4 & 51.8 & 62.2 & 70.7 & 76.5 & 74.9 \\
\text{Sweden} & 87.0 & 87.9 & 86.8 & 81.2 & 82.6 & 59.3 & 75.4 & 82.5 & 85.3 & 88.2 \\
\text{Austria} & -- & -- & -- & 79.5 & 80.5 & -- & -- & -- & 62.7 & 66.9 \\
\text{Belgium} & 83.2^a & 73.8^a & 71.3 & 73.4 & 72.7 & 38.7^a & 44.7^a & 46.1 & 56.6 & 58.9 \\
\text{France} & 83.6 & 81.5 & 74.9 & 74.4 & 74.2 & 47.6 & 55.1 & 57.2 & 61.7 & 63.9 \\
\text{Germany} & 89.9 & 83.2 & 81.4 & 78.9 & 81.4 & 46.5 & 51.9 & 56.9 & 63.3 & 68.9 \\
\text{Ireland} & 90.6^a & 84.4^a & 77.6 & 79.1 & 81.1 & 36.1^a & 42.6 & 47.2 & 55.6 & 61.4 \\
\text{The Netherlands} & 80.8 & 77.6 & 79.9 & 83.2 & 81.8 & 31.7 & 36.1 & 53.1 & 65.3 & 69.4 \\
\text{United Kingdom} & 92.1^a & 87.8 & 88.3 & 84.1 & 83.2 & 54.0^a & 62.0^a & 67.3 & 68.9 & 70.3 \\
\text{Greece} & -- & -- & 76.7 & 77.1 & 79.1 & -- & -- & 42.6 & 50.0 & 54.9 \\
\text{Italy} & 80.2 & 79.0 & 75.1 & 74.3 & 74.6 & 28.6 & 38.4 & 44.0 & 46.3 & 50.8 \\
\text{Portugal} & 88.0 & 87.1 & 82.8 & 74.6 & 79.5 & 48.1 & 52.5 & 59.6 & 63.8 & 68.4 \\
\text{Spain} & 87.9 & 86.4 & 81.3 & 80.4 & 82.5 & 32.3 & 32.9 & 42.2 & 59.1 & 61.1 \\
\text{Czech Republic} & 83.5^a & -- & -- & 79.4 & 78.3 & 68.0^a & -- & -- & 63.3 & 62.3 \\
\text{Hungary} & -- & 84.8^a & 73.9^a & 67.5 & 68.7 & -- & 60.1^a & 61.3^a & 52.6 & 55.5 \\
\text{Poland} & 82.9^a & -- & -- & 71.7 & 70.1 & 68.0^a & -- & -- & 59.9 & 56.8 \\
\text{Turkey} & -- & -- & -- & 76.9 & 75.5 & -- & -- & 35.9 & 27.9 & 26.7 \\
\text{United States} & 87.3 & 85.8 & 85.6 & 83.9 & 81.9 & 49.3 & 59.9 & 67.8 & 70.7 & 69.3 \\
\text{Canada} & -- & 85.8 & 84.9 & 81.9 & 82.2 & -- & 57.4 & 68.4 & 70.4 & 73.5 \\
\text{Australia} & 89.9 & 86.7 & 85.3 & 82.5 & 82.8 & 45.1 & 52.0 & 61.8 & 65.4 & 69.0 \\
\text{New Zealand} & -- & -- & -- & 83.4 & 83.3 & 85.1 & -- & -- & 63.2 & 67.5 & 71.4 \\
\text{Japan} & 84.7 & 84.3 & 83.0 & 85.3 & 84.8 & 53.4 & 52.5 & 57.1 & 60.0 & 61.3 \\
\text{Korea} & -- & 79.4 & 76.2 & 77.1 & 77.8 & -- & 46.3 & 49.9 & 54.4 & 54.8 \\
\text{Mexico} & -- & -- & -- & 84.7 & 84.2 & -- & -- & -- & 40.9 & 44.5 \\
\end{array}
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OECD employment outlook for several years (www.OECD.stat).

\(^a\) Year nearest to the year under study.

\(^b\) Not available via employment outlook.
in nearly all countries, as can be seen in Table 3.2. Only in Norway, the Netherlands, and Australia more than 15 percent of the working men have a part-time job.

Despite the increasing number of women in the labor market, women still have fewer managerial positions and earn less than men. This is especially the case in Japan and Korea, as Table 3.2 shows. Also, in western European countries, women are overrepresented in jobs with lower wages, and they have less authority in the workplace than men (Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund 1995). Only in the United States are there nearly as many female managers as male managers. This figure goes along with the high full-time labor force participation rate for American women. Although in Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden high participation rates of women

### Table 3.2

**Employment characteristics of men and women**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Part-time rates, 2005 (percentage of employment)</th>
<th>Female Administrators and Managers (%)</th>
<th>Gender Gap in Earnings, 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Gender Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8.5a</td>
<td>20.8a</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*aYear nearest to 2004–2005.

*bNot available.
also exist, women are less visible in executive positions in these countries (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). In eastern Europe during the socialist era, the gender gap in earnings, as well as the difference in authority levels, was substantial but not as large as in western European countries (van der Lippe and Fodor 1998). The current differences in eastern Europe are similar to those in western Europe.

Probably the most striking resemblance between all countries is the fact that regardless of women’s position in the labor market, women remain responsible for the family (Fuwa 2004). Regardless of their employment status, women still do more housework than men (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny and Robinson 1988). Of course, as we have seen, women do not participate in the labor market at such high levels as men, and they often have part-time jobs. However, when they have full-time jobs, their domestic workload still tends to be heavier than that of men. This was even the case during the socialist period in eastern Europe, when both men and women were working full-time. Given the variety of female paid employment figures in countries, and the cultural and economic differences between countries, one may expect that there will be differences between countries in the relation between paid and household work.

The Influence of Women’s Employment on Household Work

Microlevel Explanations

A rich body of literature is available on the influence of females’ paid work on men’s and women’s allocation of domestic time. Although housework and paid work are decided upon simultaneously according to the economic literature, this chapter assumes that paid work is influencing domestic work. According to the existing theories in the field—available time (Bianchi et al. 2000; Shelton and John 1996; Stafford, Backman, and Dibona 1977), human capital and relative resources (Becker 1981; Coltrane 2000; van der Lippe 1994), and gender ideology (Perrucci, Potter, and Rhoads 1978; Shelton and John 1996)—a wife’s full-time job would decrease her time spent on domestic duties. Less time is available for household work when a woman is employed, and presumably her time has become more valuable in the labor market anyway. Not only does a wife’s full-time job affect her own household work, but her husband’s household work will also be influenced. Because the wife is less available at home, more tasks need to be performed by the husband. Working full-time increases her human capital in the labor market, which will indirectly increase the husband’s time in the household. Women’s employment would make them less economically dependent on their husbands, and this leads to less domestic work by the wife and more
by the husband (Brines 1993). Having a full-time job would go hand in hand with more egalitarian norms, resulting in less domestic work by the wife as well. Moreover, when the wife has a full-time job, egalitarian gender norms will direct the husband to do household duties. Doing gender perspectives argue, though, that household duties are perceived as “women’s work,” so that the effect of full-time paid work of women on male participation in household work might be less than expected. Although most research has focused on testing these individual-level explanations, one cannot assume that these mechanisms studied in single-country cases are similar in other countries (Geist 2005). It can be expected that these mechanisms on the individual level differ between countries, implying the need for a test of cross-national differences.

**Macrolevel Explanations**

Theory formulation on the influence of the institutional context on individual choices tends to use a typology of welfare regimes, the behavior of individuals being influenced by different types of welfare states, with different features and characteristics that more or less exclude one another. The most familiar typology for capitalist countries is undoubtedly that of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1998). This typology holds that countries can be classified by their degree of “decommodification” (the extent that social insurance has become a right) and the way in which solidarity between citizens takes shape. Other typologies base their classification of different institutional contexts on the degree of gender equality in paid and unpaid labor (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993) or on the basis of culture (Hakim 2003).

In this study we use the typology of Esping-Andersen, albeit somewhat adjusted. Research indicates that this typology is a fair predictor of a multitude of behaviors of men and women in the labor market (van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002) and at home (Geist 2005). According to the Esping-Andersen typology, the Scandinavian countries belong to the social–democratic cluster, which is characterized by widespread government services to assist families in caring for their dependents, equal rights for men and women, and major support to ensure everyone a livelihood. There are few limitations on women spending a lot of time in the labor market. The conservative cluster contains a group of western European countries, like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. In this type of welfare state, the male breadwinner ideology is central, there are tax incentives aimed at promoting motherhood, and the costs of women participating in paid labor are usually high. These high costs are usually visible through tax policies or a lack of public child care. The third type of welfare state is liberal, like England and the United States; men and women are perceived as equal in these welfare regimes, but the government is passive when it comes to facilitating women’s
paid labor. For Europe, we add another two clusters (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Ecorys 2005): a Mediterranean cluster that is strongly family oriented and where there is little government intervention; and a postsocialist cluster, where full-time work for men and women has been central. In general, it is found that men’s housework hours increase in postsocialist countries when both spouses have a paid job, although the results by Davis and Greenstein (2004) show contrary findings. They find that families in Poland and Slovenia have a more equal division of housework than in the United States, whereas couples in Russia have a less equal division of tasks. Because we have data for Asian and Latin American countries available as well, we include an Asian and a Latin American cluster.

Although it is possible to formulate hypotheses on the influence of the welfare regime on housework (Geist 2005), it is more difficult to formulate hypotheses on the influence of paid labor on housework hours for the welfare regimes. Is it, for example, mainly cultural differences between the countries that influence men’s and women’s cost–benefit considerations relating female’s paid work to their participation in housework? Or, do such considerations take place under the influence of the (often insufficient) child care provisions?

To examine how regimes play out in the relation between women’s paid and unpaid labor, we need to go to the underlying dimensions of the welfare typology. Here we will focus on three indicators of the typology—namely, the culture, economy, and policy. A more equal division of paid work and housework is encouraged more in some countries than in others. In Denmark, for example, it is common for men to help with housework, whereas in Spain it is odd for a man to be involved with the housework. Gender culture is reflected both by the prevailing gender belief, and by the social and structural conditions in society (Fuwa 2004). With respect to gender culture, we will focus on the structural integration of women in society. The extent of gender differences in educational attainment, wage rates, career trajectories, and political power indicates the inclination of structural integration of women in society. With more structural integration, men will spend more time on housework and women will spend less time on housework. Furthermore, the effect of employment of wives on domestic hours of husbands can be expected to be higher in countries with more structural integration of women. Men will tend to do relatively more housework. We are also inclined to believe that women benefit with respect to their time spent in domestic duties from working full-time in countries with more structural integration of women. Studying differences in cohabitation and marriage, Batalova and Cohen (2002) argued that a more progressive gender culture would lead to a more equal division of housework when people cohabit before marriage. They found that even people who did not cohabit before
marriage have a more egalitarian division of labor if they live in countries with a progressive gender culture.

With respect to institutional conditions, our focus lies on a crucial feature of social policy: the attention given to child care in a country. This type of social policy facilitates favorable conditions for women in terms of their time use in the labor market (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1998; Stier, Lewin-Epstein, and Braun 2001). We are referring specifically to public child care facilities. When ample child care facilities are available, it becomes less of a problem for mothers to work full-time. They do not worry about their children when they are at work, and they are able to spend less time on housework than if their children were home during the day. So we expect that in countries where the public expenditures on child care are large, full-time working women will do fewer domestic duties. Men might react by performing more housework, but also by doing less because household tasks can be outsourced using the working wife’s earnings (Treas and de Ruijter 2008).

With regard to the influence of economic circumstances, we expect that in countries with highly developed economies—manifest, for example, in a high gross national product—full-time working women are able to outsource their domestic duties more than in countries with a lower gross national product, and so they will spend less time on domestic work. Their husbands do not need to spend more time on housework either.

DATA

The 2002 Family and Changing Gender Roles III module from the ISSP is used for analysis (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung 2006). The ISSP is a cross-national collaboration that focuses on important social issues in various domains each year. The annual program in 2002 covers attitudinal measures about family values, gender ideology, life and job satisfaction, as well as behavioral measures about number of hours devoted to household labor and the labor market. The original questionnaire is translated and fielded independently by local research institutes across 33 countries. We focus in this chapter on married couples between 18 and 65 years, because we are interested in the effect of female employment hours on males’ and females’ housework. After removing cases with missing values on key variables, we are left with a sample of 21,458 respondents.

The dependent variable, housework, is measured using the question: On average, how many hours a week do you personally spend on household work, not including child care and leisure time activities? Unlike many other studies, we focus only on strictly domestic duties and not on caring activities, which are not addressed in the ISSP. Paid work by women is measured by the number of hours worked per week. The control variables at the individual
level are hours of paid work by husband, male and female education, age, household income, and the presence of young children ages 0 to 5 years and 6 to 17 years. Gender ideology is measured using the following four items:

1. A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
2. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
3. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.
4. A man’s job is to earn money; a women’s job is to look after the home and family.

All the indicators are presented on a 5-point scale, with higher scores indicating that the respondent has a more egalitarian gender ideology. Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74 shows satisfactory internal consistency of the scale. As one may note, many of these control variables are also used in common explanations of housework.

The welfare regimes are measured with seven clusters: the conservative (Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland), social-democratic (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), liberal (United Kingdom, United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia), Mediterranean (Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Greece), postsocialist (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Russia, Latvia, Slovenia), Asian (Japan, Philippines, Taiwan), and Latin American (Mexico, Brazil, Chile). For child care, we used the enrollment of young children (age 0–2 years) in child care (World Education Forum, 2000; Kamerman, 2000). Structural integration of women in society is measured by the gender empowerment measure (GEM)—a summary measure of the general macrolevel inequality, particularly in economic and political life. The GEM is an index obtained from the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (2006). This index increases as the following four measures increase: (1) women’s percentage share of parliamentary seats; (2) women’s percentage share as legislators, senior officials, and managers; (3) women’s percentage share as professional and technical workers; and (4) ratio of women’s to men’s earned income, with a higher value reflecting a higher level of gender equality at the societal level. We start the analysis by explaining the cross-national differences between macrolevel indicators and household work before turning to the testing of the macro differences.

RESULTS

Cross-National Variation in Housework

The welfare regime of the country where men and women live is related to the time spent on housework (Table 3.3). Women in Latin American countries spend a lot of their time on domestic duties compared with the other
countries. In social–democratic and liberal countries, they spend less time on housework. For men, a comparable picture shows up. In Latin American countries, they spend much time on domestic work; in western regimes, less. In social–democratic, liberal, and Mediterranean regimes, tasks are more equally divided between husbands and wives than in the other regimes. Remarkably, Asian countries (known for their traditional culture) are where men spend more time on household duties than women. This might be caused by other factors not controlled for in this bivariate analysis.

The other three macrolevel indicators show a clear connection to domestic work as well. When child care enrollment is high, women spend less time on housework. One may imagine that it is easier also to spend less time on domestic duties when children are cared for by others. For men, it seems to be important that there is some child care, but not too much; they spend more time on housework when child care enrollment is in the middle range than when child care enrollment is low or high. As with the other indicators, child care enrollment might stand for another macrolevel indicator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Husbands</th>
<th>Wives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social–democratic</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsocialist</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child care</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender empowerment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid work by wives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 hours/week</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–24 hours/week</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–35 hours/week</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;35 hours/week</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 21,458
Source: ISSP 2002
Ample child care facilities often go hand in hand with a gender egalitarian culture and high economic development. We tried other measures of child care provisions, such as the availability of child care for young children, but the results do not change. The explanatory analyses described later will show whether, indeed, the effect of child care enrollment remains, controlling for other factors. A high GEM, indicating the structural integration of women in society, is clearly related to less domestic duties for both men and women, and the same can be said for high economic development. With respect to the GEM, the differences in domestic hours between a low and high GEM seem to be larger for men than for women. With respect to the gross domestic product (GDP), the housework hours differences seem to be larger for women.

**Paid Work of Women and Domestic Work of Men and Women**

Our main interest is in the relation between paid work of women and time spent on domestic work. In the second half of Table 3.3, this relation is shown. Women in the countries studied spend less time on domestic work when they have a paid job. Having a paid job is more important than the number of hours they spend on their paid job. If they do not have a paid job, they spend 28 hours a week on domestic work; if they work full-time (35 hours or more weekly), they spend 17 hours on domestic work. The housework time of the husband is much less related to the hours their wives spend working. When wives do not have a paid job, husbands even tend to do more in the household. Of course, this could also be caused by other factors, such as the presence of children in the home.

To give more insight into cross-national variation in the relation between paid work and domestic work by women, Figure 3.1 shows this relation for different welfare regimes. In liberal, social–democratic, and Asian regimes, the more time working wives spend on paid work, the less time they spend on housework. In the other regimes, the largest difference is found between housewives and working women, rather than between working women employed different numbers of hours. Furthermore, housewives in Mediterranean and in Latin American regimes spend the most time on housework. Although not reported in a separate figure, husbands are less influenced by their wives’ employment. For example, partners in liberal, social–democratic, and Mediterranean regimes spend as much time on housework when the wife has a full-time paid job.

**Micro and Macro Context: Multilevel Analyses**

Multilevel analyses, during which we control for the fact that individuals are nested within countries, are needed to show whether the results remain when we control for other variables (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Analyses are
performed separately for husbands and wives. We first test a model without variables to show how much variance exists in housework at the individual and country levels. The second model includes the individual indicators; the third model adds the macrolevel regime variable. We also report our results with the other macro indicators, but without showing a table. Because of the small number of countries, complicated models with many macrolevel variables are not feasible. Individual coefficients change only slightly when different macro variables are entered. The results are shown in Table 3.4.

There clearly exists cross-national variation in hours of housework for husbands and wives. The variance components indicate, however, that there is much more variance at the individual level than at the country level. For husbands, only 10% of the variance in housework hours \([74.37/(651.38 + 74.37)]\) is the result of variance between countries; for wives, this figure is nearly 18%. In other words, there is much more individual variation in domestic work within countries, perhaps resulting from differences in family circumstances, educational levels of spouses, and gender ideologies, than there is variation in domestic work between countries.

**The Influence of Microlevel Indicators**

First, let us turn to the amount of paid work by wives. As we might expect, hours of paid work have a strong negative effect on their time spent on housework. The more time wives spend in the labor market, the less time they have available for domestic work. Although we do not report the results,
we also have performed an analysis for which we studied full-time and part-
time working wives compared with nonworking wives. Full-time work has
a large negative effect on the number of housework hours compared with
the nonworking wives, but part-time work also has a negative effect on their
domestic hours.

For husbands, the wives’ working hours have less effect. Whether the
wife has a full-time paid job is hardly of any importance for the husband’s
housework hours. The other way around, the amount of paid work by the
husband positively influences the time the wife spends on domestic work.
Again, it is not related to the husband’s own housework time. So absolute
housework hours by females are influenced by their own and male paid
working hours, but for husbands’ housework hours this is not the case. In
a further analysis with the relative share of housework by husbands as the
dependent variable, hours of paid work by the wife do have a positive effect

### Table 3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Husbands (1)</th>
<th>Husbands (2)</th>
<th>Husbands (3)</th>
<th>Wives (1)</th>
<th>Wives (2)</th>
<th>Wives (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours paid work, women</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours paid work, men</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04**</td>
<td>0.04**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, wife</td>
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<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-1.20**</td>
<td>-1.12**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, men</td>
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<td>-1.07*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children age &lt;6 y</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>1.64*</td>
<td>1.58*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children age 6–17 y</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.54**</td>
<td>1.45**</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian norms</td>
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<td>-1.20*</td>
<td>-1.45**</td>
<td>-1.34**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>Institutional level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative (reference)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1.30</td>
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<td>-2.57</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-4.11*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.24</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3.42*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12.50**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.44**</td>
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<td>21.99**</td>
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</tr>
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Source: ISSP 2002

* p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
on the husband’s share; hours of paid work by the husband has a negative effect. But, of course, this is a relative measure.

Nearly all the other indicators at the micro level are important for wives. Egalitarian norms lead to less domestic work for women, and family status also has a significant influence. Younger children increase the amount of domestic duties, an effect we find only for wives. As is the case in many other studies, men’s behavior is influenced less by individual and family characteristics. Our analysis forms no exception.

The Influence of Macrolevel Indicators

The effects of microlevel indicators do not change much when the macrolevel indicators are included in Table 3.4. However, the macro indicators do explain some of the variation at the micro and the macro levels. The regime indicator gives some interesting results. Wives in social–democratic countries spend significantly less time on domestic duties than their counterparts in conservative countries. For men, there is variation in domestic duties only in the countries not belonging to Esping Andersen’s original typology. In Mediterranean, postsocialist, Latin American, and Asian countries, men spend more time on housework than in conservative countries. These results support the report by Geist (2005), who did not find many differences between liberal and social–democratic welfare regimes in the domestic division of labor.

Analyses have been conducted for the other macro indicators (results not shown). As expected, wives in countries characterized by high enrollment in child care facilities, higher gender empowerment, and high GDP spend less time on domestic work. For husbands, high levels of gender empowerment and GDP also have a negative effect on their time spent on housework. This is not what we would have expected, especially not for the GEM. As an indicator of structural integration, the GEM should lead to more time on housework by men! We have studied other more cultural indicators of gender culture, such as the percentage of all respondents who voiced support for full-time employment by mothers with preschoolers. This more cultural indicator shows no conclusive effects. More important, in an analysis with all macro indicators, only the effect of the GEM remains statistically significant for wives; for husbands, both gender empowerment and GDP are significant.

Interactions between Macro and Micro Contexts

Last, we studied interactions between the individual level of hours worked by the wife and the macrolevel indicators. Although Geist (2005) reported that women in conservative countries experience greater gender parity for specific household tasks with each additional hour worked than their coun-
terparts in liberal and social–democratic countries, we were not able to replicate the findings for hours of housework. The GEM does not interact with hours of paid work, implying that the effects of wives’ working hours on their housework do not differ between more or less structural gender equality in society. Fuwa (2004) and Geist (2005) do find effects of the GEM on housework, but this might be the result of the fact that they use a task measure, whereas an hour measure is used in this chapter. For the other two macrolevel indicators, we do not find significant interactions either. For husbands, the effect of the wife’s hours of paid work on the husband’s domestic duties becomes less negative when there is high child care enrollment. This implies that husbands tend to spend more time on domestic duties in high child care enrollment countries compared with husbands who have their partner working in a country with less child care facilities. This is an unexpected finding, but note that we are only focusing here on domestic work and not on child care. Having ample child care facilities in your neighborhood might free up time for housework, because child care can be outsourced. Also, children who are in child care facilities are not at home creating messes that must be cleaned up.

**Conclusion**

During the past few decades, women’s employment has been increasing in nearly all OECD countries, although the number of hours women are working in the labor market still differ quite a lot between countries. Women have fewer managerial positions and earn less than men all over the world, although these differences between, for example, the United States and Japan are huge. Just as there are marked differences in women’s employment patterns from country to country, our analysis shows that there are cross-national differences in hours of housework. Studying the relation between paid work hours and housework hours in various countries, we can conclude that the paid work of wives has a negative influence on their time spent on domestic duties, but its significance differs between countries. Especially in Mediterranean and Latin American countries, the differences in housework hours between full-time housewives and full-time working wives are large. In liberal and social–democratic countries, fewer differences in housework hours exist between these two groups of women. Surprisingly, a wife’s paid hours have little or no influence on her husband’s hours of housework in the 21st century. Although bivariate analyses suggest that husbands do more housework when their wives work full-time, these effects do not hold in multilevel analyses that control for individual- and country-level characteristics. These results show the importance of studying the absolute volume of housework hours. Although researchers in the field (Batalova and Cohen
2002; Geist 2005) argue in favor of studying the share in housework, the insensitivity of the husband’s housework to female working hours would not be apparent when studying only the housework share. The observation that the determinants of absolute and relative housework differ also corresponds with results that Sayers reports in Chapter 2. Perhaps a longitudinal design is needed, because men are showing larger increases in domestic work in successive years in response to changing employment patterns in the household (Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice 2005).

Our analysis is not conclusive regarding which of the macrolevel indicators is most important in explaining housework hours of husbands and wives. Structural integration of women in society seems to have the strongest direct effect on housework hours. Similarly, Batalova and Cohen (2002) showed the importance of a gender egalitarian culture for a more equal division of household labor. More research is needed to come up with more definite answers. We argue that it is therefore necessary to collect more precise macro indicators—cultural, economic, and policy related—to gain better insight into the influence of country characteristics. Moreover, because of the limited number of countries, regional variation in macro indicators might be useful to include in subsequent analyses of housework.

In this chapter we did not pay attention to the demand side of the labor market. Paid work by wives is viewed as a given. However, cross-national variation can exist in the demand for female labor force participation, drawing women out of the home and away from housework. New analyses need to study the relation between the demand and supply of paid labor by wives, because this may help us to understand the division of housework between husbands and wives. As a result of data limitations, child care by parents is also excluded from the analysis. A fuller accounting of gendered labor in the home would need to understand whether individual- and macro-level indicators affect child care in the same way as housework. Housework tends to consist of different flexible tasks, most of which can be performed at one’s own chosen hours and moments of the day and the week, whereas child care consists of much less flexible tasks, with the timing driven by children’s needs and school schedules. Although we would expect that the wife’s employment would be negatively associated with her time in child care and housework, it seems likely that child care rendered by the husband might be more responsive to the wife’s work than his housework has been shown to be. And, although we have speculated that countries with high child care enrollments permit men to do more housework because they do less child care, this macrolevel mechanism invites an empirical test.
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Love occurs in context, yet the dominant theories of how couples divide up housework model the interactions between two adults as if they occurred in a social cocoon. For example, bargaining or social exchange theories focused on the power derived from paid work and predicted women’s increasing employment would lead to men performing more domestic tasks.\(^1\) However, an increase in men’s domestic share during the past decades stems primarily from the dramatic decline in women’s housework hours, not substantial increases in men’s.\(^2\) The persistence of the gendered division of housework regardless of a woman’s employment supports the gender perspective that our daily activities reflect and reinforce normative expectations of masculine and feminine behavior (West and Zimmerman 1987). These normative expectations vary across social classes or ethnic groups, as well as across countries, reflecting gender regimes (Connell 1987) or cultures (Pfau-Effinger 1998). Norms also evolve over time, albeit more slowly and less spectacularly than we had first anticipated. In sum, how couples might divide paid and unpaid labor in the household varies across class, ethnic, temporal, and country contexts.

Only recently, however, have researchers begun to explore how couples’ sharing of housework varies within its sociopolitical as well as temporal contexts. This research has yielded somewhat conflicting evidence, in part because theory development linking context with individual behavior lags behind the available international data. Most analyses to date have focused on policy effects on women’s equality in the public spheres such as education, employment, or political representation (Baxter 1997; Fuwa 2004). Equally important and intertwined with equality in the public sphere is whether policies reinforce women’s normative responsibility for the private sphere. In this chapter I outline how a broad range of policies influences women’s access to paid work as well as their continued responsibility for unpaid domestic activities, illustrated with examples from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These three countries are based in

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**CHAPTER FOUR**

The Politics of Housework

*Lynn Prince Cooke*
British common law and share a liberal political ideology vis-à-vis reliance on the market over state provision of welfare, similarities that would lead us to expect common policy effects on the gendered division of labor across them. When comparing specific policies, however, the countries vary more in the degree to which the state shapes gender equality, so that we might find greater variation in how housework is divided within and across couples.

**Housework in Context**

Researchers frequently model the division of housework using time availability for housework measured with paid work hours and/or relative resources measured with absolute or relative wages of the partners. Both approaches predict that women’s increasing labor force participation should have led to a revolution in women’s and men’s domestic roles, a revolution Hochschild (1989) deemed “stalled.” Regardless of employment or earnings, U.S. women increase their housework hours when they move in with a man, whereas men decrease their hours when they move in with a woman.\(^3\) The earliest comparative work reported little cross-country variation in either the gendered division of housework or the effects of relative resources or time availability on altering this division.\(^4\) Despite this lack of significant variation, Baxter (1997) concluded any gains in gender equality in the home would result from women’s greater access to individual resources.

Breen and Cooke (2005) elaborate on this bargaining perspective using game theory to highlight the importance of alternatives to a relationship when deriving relative power in household negotiations. Only when women have economic resources sufficient to ensure their well-being outside of the relationship might they credibly threaten to leave households in which men refuse to participate in housework—a threat that increases their relative bargaining power. Under the normative gendered division of labor, Breen and Cooke (2005) argue, most men assume the average woman in their pool of possible partners has neither the inclination nor resources to leave. Consequently, an individual woman’s relative employment hours or earnings predict only minimal increases in men’s housework. What is necessary before observing greater equality is that the proportion of economically autonomous women must be sufficiently high to change men’s beliefs about what a partner would expect in the domestic sphere, and men must be willing to act on those beliefs to maintain the relationship.

Some recent evidence supports the argument by Breen and Cooke (2005). Fuwa (2004) compared couples’ sharing of domestic responsibilities in 22 industrial and transitional economies, controlling for aggregate country equality differences with the United Nations’ gender empowerment measure (GEM). The GEM includes the percentage of parliamentary seats
held by women; the percentage of women in administrative, managerial, and professional or technical positions; and women’s share of earnings income. Fuwa (2004) found time availability and gender ideology effects stronger or weaker for women in more versus less egalitarian countries, respectively, supporting that greater overall equality enhances the impact of individual resources on the division of housework. Hook (2006), using time diary data from 20 countries over several decades and controlling for the percentage of married women employed, women’s work hours, public child care slots for infants, and weeks of parental leave, found that men over time had increased their total domestic hours (household tasks and child care) by about 6 hours per week. Within this trend, a country’s greater aggregate female employment rate predicted men’s greater time in domestic tasks regardless of his partner’s actual employment. So we are accruing empirical evidence of linkages among policy, women’s employment, and how housework is divided up in the home.

The role of the state in shaping the gendered division of labor has grown as a subject of theoretical as well as empirical interest, in part following the growth in theories of the welfare state. Mainstream welfare state theories focus on worker–citizens, a definition that excludes women in their roles as dependent wives or mothers (Pateman 1988). Jane Lewis (1992) suggests, instead, examining women’s position in the labor market, social security, and tax systems to classify countries as ranging from “weak” to “strong” male breadwinner states by the extent to which policy relies on women’s responsibility for unpaid care work. Ann Orloff (1993) applies a gender lens to expand dimensions within Esping-Andersen’s (1990) widely cited welfare regime typology to include how the state affects women’s access to paid work, as well as her ability to establish an autonomous household. The approaches by Lewis (1992) and Orloff (1993) suggest that a much broader range of policies affects gender relations inside and outside the home than has been explored in cross-national analyses of housework to date.

POLICY EFFECTS ON THE GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOR

Paid or Unpaid Work?
The three dimensions of policy effects on gender relations—reinforcement of women’s domestic roles, access to paid work, and ability to form autonomous households—overlap and result in competing effects on women’s range of choices. For example, education and training systems can prepare women to pursue careers similar to those of men, with recent evidence revealing women’s educational attainment beginning to equal or exceed men’s (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2004). Yet, the structure of public education often inhibits women’s ability
to participate in the labor force. Compulsory schooling does not start until children reach the age of 6 or 7 years, so without parental leaves, public provision of preprimary care, or child care tax credits, new mothers are more likely to exit employment upon childbirth. At the same time, extensive paid maternity leaves increase the incentive to interrupt employment for longer periods of time, particularly among low-skilled women (Jaumotte 2003). In some public educational systems, school hours vary, students are sent home for lunch, or school schedules include long or frequent vacations. These policies encourage part-time employment to accommodate school schedules that are out of sync with standard employment schedules, with women, not men, historically adjusting their paid work to family demands. Even well-paid part-time employment reduces accrued work experience, increasing the gender wage gap. When conflict between work and family persists, the gender wage gap leads to couples making the “rational” decision that the woman should be the one to exit employment, perpetuating one basis of that gap.

Labor laws directly affect women’s access to paid work and the wages she might earn. In most industrialized countries, the first labor regulations restricted women’s access to employment, often in hopes of improving working conditions for men and the working class more generally. These restrictions resulted in occupational segregation and gender wage differentials increasing late in the 19th century while married female employment rates plummeted among the new, white middle class. Pushed by second-wave feminists during the 1960s and ’70s, industrial societies subsequently passed equal pay, antidiscrimination, or affirmative action policies supporting greater equality in women’s economic roles. This legislation painted over, but did not fundamentally restructure, the gendered foundations, so aggregate levels of gender employment inequality persist in different ways across countries.

Tax provisions also affect women’s access to paid work. High marginal tax rates, where a second earner’s income gets taxed at a higher percentage, discourage female employment among couples—an effect that becomes more acute under progressive tax systems as household earnings increase. Tax credits for dependent spouses also discourage married women’s employment, more markedly among higher earners if calculated as a percentage of income, or among lower income families if a lump-sum amount is sufficiently high to make available female employment a less desirable option. Similarly, family allowances discourage employment among the least-skilled women, particularly in countries where child care is limited or expensive. The employment disincentive becomes more extreme when family allowances or other transfers are means tested and cease abruptly when earnings exceed some modest threshold, leading to a poverty trap and reliance on state transfers.
To achieve gender equality, education, labor, and tax policy must support women’s access to paid work on all dimensions simultaneously; support for only one or two aspects leads to some element of a gendered division of labor being perpetuated. For example, high relative wages but extensive female part-time employment reduces women’s accrued experience relative to men’s. High relative wages coupled with tax policies supporting married male breadwinner families might encourage growth in nonmarital households so that dual-earner couples can reap the gains from the market without incurring government penalties. Good employment prospects but little financial support for child care exacerbates the tension between family and work, and class differences among women as well. Thus, gender equality remains elusive within a patchwork of competing policy effects on women’s choice between paid and unpaid labor.

_Economic Alternatives to a Relationship_

The better a partnered woman’s options in lieu of a coresidential relationship, the greater her bargaining power within a relationship when negotiating housework with her partner. Across industrialized countries, however, female-headed households are worse off than male-headed households, and are at greater risk of poverty in large part because of women’s inferior access to paid work. However, transfers from the state can close the gender earnings gap across different household types. These include tax credits for lower income earners, child care credits, family allowances, housing benefits, or social transfers not tied to employment. Such provisions enhance women’s—or at least mothers’—economic alternatives; but, as noted earlier, they discourage employment when they provide income unrelated to paid work. The availability of transfers, however, minimizes class differences among women and strengthens lower income women’s relative resources within the family, because they provide access to income that otherwise might not be available. This enhances a woman’s bargaining power when couples negotiate housework.

Rules for entitlement to work-related contributory benefits such as unemployment or pensions also influence women’s access to resources. In some countries, a woman’s entitlement is linked to her husband’s contributions rather than her own, with women losing access to these benefits upon divorce. A more common problem is that employed women pay insurance contributions as individuals, but the household is used as the basis for benefit entitlement. As a result, a woman who loses her job might not have access to her unemployment benefits when her partner’s earnings maintain the household income above the required threshold. In keeping current with changing family demographics, many countries apply the household test to
cohabiting as well as legally married couples, although in some countries, such as Australia, only heterosexual couples fall under these rules.

Laws governing the division of marital assets and private postmarital payments also shape women’s ability to establish their own households. Divorce law changes during the 1960s and ’70s were heralded as an advance for women’s right to leave unhappy marriages. Yet these laws also limited women’s right to spousal support, frequently expecting a woman to be economically independent, regardless of whether she had been employed during the marriage. Child support payments can ease financial pressures when mothers establish their own households, but the amount of support and/or the likelihood a mother receives it remain low even in countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where central government took control over award levels or collection.13 Because these laws and provisions affect women’s postrelationship economic situation, they alter her relative power within the relationship and influence the negotiated division of housework.

Detailing the myriad of policy effects on gender relations highlights a key problem when comparing the division of housework across countries: Statistically, it is impossible to control for all of these effects. We quickly run out of country degrees of freedom in the hierarchical linear models increasingly favored for conducting such multinational comparisons. An alternative approach used here is to combine comparative and quantitative analytic methods. The comparative method is used to select countries that are similar on key dimensions, and to detail their historical and current policy differences, with quantitative individual-level analyses subsequently used to explore whether the pattern of aggregate variation yields differences observed at the individual level. Together, the different approaches advance our understanding of how context shapes couples’ private lives.

**Contrasting Cases: Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States**

Esping-Andersen (1990) categorizes liberal regimes as those countries of British political heritage where an ideology of market capitalism dominates over state welfare provision.14 Consequently, the welfare state in these countries is less developed than in other regime types, with a greater expectation of individual responsibility for one’s well-being across the life course. Modest, means-tested cash transfers are more common than government provision of services. Given the presumed minimal state reinforcement of hierarchies, women should have greater equality in these countries compared with the corporatist–conservative regimes found on the European continent that
reinforce gender hierarchies, but perhaps less than in social–democratic or former socialist countries actively encouraging education and employment equality, and assuming greater state responsibility for child care. A broad categorization of liberalism, however, overlooks the influence other institutional actors have in setting and reshaping the state foundation of equality.

**Australia**

The powerful Australian trade union movement achieved men’s preferential employment access with the 1907 Harvester Judgement of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court. This ruling established a family wage supporting a man, his dependent wife, and three children, regardless of an employer’s capacity to pay. Women’s access to employment was restricted with the 1912 court ruling distinguishing between men’s and women’s work, leading to greater occupational segregation. The gender wage gap became law with a 1919 ruling setting the female wage to approximately half the male wage. During the 1920s, feminists lobbied for equal pay and motherhood endowments to remove the pretext of a family wage, given that 60 percent of working men were single with no dependents. Payment of the family wage was defended, however, on the grounds that single men had to purchase services provided to married men gratuitously, including housework (Lake 1993).

Beginning in the late 1960s, Australia passed a series of equal pay and comparable worth statutes that narrowed the gender wage gap compared with other countries, although these statutes did not rectify the occupational segregation. Australian government support for gender equality increased a bit further during the 1970s and ’80s, with the introduction of commonwealth funding for long-day child care places, 52 weeks of unpaid maternity leave, and equal rights in child custody and property settlements after divorce. Affirmative action became law in 1986, but penalties for non-compliance remain negligible and the law applies only to private sector businesses with 100 or more employees, or less than 10 percent of Australian employers. Single mothers’ high reliance on government transfers led to the 1988 Child Support Registration and Collection Act, which established a new agency that would calculate child support awards and collect support payments. For similar reasons, the United States, in 1974, and the UK, in 1990, passed similar laws. Despite these efforts, less than three quarters of the Australian child support due is actually collected (Baker 2001), with similar lackluster results in the United Kingdom and the United States. As of the mid 1990s, about half of Australian single mothers lived in poverty, comparable with the proportion in the United Kingdom, but much less than in the United States. These high poverty rates are driven in large part by
single parents who are outside the labor force. Among nonemployed single parents, 42% in Australia, 65% in the United Kingdom, and more than 93% in the United States live in poverty (Forster and Pearson 2000).

A conservative coalition took control of the Commonwealth government during the 1990s, implementing more liberal market policies eroding the male wage while simultaneously reinforcing women’s domestic responsibility. The 1996 Workplace Relations Act introduced family caregiver leave and increased incentives for women to work part-time to balance employment and family demands better. The Family Support Reform of 2000 introduced Child Care Benefit to provide cash assistance to families rather than continued expansion of public child care, along with a two-part means-tested allowance comprised of a general allowance and an additional allowance for households with a single breadwinner. In perhaps one of the more stark modern examples of reinforcing women’s place in the home, a Baby Bonus was introduced in 2002 that offers a refundable tax offset of up to $2500 annually for up to 5 years if one parent reduces or exits employment upon the birth of the first child.

So despite the gender wage gains from the 1970s resulting in one of the narrowest current gender wage gaps for full-time workers at 89 percent (although much larger when including part-time workers), most Australian policies reinforce a gendered division of labor. In addition, more young Australian women than men go on to university, but more women than men also fail to complete secondary schooling. The employment gap between women and men is 20 percentage points, and among Australian women who are employed, one third work part-time with lower wages and less access to benefits.18

**United Kingdom**

British policy reinforces separate spheres through continued reliance on women’s unpaid work in the home. William Beveridge (1942), architect of the modern British welfare state, premised a gendered system, because “…the great majority of married women must be regarded as occupied on work which is vital though unpaid, without which their husbands could not do their paid work and without which the nation could not continue” (p. 50). This premise led to a series of restrictions on married women’s independent access to work-related contributory benefits such as unemployment or pensions, leading many women to opt out of making any contributions. After the insurance system changed in 1977 to require full contributions, the low-paid, part-time work in which women dominate often fell below the Lower Earnings Limit, so that many women still remained uncovered by contributory insurance.19

Britain’s affiliation with the European Union (EU) advanced gender equality further than would have likely occurred otherwise. In anticipation of
joining the EU, Britain passed the Equal Pay Act of 1970 to be compliant with provisions under the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The 1975 Sex Discrimination Act established the Equal Opportunities Commission, which subsequently took cases to the European Court to put pressure on the national government to comply with gender equality directives. For example, the 1975 Employment Protection Act granted maternity leave before and after birth, some of which was paid at 90 percent of prior wages, and some of which was paid at the flat sickness benefit rate. These maternity leave provisions are the most generous among the three countries discussed here, but until the 1990s, qualification parameters meant that only a fraction of British women were eligible. EU pressure led to improvements in these provisions to cover more women, including rulings on Parental Leave (1984), Pregnancy (1990), and Working Time and Part-time Work (2000) (Walby 2001).

New Labour came into power in 1997 and introduced a series of New Deals emphasizing labor activation, although not necessarily away from a male breadwinner model. Some argue the Working Families Tax Credit discourages employment of second earners, thus reinforcing a male breadwinner model (Bennett 2002; Walby 2001). New Labour introduced a child care tax credit for working families for up to 70 percent of actual expenses and has expanded public preprimary child care, but only with part-time slots of limited help to mothers desiring full-time work. This reflects New Labour’s focus on women’s part-time employment as the key work–family reconciliation strategy. Consequently, the gender employment gap at 14 percentage points is somewhat smaller in Britain than in Australia, but a similar proportion of employed women work part-time. Lacking Australia’s comparable worth policies, however, the British gender wage gap is among the largest across industrialized countries, with British women who work full-time earning on average just 75 percent of what British men earn (OECD 2002).

**United States**

Ideological adherence to liberal tenets delayed and blunted development of a U.S. welfare state; decentralized trade unionism coupled with the nip and tuck of litigation reduced the degree to which gender inequalities became embedded within the state. U.S. employers effectively exploited the separation of powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government to overturn early trade union legislative gains in the courts. So in contrast to Australian and British trade union movements, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) severed itself from what it considered a paternalist state, choosing instead to fight for employee benefits via traditional market-based actions. This decision led to the development of corporate rather than state welfare programs. The AFL also opposed lobbying for family wages on grounds that it would undercut union power, and it took
the formal stance of gender equality in employment at the national level while turning a blind eye to local-level discrimination. Among the three countries, the United States was the last to pass protective legislation that limited women’s access to employment opportunities.

After World War II, U.S. women’s equal access to paid work arose as a civil rights issue. Passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made discrimination on the basis of, \textit{inter alia}, sex unlawful in all aspects of employment and training in firms of 25 or more employees. The Act also established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce antidiscrimination laws, although the Commission was deemed a “toothless tiger” until 1972, when Congress gave it litigation enforcement authority. With this authority, the EEOC could file lawsuits not just on specific complaints against employers, unions, and employment agencies, but also on what the Commission viewed as patterns of discrimination. EEOC efforts through the courts and political lobbying led to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, requiring employers with disability policies to include pregnancy, and the 1980 Guidelines on Sexual Harassment ruling that employment decisions conditional upon sexual favors or hostile employment environments created by unwelcome sexual conduct were prohibited under Title VII. Successful litigation of complaints brings award of damages. For example, in a recently settled case, a 17-year-old female kitchen helper charged she had been subjected to sexual harassment for 3 months despite complaints to managers. She received $12,000 in back pay and another $168,000 in compensatory damages. U.S. policy support within the home remains the least generous of all industrialized countries. At no point did the United States introduce universal family allowances as in other countries. Instead, working persons receive tax deductions based on number of children, a policy expanded in the mid 1970s to include additional tax credits for low-earning families, and a child care tax credit for 20% to 35% of actual expenses up to a set maximum, compared with the 70% now covered under British provisions. Although some U.S. women had access to maternity leave as part of a corporate disability program, parental leave only became a right with the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, which allows up to 12 weeks unpaid parental leave, the least generous program among the OECD countries (Jaumotte 2003).

Under this corporate-driven welfare system, the U.S. gender gap in employment is just 15%, similar to that in the UK. Unlike the UK, however, U.S. women’s part-time employment as a share of women’s total employment has been steadily declining since the mid 1960s and is just 12% of all U.S. female employment. The freer rein of market mechanisms also yields greater income inequality more generally in the United States compared with Australia, being more similar to the UK’s along with a similar gender wage ratio of 78%.23
So with their divergent policy profiles, the three countries have different equality structures than a simple liberal regime label suggests. Australia codified men’s privileged access to high-wage work, whereas the UK reinforced women’s domestic responsibility. Under greater adherence to liberal principles, U.S. policy intervened less to restrict women’s access to paid work, and a woman’s normative responsibility for the domestic sphere is neither reinforced nor alleviated.

**Liberal Divisions of Household Work**

I use data from the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) to explore whether the more subtle policy differences across the three liberal regimes yield divergent divisions of housework as found by Fuwa (2004) and Hook (2006) across widely differing societies. The 2002 ISSP module is the third on family and changing gender roles, but the first to include respondents’ estimates of each partner’s weekly housework hours (excluding childcare). From the 2002 ISSP, I select cohabiting or married couples where the respondent is younger than 60 years of age to look at differences in the household division of labor across countries and income brackets.

Table 4.1 displays partnered women’s employment participation. More U.S. partnered women are employed full-time than in the other two countries, whereas more Australian women are out of the labor force. Among partnered women who are employed, 34% in the United States, 44% in Britain, and more than half in Australia work part-time.24

Men’s and women’s average housework hours at different levels of women’s employment are displayed in Figure 4.1. Men and women in the UK and the United States spend about the same amount of time on housework, whereas Australian women and men each spend appreciably more than their counterparts in the other countries. Apart from these differences, trends across the countries are similar. Men’s average housework hours do not vary significantly with women’s employment, although women across the countries reduce their housework hours to a similar degree as their employment hours increase.25 A British or U.S. woman working full-time spends,

### Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Full-time, %</th>
<th>Part-time, %</th>
<th>Out of Labor Force, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Calculated from 2002 ISSP data on married or cohabiting couples, where respondent is younger than 60 years of age.
on average, 10 fewer hours per week on housework than a housewife. An Australian woman working full-time spends about 12 fewer hours, but still devotes 5 more weekly hours to housework compared with her British and U.S. employed counterparts.

If men do not increase housework hours to compensate for the reduction in women’s housework as they increase their employment hours, this suggests dual-earner couples either forgo some domestic production (i.e., tolerate dirtier homes) and/or purchase more services on the market for it. Market provision includes hiring domestic personnel, or purchasing time-saving appliances, laundry services, restaurant or pre-packaged meals, and so on. If this is the case, greater equality in men’s relative share (but not hours of housework) is made possible with the household’s reliance on outside labor to produce domestic goods historically fashioned with women’s hourly input. This depicts a shift between hours in paid and unpaid labor occurring at macro as well as micro levels, which together form what Glucksman (1995) has referred to as the “total social organisation of labour.”

Any macrosocial organization of labor necessarily reflects the labor regulations and policies affecting not only women’s, but men’s, access to paid work. For example, the strength of the Australian working class movement that led to the Harvester Judgement and to greater gender employment inequality also resulted in skilled workers winning an 8-hour workday during a time when British and U.S. workers were attempting to win a 10-hour
day (Sutcliffe 1967). The greater time Australian men and women spend in housework might thus reflect fewer hours spent in paid work. With the higher Australian wages, however, services would be more expensive. As a result, the poorest Australian households might not be able to afford market-produced domesticity, whereas higher income households might require more time in paid work to purchase services compared with similar families in the UK and the United States. So although men’s housework hours vary little across partners’ employment status, how the household organizes the total of its paid and unpaid labor should vary substantially across the countries and across social classes within the countries.

I map these simultaneous dynamics in Figure 4.2, which displays partnered women’s and men’s average employment and housework hours across income quartiles within each country. The ISSP only surveys a single respondent within a household, so these are not couple reports, but estimates as reported by individual women and men for themselves and their partner. See Chapter 11 (Geist, this volume) on international differences in what he says versus what she says are the hours each spend in housework. Notably, the nature of poverty appears different in Australia, because women’s and men’s employment hours among couples in the lowest income quartile are miniscule compared with the UK or the United States. This suggests that the poorest Australian families rely more heavily on state transfers, whereas the poorest British and U.S. families are the working poor, with U.S. wives’ greater employment hours not necessarily ensuring the couple escapes

Figure 4.2. Women’s and men’s average weekly employment and housework hours in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States by income quartile. Based on author’s calculations of the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) for cohabitating or married couples less than 60 years of age.
relative poverty. Among the poorest first quartile of Australian households, men and women devote appreciably more hours to housework, but their combined household time in employment and housework is significantly less than the poorest British or U.S. households. Not surprisingly, the moderately poor (second quartile) in all three countries achieve this greater economic security when women and men spend more hours in paid work and, perhaps, slightly less time in housework.

The relative time in paid and unpaid work across the countries reverses among upper income households. Some couples in the UK and the United States work smarter, but not harder; the total household time in employment and housework among British couples in the third income quartile and U.S. couples in the fourth is not appreciably greater than for second-quartile income couples in those countries. In contrast, Australian women and men spend more hours in paid work as well as housework as their household income increases. Consequently, those policies proclaimed a boon for working class Australian men during the 19th century might prove to be a bust for dual-earner couples in the 21st.

CONCLUSION

As this book attests, there is increasing interest in how couples in different countries negotiate the division of housework when women are employed. Comparisons across socialist, former socialist, and more advanced industrial economies have revealed variation in men’s hours or share of housework, and some variation in the effects of women’s relative resources on shifting this division further (Fuwa 2004; Hook 2006), but comparisons across more similar countries have found no significant differences (Baxter 1997; Kalleberg and Rosenfeld 1990). Here I detailed how a broad range of policies affects the household division of labor, comparing the similar country cases of Australia, Great Britain, and the United States. These three countries share a common political heritage and ideological adherence to minimal state interference in citizens’ private lives, but vary more markedly in how policy has reinforced men’s preferential access to employment (Australia), promoted women’s responsibility for unpaid work of the domestic sphere (United Kingdom), or adhered to liberal tenets of minimal state interference in either (United States).

I found very little variation in men’s housework hours across the countries regardless of their partners’ employment, but greater variation in the total household organization of labor, which highlights further equality dilemmas. In all three countries, more equitable housework divisions among upper income couples derive in part from a reduction in total housework hours, undoubtedly in part by purchasing domestic services in the market. Service sector jobs producing domesticity tend to be more poorly paid and/or
part-time such that gender equity among the upper classes is made possible by class and wage inequality. The hierarchical relations remain gendered as well, as women dominate part-time and lower wage work. In Australia, early class gains leveraged against female employment, and subsequent comparable worth policies that kept average wages higher extracted costs at each end of the income continuum. Lower income couples cannot afford to purchase domestic services and spend a greater number of hours performing the tasks themselves, likely leading to greater work–family conflict among the working poor. Australian couples in the higher income brackets spend more total hours in paid employment and housework than couples in the other two countries, suggesting greater time poverty at the upper end of the income range. The data used here do not include time spent in child care, which we can assume only increases the time or financial pressures on families.

In weighing the relative equality effects of different policy approaches to the household division of labor, restricting access to paid employment in a market-based economy yields the most extreme penalties within and across households. In contrast, policy reinforcement of women’s responsibility for the domestic sphere as in the United Kingdom still allows women the agency to reduce their domestic commitments. In today, governments express little concern over untidy houses, but a great deal of concern over declining birth rates, because this affects future economic growth. Together, results indicate that policy planning needs to be more holistic than has been the case to date, with greater awareness of policy linkages among gender equality, financial poverty, time poverty, and family outcomes.

NOTES


2. Detailing these dynamics requires that each partner’s actual housework hours are compared over time, not just the relative share. The articles by Bianchi et al. (2000) and Sayer (2005) detail this for the U.S. case, whereas Hook (2006) looks at changes in men’s hours across time and countries. In all cases, there has been a modest increase in men’s housework hours, but a larger decrease in women’s. Across time, child care hours have increased for both women and men, but the gender gap is even larger.

3. There is ample U.S. cross-sectional evidence of the persistent gendered division of housework, summarized by Shelton and John (1996). Gupta (1999) and South and Spitze (1994) used U.S. longitudinal data to illustrate how each gender’s share changes with their partnering status.

5. Hook (2006), however, concludes this evidence does not support bargaining dynamics as suggested by Breen and Cooke (2005), although her data precluded assessing them because they are collected on individuals but not their partners. I discuss these competing conclusions in more detail (Cooke 2007a).

6. In *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen (1990) contrasts welfare states along three dimensions. The first is state–market relations, reflecting the welfare mix of private and state provision; the second is the degree to which the state grants social rights equal status with property rights; and the third dimension is the degree to which the state reinforces existing hierarchies. From this classification, he argues there are three regime types: liberal regimes that rely on the market for individual welfare, corporatist–conservative ones that provide more universal provisions but maintain status hierarchies (including gendered ones), and social–democratic regimes that share a policy goal of greater equality and solidarity through more universal provisions.

7. I first discuss and diagram some of these proposed effects in Cooke (2007b) and expand upon them in Cooke (2007a), but since writing those articles, I have increased my emphasis on how policy and other institutional effects reinforce women’s domestic responsibility, regardless of the support for public equality.

8. This is an old debate—how much a gendered division of labor reflects women’s individual choice, a perspective in the fore in the work of Becker (1981) or Hakim (2000), versus the degree to which her choices are socially constructed in part by state policies, the argument applied here and also assessed more directly in Cooke (2006).


11. Daly and Rake (2003) use Luxembourg Income Study data to illustrate that transfers in Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany result in the income in female-headed households being 90% of male-headed household income compared with just more than 70% in the United Kingdom and the United States.

12. Using the National Survey of Families and Households, I found U.S. women’s transfer income and employment earnings each predict husbands’ share of housework (Cooke 2007b).

13. See Phipps and Burton (1995) on the relative levels in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States as of the mid 1980s.

14. Canada is also classified among the liberal regimes, but the analyses here are part of a larger research project that excludes Canada, because that country’s panel dataset excludes questions on domestic labor.

15. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of women in the Australian state, see Baldock and Cass (1988) or Ryan and Conlon (1989).

17. In Cooke (2007b), I discuss the progression of child support enforcement in the United States, as well as the effects of more effective enforcement on the division of housework.


19. Dex and Shaw (1986) argued that Britain’s employer tax policies also encouraged the growth in employer’s preference for offering part-time jobs compared with the United States, where two part-time employees are more costly than a single full-time one.

20. See Sklar (1993) and Skocpol (1992) for an overview of the dynamics among gender and class during this period, and Mink (1986) for discussions of gender, class, and race.


23. For income inequality at different points in time, see the Luxembourg Income Study website (www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm).

24. These percentages are calculated as follows: percent part-time ÷ (percent full-time + percent part-time). They contrast somewhat with the OECD statistics for all women age 15 to 64 years, because the ISSP sample is comprised of only partnered women younger than 60.

25. The visual differences were confirmed statistically regressing men’s and women’s housework hours on the respondent’s age, number of children, religion, education, and household income. After including an indicator variable for the United Kingdom and one for Australia (referent = United States), the Australian indicator variable was positive and significant for both genders, but women’s employment intensity did not predict any significant shift in men’s housework hours, only women’s. Interaction terms for country × wife’s employment were also not significant, so effects are consistent across countries.


27. Lundberg and Pollak (1994) suggest a similar solution at the couple level in their noncooperative bargaining models (i.e., when left with the entire domestic burden, women reduce it to a level that is manageable on their own).

REFERENCES


It is a well-known fact that men and women have unequal pay and status in labor markets across industrialized countries. There are many contributors to the disadvantaged positions in which most women find themselves, but one of these is women’s lower amounts of paid work experience compared with men’s. Periods out of paid work can occur for men as well as women through becoming unemployed or long-term illness. These reduce the amount of human capital or prevent its accumulation, because significant human capital is only acquired during periods of paid work, education, or training. Women are known to spend more time than men away from the labor market to bear and rear children, periods during which they specialize in unpaid domestic and child care work in the home. Such periods of unpaid work depress their wage rates (Budig and England 2001; Hersch and Stratton 2002). Even when women in couples are employed, they often still perform a larger share of unpaid work in the home—the so-called double burden. This uneven share has also been argued to prevent women from competing effectively with men in the workplace promotion stakes. While women go home earlier to fulfill their domestic duties, men can stay later, be seen in the office after hours, attend early evening or breakfast meetings, go for a drink after work with colleagues, and network to find out more about company opportunities and useful contacts.

If we desire to have greater equality in the paid work market between men and women, should we consider ways of trying to equalize women’s and men’s unpaid workloads in the home? There is a long tradition of socialist interventions to reduce the housekeeping labor burden that women disproportionately carry (communal dining halls in Chinese collectives, 19th-century American utopian communities, and Israeli kibbutzes). On the whole, western governments have been reluctant to make policies that are directly aimed at changing behavior in the home, which has been regarded as a private sphere. Nonetheless, the women’s agenda has been the subject of policy making in some countries, with an effort to equalize men’s and
women’s contributions to caring for children, either indirectly or, in a few cases, directly. However, it is not clear that such policy interventions have had any significant or sizeable effects on unpaid work; Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) suggest the effects are, at best, contradictory and mixed. The aim of this chapter is to consider whether it is possible to devise realistic and effective policies that will equalize men’s and women’s contributions of unpaid work. It puts forward a provocative argument, possibly even extreme, to focus more policy attention and discussion on this issue in future.

We need to note from the outset the possible ways in which equality in men’s and women’s shares of unpaid work could be achieved. Assuming the amount of unpaid work is constant, equality in shares could be achieved by reducing the unpaid hours women currently do without changing men’s hours or by increasing men’s hours of unpaid work while women’s hours decline or stay constant. This second approach would require less change in women’s hours than the first approach. Alternatively, equality could be achieved by reducing the total hours of unpaid work done, and then reducing women’s hours by more than any reduction in men’s hours, or reducing women’s hours while men’s hours stayed constant. Last, equality could even be achieved, in principle, by increasing the total hours of unpaid work, but with men’s hours of unpaid work growing far more than women’s hours; the latter might even stay constant or decrease as long as men’s total unpaid hours increased substantially. Some approaches to getting equal shares for men and women are more (or less) likely to be achievable than others. The approaches that require more change in men seem to be less possible than routes that rest on more change in unpaid hours for women. Because of these possible routes to equal shares, it means that attention should ideally be paid to the total amounts of unpaid work done by households and not just to the shares between men and women.

The first part of this chapter examines the sorts of approaches to policy making that have been tried and their effects on behavior. This chapter focuses mostly on policy making by state governments. Of course, there are other agents generating time use policies—namely, employers and communities. Unfortunately, space constraints do not permit us to give a thorough treatment to employers and communities in this chapter. The later sections of the chapter consider the arguments about whether it is realistic to try to change time spent and shares of unpaid work through policy interventions. A number of such arguments can and have been advanced, based on reasoning and empirical studies. These arguments include the following: state interventions of the sort that are politically realistic will not work; changes in the share of domestic work and time spent on it have been occurring without intervention; interventions to equalize men’s and women’s domestic work go
against what couples, both women and men, prefer or choose; and we would not want to coerce men to this degree, even if we could. The chapter ends with a discussion of policy interventions that have not been tried, followed by an overall conclusion assessing whether policy intervention to change men’s and women’s shares of unpaid work is possible or realistic.

TIME USE POLICIES

In this section we consider the types of policy interventions used by governments that might, in principle, change unpaid work behavior within households. There are at least two broad traditions of policy discussion relating to time use and gender shares that consider unpaid work. As illustrated by Sayer’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 2), one is time use research, largely based on time use diaries, which are available over vast historical periods as well as in cross-country comparisons (Gershuny 2000; Gershuny and Sullivan 2003; Robinson and Godbey 1997). Such studies show unpaid work time changing over time, with a slow convergence of women’s and men’s hours of unpaid work in most capitalist countries by women reducing their hours of domestic work as they increased their hours of paid work and men increasing their hours of domestic work. Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice (2005) describe this as a process of lagged adaptation. Almost all policies are seen as relevant to time use decisions by such studies (consumption, production, welfare, income support, and so on).

Another research tradition that focuses on policies relevant to unpaid work occurs within the discipline of social policy (Cooke’s Chapter 4 is an example). This discussion grew out of research on the way nation states organize welfare and income support for their vulnerable citizens. Studies of welfare within countries extended to cross-national comparisons as the potential for comparative research and comparative data became more available during the 1980s. Esping Anderson’s (1990) classification of the different types of capitalist welfare states had a large influence on this area of research. His set of three categories of welfare state has been well received and popular. However, it has also attracted a large amount of criticism from feminists as a result of his failure to consider women’s place in drawing up his welfare schema. The European Commission (later the European Union [EU]) has also played an important role in facilitating social policy research in this tradition within Europe, as it commissioned many cross-national research projects and organized much collection and collation of comparable country data. Out of this social policy discourse, there is now a lively set of feminist researchers who discuss the issues of reconciling work and care—or work–family balance—and, in particular, the policies that may or may
not assist this balance without detracting from gender equality. The type of unpaid work that is given most attention within this tradition is care work, encompassing child care but also care for older adults.

Both of these traditions recognize the changes that have been occurring in families’ participation in paid work and unpaid caring across industrialized countries—namely, the rise of the dual-earner couple, based on increased participation in paid work by married women and mothers with young children. The time use tradition has considered child care as a specific type of unpaid work, but it has not specifically considered care for older adults as well. The social policy discourse builds on some of the results of the time use diary research, but without necessarily considering its historical and period changes in unpaid work. Social policy discussions of care work and domestic work often fail to differentiate between these types of unpaid work. This is not the case for Gershuny (2000) and other time use diary researchers, who point out that the data on the various categories of unpaid work (personal care, shopping, child care, core domestic) have not all followed the same historical trends, in terms of time allocation and their gender shares. This is an important point that should be given greater prominence and attention in future research.

Despite some of these differences in level of analysis and definitions of unpaid work underlying these two traditions, there are many overlaps in their policy discussions. This is not surprising, because both traditions are talking about gendered time use. Both are agreed that the differences in state policies set a framework for household decision making that leads to important variations in the amounts of unpaid work done and in the gender shares of unpaid work. Both believe that policies that regulate working time and the extent to which there is flexibility in working time, or that relate to childbearing and early child care, are likely to affect time use decisions within households. Both also see the circular effects of unequal wage rates on men’s and women’s decisions about paid work and unpaid working hours.

Gershuny’s (2000) policy discussion is differentiated from that in the social policy tradition, because it goes on to locate household day-to-day time use decisions within a much broader framework that covers institutions and infrastructure as well as policy. He paints a canvas whereby there is a “... systematic interconnection of patterns of consumption and production, the interdependence of daily life and employment structure, ... as well as of its more empirical reflection in the changing nature of work-leisure balance in developed societies, [and this] suggests the potential for some really rather substantial divergences between States” (p. 33). Gershuny’s list of relevant state policies for considering differences in time use include a much larger set than is considered in the social policy discussions. In addition to those discussed in the social policy tradition, Gershuny (2000) argues for the
need to consider policies that cover both the regulation of production, but also the regulation of consumption, because he recognizes that they are all interrelated, as the previous quote illustrates. The regulation of production covers the legal framework for corporate activity, the development of systems of industrial relations and employment protection (maximum working hours, parental leave, holiday entitlements), the provisions for maintenance and development of skills suitable for current technology and management practices, the provision for incentives for investment and taxation of profits, and the development of a system of publicly coordinated research and development. Policies under the heading of “regulation of consumption” include its infrastructure (domestic electricity, gas, and water supplies; cultural sports; social care facilities), the direct regulation of paid work (the length of the workday, school leaving ages, retirement ages), transport systems, the labor market; policies for income taxation and social security; as well as redistribution policies that affect the distribution of disposable incomes across a society. Finally, nation states vary on the extent to which state intervention is acceptable or planned in various aspects of life, the economy, and its infrastructure. This is a very large agenda. It is not possible in this chapter to examine all these cross-country differences in detail, although some of the chapters in this volume offer detailed comparisons. The policies given most consideration in this chapter are those more directly related to balancing work and care.

As Lewis (2008) and others have pointed out, the policy regimes of many industrialized countries were designed and devised around the model of a male breadwinner family in which the man worked full-time and the women cared for the family and was not expected to be employed. This male breadwinner behavior, in its pure sense, is hardly visible in industrialized countries of the 21st century because of the huge increases in women’s employment that have taken place. However, social policy analysts argue that this model for policy still exists, albeit in a modified form. A popular modified form is for the male partner to be in paid work full-time and the female partner to be in paid work part-time. A range of models underlying policy has been suggested by authors, as set out in Table 5.1. Policies have grown up in very different ways in different countries, and the logic underlying the policies also varies considerably by country, even when they look the same. Lewis (2008) has also pointed out that policy regimes in some countries have adapted to the new models of family behavior that have emerged, but other countries have been slow to adapt.

In principle, there are two extremes for state policy regimes. They can either support adults, undifferentiated by gender, as paid workers, or they can acknowledge men and women as likely to offer different levels of contributions to the labor market. No policy regime takes the extreme adult
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model/Author</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Associated Policies</th>
<th>Example Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult worker model family: Lewis (2001), comes in two forms:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Supported</td>
<td>Focus on getting single parents and low earners into work</td>
<td>In work benefits, tax credits act as subsidy to low-paying employers</td>
<td>United Kingdom since 1999, more so since 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unsupported</td>
<td>Gender neutral, equality defined as sameness</td>
<td>Earned income tax credits to make sure it is economic to work</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender participation model, sometimes called Nordic model, or gender-differentiated supported adult worker model: Hobson (2004), Lewis (2008)</td>
<td>Gender equality promoted, but makes allowances for difference</td>
<td>Generous cash support for parental leave, services for child care and elderly dependents, but also for women to have extensive periods of leave (3 years if two children in quick succession) and rights to work part time until child is 8 years old</td>
<td>Sweden, Lesser extent in other Scandinavian countries, To a lesser extent in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality based on a women's model of equality: Knijn (2004)</td>
<td>All workers encouraged to reduce their weekly paid working hours to be part time</td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
worker position, but the United States came pretty close to this in only offering women rights to unpaid maternity leave since 1996. Scandinavian countries are often heralded as being more focused on providing equal opportunities to women and men, but policies also allow women’s employment contribution to be different from men’s in having longer parental leave and long periods of part-time work following childbirth. As soon as policies allow or promote women to behave differently in terms of their employment participation or their hours of work, inequalities in the home and in domestic contributions are likely to emerge. This is evident in the numbers of women still spending more time on domestic work than men in Scandinavian countries, despite their espoused commitment to gender equality (Table 5.2). Swedish women have more choice about combining work and care, but this is at the expense of equality. In the Swedish labor markets, there is a very high degree of occupational segregation. The approach of allowing “gender difference” within a policy regime will usually lead to gender difference in time spent on domestic work and then further reduction in women’s time spent in paid work.

Authors have argued that the only way around this is to have policies that address fathers’ labor market participation and, in particular, get men to spend less time in paid work and more time at home. More recently, attempts to change men’s behavior have been tried. The EU issued a directive in 1995 (to become a legal requirement in 1996) to offer each parent a non-transferable right to a period of parental leave to look after young children. However, because this does not have to be paid leave, only a minority of parents, especially fathers, can afford to take it. Some EU member countries also offer paternity leave to counterbalance maternity leave entitlements for women; this leave is also paid in some cases (Britain since 2003, Belgium, Norway), but usually is a very short period of days, in comparison with maternity leave entitlements (e.g., 18 or more weeks of paid leave). In many ways, these new policies have been largely symbolic gestures. Although there has been some take-up, especially in the public sector, it is not looking promising that shares of domestic working time in the home can be radically changed by these sorts of policies.

In Sweden (2.5 months), Norway (2 months), and Iceland (3 months), fathers of young children are offered an individual entitlement to a period of paid leave that only he can take at a high level of replacement earnings. Often referred to as Daddy Leave, it is lost to the household if he does not take it. Parents do not generally take leave simultaneously, but tend to stagger it. Although very short in time (a month or two), the theory is that men will be more likely to bond with their children if they spend time caring for them from an early age. In this way, fathers will be sent a signal that the government encourages them to be involved with their children and that
## Table 5.2
Mean minutes spent per week on different types of work and leisure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work and Leisure</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core domestic work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other unpaid work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>399</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Gershuny (2002). Chapter and tables from which these figures were collated are: Tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.12, 7.13, 7.16, 7.17, 7.21, 7.22, 7.25, 7.26, 7.28, 7.29, 7.32, 7.33.
Can State Policies Produce Equality in Housework?

doing unpaid work is okay for men (Leira 1998). The policy is focused on intervening at a critical point in men’s lives: the time they become fathers. This is a point when men may be more open to change. However, it is also a point, typically, when traditional gender divisions of work in the home assert themselves, even when there was more equality up to this point.

Has Daddy Leave changed the shares of unpaid work in the home? The take-up of this leave by Swedish fathers has increased slowly from its initiation in 1995, but only a minority of fathers take this leave. The share of leave taken by men reached 17% by 2003, even in a society regarded as the most committed to gender equality over a very long period and where replacement wage rates are at their highest (90% for much of the time).

Figures from time use diaries (see Table 5.2) show Swedish men spending the highest number of minutes (56) doing core domestic work among men in the countries represented, and Swedish women spending the least time (143 minutes). When other unpaid work time is added to core domestic, Swedish women spend the same time as U.K. and Canadian women (289 minutes), which is a larger amount of time spent by Danish and Finnish women, although Swedish men still have the highest men’s totals for unpaid work time (173 minutes). One could argue on the basis of these figures that Swedish policy encouragement of men to be more involved in domestic work in the home has had a small impact. Equality of unpaid domestic work hours, although not total hours spent working (paid plus domestic), is still a long way off.

There is the added question of whether taking time off to care for children around the time of their birth leads to greater child involvement by fathers later or better outcomes for children. Ekberg’s (2004) quantitative evaluation of the effects of Daddy Leave in Sweden suggested that it did increase father’s use of parental leave, but this increase in leave was not translated into an increase of fathers looking after sick children when time off work was needed by a parent to do this. Dex and Ward (2007) examined this issue up to age 3 using U.K. data and found fathers who took some parental leave around the birth of a child (not Daddy Leave) were more likely to read to the child on a daily basis when the child was age 3 than fathers who did not take any leave (53% to 60% vs. 43%). Also, they found a correlation between fathers taking parental leave and the 3-year-old child having fewer behavioral and emotional problems.

Policies on (paid) working time are clearly important to time spent in paid work and therefore to the time potentially available to share in unpaid work. Here again the EU social policies have taken initiative to direct members to limit hours of paid work to a maximum of 48 hours per week. However, this limit is very high and still allows men to work relatively long weekly hours. When travel time to and from paid work is added in, it is
even less likely that men will make a major contribution to domestic work. The United Kingdom even decided to allow opt-outs from this 1993 directive when it enacted it into its own statutes. It is not mandatory in the United Kingdom for all of its workers to comply with the 48-hour rule. Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom now has the highest mean weekly paid working hours among men in Europe. Some countries have allowed parents the right to reduce their hours of work (e.g., Sweden, Netherlands), but it is primarily women who use this ability to work part-time. In 2003, the United Kingdom offered parents of a child younger than 6 years of age the right to request flexible working arrangements of their choice (about to be extended to more parents in 2009). Employers were given a serious duty to consider their request. This marked a new idea in U.K. industrial relations, moving away from voluntarism, but not as far as making this a statutory requirement. Although such requests can be made by either parent, surveys show it is mainly women who make the requests and are offered flexible working arrangements (Holt and Grainger 2005; Palmer 2004).

Part-time paid work among women is extensive across many European countries during the 21st century. Employers have played a large role in initiating part-time paid working arrangements, and part-time work has been increasing in the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, and was already high in Denmark and the United Kingdom (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2001). This has led to the dominant family economy being based on either a 1.5-earner couple in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Germany, where women adopt shorter part-time paid hours, or a 1.75-earner couple in Sweden, Finland, or Norway. On the whole, outside of Scandinavia, the form of family economy chosen by couples has been selected without state policy inputs or encouragement. Where policies have emerged, they have tended to follow, rather than precede, families’ decision making. Service and distribution sector employers have played an important role in the part-time employment revolution. Since the 1960s, they have created many part-time jobs as a way of targeting a cheap, available, and reliable workforce of women with children. More recently, full-time dual-earner couples have also been on the increase in the United Kingdom, although many are childless, which is also a growing phenomenon. Their motivation appears to be to pursue a full-time career instead of raising a family. Again, it is not work–life policy that has produced the decline in fertility evident in most countries. Fertility has declined in some countries (e.g., France) even despite serious policy efforts to prevent it. However, education policy undoubtedly has contributed. As women have increased their educational qualifications and earning power, they have decided they want a career rather than children, or found out too late, after delaying fertility, that they cannot have children.
Can State Policies Produce Equality in Housework?

Having reviewed the main policies that have been used to address work–family balance during the past two decades, one could not argue very convincingly that they have had a significant or sizeable effect on the share of unpaid work within households. They have affected whether and when women and men are in paid work over periods of childbirth and family formation. Studies have found women’s returns to work after childbirth have been sensitive to the conditions of their maternity or parental leave period (Brewer and Paull 2006; Ruhm 1998). In some cases, and with the most recent policies, it is perhaps too early to say that they have not achieved the goal of changing shares of unpaid work. However, in the case of the policies based on difference, one could argue that they give to women with one hand, but take away with the other, as they reinforce gender divisions. Clearly, the in-principle effects of a particular policy rely heavily on the details. It is one thing to offer a generous leave arrangement, but if it is not paid, it is not much of an offer and take-up is likely to be low. Many of the policy provisions are of this kind. Nonetheless, there are enough examples where offers of support to families are backed with resources (e.g., in Scandinavia and France) for us to see that they have moved the position slightly toward men doing more and women doing less domestic work. Policies to affect fathers’ behavior have the most potential to address the gap in shares of unpaid work, but these are so minimalist in their aims that one might even say they are token gestures. The evidence suggests that there is some effect on men’s behavior from these policies, perhaps because they intervene at critical points, but it is hard to believe they can offer the seismic shift necessary to equalize shares of unpaid work. It is notable that there have been no sizeable attempts to change the wage ratios of men and women through income tax or other policies to weight household decision making in favor of women doing more paid and less unpaid work while men stay at home to do more unpaid work. This issue is discussed again later.

As Lewis (2008) claims in her review of such policies: “State policies are but one determinant of those terms and conditions [under which a shift to an adult worker family model might take place], and a causal relationship between them and behaviour is remarkably difficult to demonstrate” (p. 274). It is, of course, less difficult to claim causality. Lewis’ conclusion is consistent with Gershuny’s, claiming that a huge range of policies, institutions, infrastructure, and behavior patterns all overlap and reinforce each other. Gershuny could be argued to be suggesting that unless one can change the whole show, then marginal changes in one or another particular policy will not make any demonstrable difference. Despite the small amount of change
that can, at best, be expected to result from any one policy, he thinks that it is still worth having policies that encourage men to do a share of domestic and care work as a signal from the state that this is a good idea (personal communication with J. Gershuny).

One last point that needs to be considered under this heading is that we still have differences in both the amounts of unpaid work and in the gender shares across countries. Does this not imply that country-specific factors, even policy differences, are at work to explain some of the differences? Although it cannot be ruled out that policies are explaining some of the differences, we also have to recognize that policy and legal differences reflect differences in national populations’ values, attitudes, and preferences. People make and support the institutions under which they live. The national differences are likely to reflect, therefore, the whole host of elements, infrastructure, institutions, policies, and preferences that Gershuny argues lay beneath and structure individuals’ time use decisions.

These arguments amount, therefore, to the view that one policy change alone is unlikely to have a realistic chance of producing equality in the shares of unpaid work within households. This is because the scale of the task is very ambitious, and policy changes mostly have to be incremental to be politically acceptable. However, pressure from policies, when it coincides with changes such as lagged adaptation, may help to move things a bit more in the direction of equality, but there is no hard evidence about this.

IS EQUALITY IN UNPAID WORK WHAT WOMEN WANT?

Some authors have argued that equality in domestic work is not what the majority of men or even women want. The case for preferences driving decisions about paid work has been argued, mainly about the United Kingdom, by Hakim (2000), although this preference argument is not without critics (Crompton 2006). Hakim argues that it is possible to divide the female population into three groups according to their preferences: there are the career women who are focused on paid work; there are the homemakers who are focused on unpaid work and care; and, between these two, there is the adaptive group who will do paid work, probably part-time, but will give it up when it gets in the way of family commitments, because these have priority. The adaptive group is argued to be the majority of women among whom part-time paid work is very popular. It is certainly the case that part-time paid hours are popular among some women, despite part-time work being predominantly low paid and low skilled in many countries. There is also evidence in many countries that many women who are in full-time paid work would prefer to work fewer hours per week, although many men would prefer to spend fewer hours in paid work too (OECD 2001). The desire for
flexibility in working hours and for extending maternity leave rights and pay have also been popular in Britain, especially among women (DTI 2000). In expressing support for such options, women are indicating that they are happy to adopt the difference approach to being paid workers, with fewer hours, less attachment, less work experience, and, presumably, less pay and less career promotion. Such policies facilitate an accommodation to gender inequality and a continuation of the unequal domestic division of unpaid work, because they do not require the household boat to be rocked.

Counter to this claim that a redistribution of unpaid work is not what women want, other commentators would point out that the so-called choices that parents make are still being made on a playing field that is not level or equal between genders. There are a range of other policies that support the (higher paid) male partner working longer paid hours than the female, and then there is still the unequal wage rate issue. Nonetheless, we cannot totally discount people’s expressed preferences. Parents like part-time paid work, they like flexibility in their working hours, and they are generally happy with the care policies that acknowledge that women are different and treat them differently. It seems unlikely that equality in unpaid work will come from such preferences. However, societal attitudes have clearly been changing as mothers have done more paid work (Scott 2008), and this may continue to have an associated affect on shares of domestic work within households.

THE TIME SPENT ON DOMESTIC AND UNPAID WORK IS CHANGING ANYWAY

Another argument against policy intervention is that the time spent on unpaid work by women has been decreasing without policy interventions. We now have many detailed time use studies of men’s and women’s time spent in unpaid work, which go across years and across countries and years. Such data reinforce the picture that women in a large range of countries spend more time and do a greater share of unpaid work than men (see Table 5.2). However, there are other “stylized facts” about domestic work:

- Adding up women’s and men’s paid and unpaid work leads to near equality in the amounts of total work done by men and women, or men doing slightly more total work than women (see Table 5.2) (Jacobs and Gerson 2001). Such figures show that claims of the “double burden” carried by women who are employed and do the larger share of unpaid work are not often supported. In fact, Sullivan and Gershuny (2003) have shown that there is little evidence that the double burden exists for the vast majority of women. If anything, it is a temporary phenomenon or one based on perceptions rather than total amounts of time spent on both paid and unpaid work.
• The average amounts of domestic work and paid work vary by country as well as by gender (see Table 5.2 and Geist, Chapter 11, this volume).

• Although women appear to do more of the unpaid work hours and to have a larger share than men (see Table 5.2), the calculations of the amount of hours spent on unpaid domestic work have also been found to depend on which tasks and work items are included in the calculations. When gardening and maintenance or odd jobs are included, the gap between men and women in number of weekly hours spent on unpaid domestic work narrows substantially (Gershuny 2000).

• There are no notable gender divisions in time spent in personal care or in shopping (Gershuny 2000).

• There have been changes over time and by country in the amounts and the shares of unpaid work (Gershuny 2000; Jacobs and Gerson 2001; Robinson and Godbey 1997). The time spent on domestic household work by women has been declining over time in many countries (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny 2000; Harkness 2008). The time spent on domestic work by men has increased, but not as fast as the increase in women’s paid work. Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice (2005) have demonstrated that moving from being out of paid work into paid work, especially if it is full-time, is associated with women doing fewer hours of domestic work. Corresponding increases in men’s hours of domestic work are visible when they move out of paid work or when their wives make the opposite transition.

• Early during the 20th century, increases in women’s paid work were matched by a decrease in time spent on domestic work. However, for every 2-hour increase in paid work, domestic work declined by 1 hour. Later in the century, this process continued with every 2-hour increase in paid work being associated with a 1.5-hour decline in unpaid work. More recent 21st-century British data suggest that declines in women’s domestic work are continuing, but now the decline in domestic work time exceeds the increase in paid work time (Harkness 2008).

• Gershuny (2000) describes this combination of changes in women’s and men’s paid work and domestic work times as movements toward a gender convergence in time spent on the different types of work. He also presents evidence that this move toward convergence is apparent in a large number of countries.

One conclusion we could draw from these detailed analyses of time use diaries is that, over time, and without any particular state policy intervention, women’s unpaid domestic work has been declining while men’s contributions have been growing. The changes in men’s unpaid contributions have admittedly been smaller than changes in women’s paid work, but they have changed nonetheless. Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice (2005) are optimistic that this process of lagged adaptation in men’s behavior will continue to lead to further changes and toward equality in shares of domestic work. As we
noted earlier, equality in shares could be achieved by a continued reduction in total hours of the kind that has been occurring, with women’s hours of unpaid work decreasing more than those of men—a trend documented from time use diaries.

The forces that appear to have brought about these changes, as far as commentators can tell, are as follows. It has been suggested that technological change in household appliances has offered labor-saving efficiency in carrying out some of the core domestic tasks. However, detailed attempts to measure the time gains from labor-saving appliances have not identified definitive gains (Bittman, Rice, and Wajcman 2004; van der Lippe, Tijdens, and de Ruijter 2004). Another suggestion is that declining fertility has led to smaller families across the industrialized world, and this has reduced the amount of unpaid domestic work. Numbers of children as well as their ages have been found to be positively correlated with amounts of time spent on unpaid work (Gershuny 2000). It is also possible that women have reduced their unpaid work because of doing paid work, either because they are more tired, have lowered their domestic standards, or can afford to outsource more jobs. However, declines in domestic work are also visible among women who do part-time paid work and among those who are not employed (Gershuny 2000). Last, economic mechanisms have also been offered as part of the explanation of the changes. Here, the mechanism is that as women’s wage rates have increased in response to their greater education and human capital, the opportunity cost of doing unpaid work instead of paid work increases and women are likely to switch from one to the other. Over time, however, there have been relative price changes, particularly price increases, in purchased goods and services (paid cleaners or housekeepers). This price increase would lead us to expect that women would substitute their own cheaper housework production for the more expensive purchases of goods and services. However, the increasing incomes that have also occurred over time mean that people will prefer leisure to unpaid work, and will switch to purchasing goods and services to reduce their own housework. It is the greater effect of increasing incomes that has been winning over substitution effects. This argument, essentially, is that the progress of modern economies has built into it, given technological progress but subject to business cycle fluctuations, forces that are leading to declining work (paid and unpaid) and increasing leisure. These forces are not policy driven and are likely to continue into the future without policy assistance.

However, there are groups who do not fit this pattern, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. Increasing weekly hours of paid work is evident among some groups of managers and professionals (Jacobs and Gerson 2001; Kodz et al. 2003), even if the majority are having greater leisure.
MECHANISMS THAT DETERMINE THE AMOUNTS AND SHARES OF UNPAID WORK

We can pursue the issue of how far policy can hope to change the amounts or shares of unpaid work by considering the determinants of the amounts of unpaid work and how these are shared. Table 5.3 sets out the main factors that are likely to affect the number of hours of unpaid work for a household by type of unpaid work, alongside the main factors affecting the gendered share of unpaid hours by the type of unpaid work. The amounts of unpaid work are rarely discussed except at the mean, but these vary considerably across households. People need to shop, cook, eat, wash themselves and their clothes, and iron their clothes. They also need to do at least some cleaning of their living space. In addition, where there is a garden and a car, time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unpaid Work</th>
<th>Determinants of Its Total Hours</th>
<th>Determinants of Gendered Shares in Hours of Unpaid Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child care</td>
<td>Hours will increase with number of children, age of youngest child, whether child is a teenager, class</td>
<td>Wages rates of male/female partners will influence decisions/negotiations on partners’ hours of work</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Availability of male/female partners after hours of paid work decisions made</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preferences about child care will be built into decisions on number of children, and decisions about hours of paid work of partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>Hours will increase with the size of living space, the number of children, being in a rural location (where children probably spend more time outside, have more freedom, and get dirtier), and preferences about standards of cleanliness; and hours vary with income level (ability to substitute subcontracted cleaning)</td>
<td>Availability of male/female partners after hours of paid work made</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes of male partner</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preferences about standards of male/female partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance (care of house</td>
<td>Hours will increase with ownership of house/flat compared with renting, size of house, house compared with apartment, older age of property, number of cars, preferences about DIY projects; and hours vary with income (higher income allows subcontracting this work)</td>
<td>Preferences about maintenance, built into choice of housing and cars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fabric, clean car, DIY)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Availability of male/female partners after hours of paid work decisions made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardening</td>
<td>Hours will increase with living in a house versus an apartment, the size of the garden, and preferences about gardening</td>
<td>Preferences about gardening of male/female partners will be built into choice of housing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
can be spent keeping a garden, and maintaining and cleaning a car. All these activities can be done extensively or in a minimalist way. People can walk to a local store to do their shopping or drive to a larger out-of-town supermarket, cook ready-made bought food or buy ingredients to do the preparation and cooking themselves, iron all of their clothes or put some on wrinkled. Cleaning the house and cooking are probably the elements of domestic work that are more varying in the time that can be committed to them, according to personal preferences about cooking and household cleanliness. The main determinants of total time spent on domestic work can be argued, therefore, to be related to personal preferences about standards of cleanliness, food and cooking, do-it-yourself home repairs and improvements, gardening, the numbers of people in the house weighted by whether there are children and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unpaid Work</th>
<th>Determinants of Its Total Hours</th>
<th>Determinants of Gendered Shares in Hours of Unpaid Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>Hours will increase with the number of adults and children in the household</td>
<td>Shopping for personal items (e.g., clothing) done by male/female partners</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other shopping may have detailed gendered expectations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Food shopping depends on availability of male/female partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washing and ironing, cooking, and preparing meals</td>
<td>Hours will increase with the number of adults and children in the household, according to the preferences about fast food versus home-cooked meals, preferences about level of elaboration of meals/ironed clothes.</td>
<td>Gendered attitudes of male/female partners to washing and ironing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Availability of partner after hours of paid work decisions made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Affects work intensity rather than requiring more hours; Accomplished by multitasking alongside other unpaid or paid work activity</td>
<td>Preference between partners about who wants to be the manager; this may be built into decisions about paid work hours</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This work may naturally gravitate to the partner who spends most time at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion</td>
<td>Mostly does not involve additional hours of work, except in times of upset and conflict when hours may be allocated to it</td>
<td>Studies suggest that women do most of this work, but no reasons have been offered. It may be related to women’s preferences, which if not met, cause them more problems than they cause men, who may have different preferences. It is also possible that this is a biological difference between men and women, not sociological or a result of culture differences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many items also vary by class, but this can also influence unpaid work through preferences, income, and choices of housing and family size. DIY, do-it-yourself.
how many; the number of rooms in the house; the location of the house in an urban or rural environment; and the level of household income.

Shopping, ironing, washing, and cooking times would be expected to increase, all things being equal, with the number of adults and children in the household. Cleaning time would be expected to increase, all things being equal, with the size of the house, with owning a car, with the number of children, and with being in a rural location where children probably spend more time outside, have more freedom, and get dirtier. High standards of cleanliness or cooking will increase the unpaid work. The amount of unpaid work time does not increase substantially, I would argue, for the manager of the household, because it is likely to be done while multitasking, but the intensity of work may well increase as a result (Hochschild 1989, 1997). However, one can imagine that the manager, who is most often the woman, thinks that the time spent is greater or her share is greater when she accepts more responsibility. This may help to explain why women tend to overstate their own contributions to unpaid domestic work and understate men’s contributions (Kamo 2000; Lee and Waite 2005; Geist, Chapter 11, this volume). It may also mean that women fail to recognize, as time use diaries show, that there is mostly equality in the total of paid plus unpaid work time that men and women contribute to the household.

For some households, the amount of unpaid work that women would like to do (to achieve their standards of cooking or cleaning, to display femininity, or to fulfill their ecofriendly values) might even be the key driver of the gender share in total unpaid domestic working hours. For example, if there is a strong preference for a lifestyle that involves a high amount of unpaid work time, then this implies the need for reduction in paid working hours within the household. The desirable number of hours of unpaid work may be a preference or value that both partners have agreed upon when they entered into their partnership; or, alternatively, in some households, it may be a cause of conflict. For example, a couple that has a high standard of cleaning (or that wants a large family or that prefers time-intensive home cooking to fast food or that wants to live in a huge mansion) will have to decide that one of them needs to have fewer paid working hours to fulfill their preferences. For such couples, the decision to have unequal shares of unpaid and paid work follows automatically from their values or preferences, although there are clearly deep gendered feelings from tradition that underpin these preference as well as hard economic facts and relative wages. The majority of couples will be making decisions about their houses, family size values, and preferences jointly. Women are, therefore, implicated in the amounts of work that result from these decisions. Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice (2005) also point out, as do others, that there are routine elements to
the shares of domestic work and who does what, and inertia sets in after routines have become established. Couples will be influenced by gender cultures, which are fairly widespread across countries, in which many domestic jobs are implicitly understood to be women’s work.

But wouldn’t the preferences and decisions of any one couple be different if the majority of couples were egalitarian in the division of paid and unpaid work time? This may well be the case. However, it is still likely that policy interventions will not find such factors easy to change. Policy as a route to changing the preferences that underpin the amounts of time spent on unpaid work and its shares is likely to be unrealistic. However, it may be the case that preferences or circumstances change after couples get together, and male and female partners may change in different directions (Gerson 1985, 1993). When this occurs, policies encouraging men to spend more time on unpaid work may be suddenly in tune with their personal changes and have more impact. Similarly, there may be critical times in couples’ lives when change is more possible—for example, when a second or third child arrives and more parenting time is required, or when the male partner loses his job. So policy influences may be able to have greater effects at these critical times, and in such cases.

After decisions are made that commit the male partner to paid work for longer hours than the female partner, shares of unpaid work during which the female partner does more are likely to result. One could even argue that fairness demands that women do more unpaid work in the home if they are going to do less paid work outside it. The female partner could, in principle, do more paid work, but the wage rates are against this choice and in favor of women’s specialization in home work (Becker 1991). Men are able to earn more per hour, on average, than women. So it is more efficient for the man to work, and thus, he accumulates more human capital, which will bring him higher wages in the future. But this just reinforces the unequal wage rates for men and women, and locks women into the unpaid home work. Does this really matter? After all, the couple has committed to living together as a unit, and they gain additional family income by this specialization. In the past, couples were happy to do this, but times have changed. It is now seen as riskier for the woman to compromise her earning potential. If she is going to have to do paid work in the future, she needs to maintain her earning potential to cope with uncertainties, such as the man’s unemployment or divorce, and to be able to have a reasonable pension in old age, or, in the United States, to have employer-based health insurance. So, is it possible to change the wage ratio to make a more level playing field for men and women’s intrahousehold decision making? This is considered in the next section.
WOULD IT BE A GOOD IDEA TO FORCE MEN TO DO MORE UNPAID WORK?

Were the means available to coerce or force men to do more unpaid work, would this be a good idea? This brings up another of the arguments against more coercive policy interventions for fathers to do more caring. This issue has been raised by authors such as Baldock and Hadlow (2004). If it is care work that is being considered as unpaid work, compulsion to care goes against the inherent meaning of the activity. The argument is that one cannot force someone to be responsible and attentive in a competent manner, feeling the emotions that need to accompany the actions for caring to take place. The most that is possible is that people are given the choice to care and favorable conditions to do so. In this sense, parental leave policies such as Daddy Leave are reasonable, because they retain the element of choice. Although one could argue that women have less choice about caring whereas men have more choices not to care, the evidence points to women generally being happy with caring roles and not wanting to give them up. There may be a stronger case for getting men to share ironing and cleaning, because emotions or love are not necessarily required to carry out these tasks to a reasonable standard. In practice, however, child care is more rewarding, and where men have increased their household contribution, it has been more in child care than in other core domestic duties.

In conclusion, there are serious doubts about whether it is possible or realistic to expect or hope that policy changes of the sort we have seen to date can change the amounts of paid and unpaid work done by men and women, or equalize their shares of unpaid work. Policies probably are one of the supporting planks that help to maintain the unequal gendered division of unpaid work within households, but there appear to be plenty of other contributors, all too many in fact to make policy change a driver of sizeable changes in these shares.

UNTried POLICIES

Shares of unpaid work within households are related to the unequal wage rates of men and women. As mentioned earlier, state policy attempts to change the female-to-male wage ratio to achieve changes in the shares of unpaid work are not in evidence. The concept of wages for housework has been discussed and suggested, but never implemented (e.g., Young and Halsey 1995). In the United States during the 1970s, the possibility of crediting homemakers with social security contributions was discussed, but not adopted. Women’s behavior in entering the labor market in large numbers
has made redundant any policy interest in such ideas. Cash for parental care is a policy that has many examples, including parental leave. More recent examples used in Finland and Norway offer parents the choice between cash to care for their own children at home or a subsidized place in formal child care. Such policies have been popular among lower paid women who are the ones who have taken the cash and stayed at home, rather than choosing the child care places. These policies are criticized by feminists who think that women will only be emancipated through employment. However, none of these policies has tried to manipulate women’s wages.

It is not likely to be possible to change suddenly the amounts of human capital that are embedded in individuals’ wage rates, such as the differing amounts of paid work experience men and women have. But legislating for equal pay for equivalent work is a policy that starts to tackle the issue, as long as it is actually implemented in workplaces. Similarly, gender pay audits and pay reviews, as well as enforced monitoring of pay and equal opportunities, can assist in making sure women do not fall behind when they are in paid jobs. However, the result of several decades or more of trying to achieve gender wage equality is that both raw and adjusted-for-work-experience female-to-male wage ratios remain resistant to equality in nearly all countries.

One approach to increasing the wages of partnered women relative to men would be to tax partnered men’s wages sufficiently to give women in paid work a sizeable tax credit to boost their hourly wage rate to the same level as their partner’s after-tax hourly rate. This policy could, in principle, equalize wage rates and eliminate the incentive for the female partner to be the person who did more of the paid work. Whether equality in wage rates would be sufficient to get the women to do the paid work is not clear, because there is still a lot of evidence that women like caring (Houston and Marks 2005). This would certainly be a serious test of whether policy could effect the degree of change necessary for equal shares in unpaid work.

CONCLUSION

The determinants of both the amounts of unpaid work done by households as well as the shares done by men and women are more extensive and more complex than is often assumed in social policy discussions about policy levers. After one examines them in detail, it is clear that different factors influence households’ decisions, and these vary according to the type of unpaid work that is being considered. This chapter emphasized that taking a disaggregated look at domestic work is important. Advancing the debates and theorizing will only take place through researching domestic work at a
disaggregated level and acquiring the necessary data to do that. The extent of unpaid work has many of its roots in the values, attitudes, and preferences of couples, which are probably agreed and accepted at an early stage in partnerships, at least in the ones that last. Early arrangements do seem to become habituated and hard to break, because a whole lifestyle is often built around them. In addition, they are built upon many generations of “doing gender” role models. These deep-rooted preferences may be as important in underpinning household decision making as relative wage rates are in the allocation of who does the paid (and unpaid) work, although clearly preferences and behavior have been changing, so they are not fixed immutably. Changes in circumstances and preferences do occur for some couples at critical points. There is evidence that transitions in to and out of paid work are times when changes occur in domestic hours, which may even lead to complete reversals of traditional roles for some couples. So far, interventions, such as Daddy Leave, that attempt to change men’s orientations to home work have been limited in their goals, and while having had some success in getting men to increase their amounts of unpaid work and care, have left the gendered shares of domestic work some way off equality.

However, it is not policies that have produced the most dramatic changes we have seen to date. Very large changes have taken place in women’s and mothers’ employment behavior, which have led rather than followed changes in policy and even changes in public opinion. These behavior changes have led to the push to change policies that have been generally in the direction of recognizing women as different from men—a position that the majority of women probably support, despite its being likely to reinforce gender inequality in the workplace. At the same time, there has been an ongoing discourse and demand from feminists for full equality in the workplace as well as in the home. However, full equality is probably not what the majority of women want to see. Rather, more realistic is a shift toward higher relative pay, especially for work of equal value, and maybe a significant, but possibly small, increase in men’s contributions to unpaid work in the home. This would leave women free to do paid work, be the majority caregiver and multitasking manager of unpaid domestic and emotion work at home, but not be totally equal in time spent in paid or unpaid work.

In conclusion, there are serious doubts about whether it is possible or realistic to expect that policy changes of the sort we have seen to date can equalize the shares of women and men’s unpaid work, although policies may be able to help achieve smaller changes in the shares. If policies were aligned to facilitate such changes at critical points when men are open to change, there might be more couples who take them up, but it is unlikely to be a majority. Full equality in shares of unpaid work is a much larger and more elusive target.
Can State Policies Produce Equality in Housework?

Notes

1. For example, Lewis (2008) cites a finding from Gershuny (2000) as her source for claiming that, despite the increase in paid work by women, “women have continued to bear the brunt of care work in families in all western countries; women have changed their labour market behaviour much faster and to a much greater degree than men have changed their participation in domestic work” (p. 269).

2. It is, however, the case, in nearly all countries, that at particular life course stages, the majority of couples do spend a period or several periods of childbirth with one full-time earner, the male partner, while the female partner takes time out of employment to have the child and care for it. These periods have been getting successively shorter and shorter over the generations of mothers (Macran, Joshi, and Dex 1996).

3. Belgium, Italy, Finland, Sweden, and Norway offer some payment while parents are on leave.

4. Portugal offers fathers 5 obligatory days of paternity leave plus 15 days of fully paid parental leave if taken immediately after maternity leave. Spain and Slovenia offer fathers 15 days of paternity leave at full pay. The United Kingdom, since 2003, offers fathers 2 weeks of paid paternity leave.

5. Finland offers fathers 18 days paid paternity leave (not well paid) plus 12 bonus days for fathers who take at least 2 months' paternity leave. Germany gives a family 2 extra months of paid parental leave if the father takes at least 2 months' leave.

6. One month of leave was allocated to the father in Sweden only from January 1, 2002; from January 1, 2005, this period was extended to 2 months.

7. In the United Kingdom and Germany, official definitions draw the boundary between full- and part-time weekly hours at 30 per week, whereas in Sweden and Finland, the boundary is drawn at 35 hour per week. In Sweden, there are particular employment rights for mothers to work part-time hours that coincide with this threshold.

8. The introduction of a minimum wage in the United Kingdom in 1999 did improve a large number of low-paid women’s wages, but given the low level at which it was introduced, it has not made a large impact on the female-to-male wage ratio.

9. Ironically, Denmark abandoned its trial of Daddy Leave in 2002, because it was criticized as interfering with men's freedom to choose. Lewis (2008) thinks this is erroneous reasoning and that Daddy Leave—“use it or lose it”—does offer men a freedom to choose.

10. There are arguments that women have low expectations, culturally as well as economically embedded, that make them loath to express dissatisfaction. This is akin to Marx’s concept of alienation. To take such views seriously, we must question whether we can ever believe anything anyone ever says. We also have to take the strong position of telling people we know what would make them happy/satisfied better than they know themselves. These are not positions that I would want to support.
REFERENCES


Can State Policies Produce Equality in Housework?


In recent years, scholars have become increasingly interested in the link between gender equality in the nation and in the household. The motivating idea of their research is that household processes such as the division of housework can be affected by national characteristics such as the employment rates of women, their presence in the higher reaches of the government and private sector, the prevalence of antidiscrimination laws and policies, and other societal markers of the status of women. A number of studies have used data from multiple countries to analyze the gender gap in the performance of domestic labor. They have established both the universality of this gap as well as important cross-national differences in its magnitude and correlates. Although it would be too much to say that this research has unambiguously demonstrated a relationship between gender inequalities at the national and household levels, its findings are at least suggestive of such a connection (e.g., Batalova and Cohen 2002, Fuwa 2004).

Here we ask a different question: Are countries with greater economic inequality among women characterized by greater disparity in their performance of domestic labor? Our analysis addresses a major gap in the existing cross-national scholarship on housework. Like the quantitative housework literature in general, prior cross-national research has focused on the gender gap and has paid relatively little attention to disparities in domestic labor among women. Specifically, it has not analyzed gaps in housework among women that are related to economic differences among them. Consequently, we know how much more time women spend than men on domestic labor in many countries, but not how much more or less time women with low earnings spend on this kind of work compared with those with higher earnings. And the recent wave of cross-national quantitative studies has not examined the possible connections between economic inequality at the national level and inequalities in time use among women.

In this chapter we perform the first cross-national investigation to date of the relationship between economic inequality among women and disparities
in their time spent on domestic labor. Using large, nationally representative samples of women in heterosexual couple households from Germany, Sweden, and the United States, we analyze what we will call the economic gap in women’s housework. We focus on the gap related to differences in the earnings of married and cohabiting women. For each country, we report the observed difference in time spent on housework by women with the lowest and highest 10 percent of earnings in that country. Furthermore, we compare this economic disparity in women’s housework time with the gender gap in domestic labor within each country. To account for the variation in women’s earnings that comes from differences in their employment hours, we present our findings separately for women employed full-time.

Our purpose here is twofold. First, we simply want to focus attention on the economic gap in women’s domestic labor in each country. Second, we would like to suggest that the logic of linking inequality at the national and household levels, used in the literature to date with respect to the gender gap in housework, may also be applicable to within-gender disparities in domestic labor. Across countries, greater earnings inequality may be associated with wider gaps in the burden of domestic labor among women. The three nations in our study are ideal for this investigation, because they feature varying levels of economic inequality among women. They also fall at different points on the continuum of collective versus market regulation of earnings, provision of social benefits, and other factors affecting disparities in earnings. Our comparison of the economic gap in women’s housework across these three countries is suggestive of this broader divergence among them.

BACKGROUND

Housework and Women’s Earnings

Our study brings together two separate lines of inquiry in the scholarship on gender relations in heterosexual couple households. The first has documented the role of women as independent economic actors with respect to household finances and expenditures (Bellante and Foster 1984; Cohen 1998; Ludwig-Mayerhofer, Gartner, and Allmendinger 2006; Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis 1991). This research implies the importance of earnings inequality among women for outcomes like the division of domestic labor, but does not pursue this theme. A second strand of investigation concerns the relationship between gender inequality at the country and household levels (Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Breen and Cooke 2005; Calasanti and Bailey 1991; Fuwa 2004; Künzler 1998). This research emphasizes the need to account for gender disparities in the wider context within which households are embedded, but typically does not examine inequalities among women. Here we draw on the insights of both of these bodies of literature to frame
our comparative investigation of the relationship between disparities in women’s housework and earnings.

We consider first the literature on household spending. There is growing evidence that women in couple households have different priorities from their male partners for monetary expenditures, particularly with regard to children and substitutes for domestic labor. A pioneering study by Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) showed that government cash payments to mothers in the United Kingdom during the late 1970s were associated with greater expenditures on women’s and children’s clothing compared with expenditures on men’s. Brandon (1999) found that in the United States, mothers’ own earnings increased the odds of their choosing market child care over parental care; fathers’ incomes affected child care choices only if husbands and wives pooled their incomes. Similarly, Phipps and Burton (1998) reported that only women’s incomes were associated with child care expenditures in Canada, even when both spouses were employed full-time.

More directly to the point of our study, the evidence is accumulating that household expenditures on market substitutes for housework are driven particularly by women’s earnings. Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis (1991) found that women’s wage rates, but not men’s, were positively associated with spending on housework substitutes. Oropesa (1993) also reported a link, for women employed full-time, between their own incomes and the likelihood of paying someone to clean the home. Phipps and Burton (1998) and Cohen (1998) found that women’s incomes, more than their husbands’, were directly associated with household spending on eating out; Cohen (1998) showed that this was also the case for spending on housekeeping services. Most recently, Treas and de Ruijter (2008) confirm that the association of household spending on outsourcing routine housework with women’s earnings is greater than its association with their partners’ earnings.

An important implication of these findings is that women with high earnings may have an advantage, with respect to time spent on domestic labor, over their low-earning peers. However, the literature has not examined this potential disparity among women in time spent on household labor nearly as thoroughly as it has the housework gender gap. The theoretical roots of this omission lie in the sustained focus of the quantitative literature on the relationship between married women’s housework and their economic resources relative to their husbands’ (e.g., Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Greenstein 2000). The dominant theoretical models in this research, the “economic exchange” and “gender display” hypotheses, do not distinguish between women with low and high earnings (see Bittman et al. [2003] for a lucid overview of both models). They implicitly assume that a married woman with low earnings is equivalent to another with high earnings with respect to their time spent on housework, at least
if their earnings relative to their husbands’ are the same. This conceptual approach has precluded the investigation of a relationship between earnings inequality among women and variation in their time spent on housework.

The existence of an economic gap among women in their time spent on household labor has been suggested in a recent study by Gupta (2007). Using the National Survey of Families and Households from the United States, Gupta (2007) found that only their own earnings mattered to women’s housework time, not their earnings relative to their partners’, and not their partners’ earnings. This result implies that inequalities in women’s own earnings could be more consequential for differences in their housework time than variation in their relative earnings or in total household income. Placed in the context of the literature on household spending discussed earlier, it suggests that women deploy their own earnings more than their male partners’ for the purposes of reducing time spent on housework.

Furthermore, women with low earnings may experience additional housework burdens if they lack labor-saving devices. For example, washing and drying clothing may take longer if it has to be carried to and from laundromats. Shopping could take longer for women who have to use public transportation. Women with young children who cannot afford preschool or child care may have to spend more time on housework because of the continuous presence of their children dirtying the home. The volume of housework for poor women may also increase if they live in deteriorating housing that requires them to clean up after leaking pipes or flaking plaster, as in the extreme example documented by Kotlowitz (1991, pp. 27–28). Given the same volume of work, such factors may increase the labor intensity of their household labor. For all these reasons, an analysis of the consequences of economic differences among women for their time spent doing housework is overdue.

**Housework, Earnings, and Nation**

The second set of ideas informing our study concerns the relationship between gender hierarchies at the macro level and those operating in households. Some scholars have argued that the division of domestic labor, a micro- or household-level process, must be understood in the context of gender inequality in the larger social settings in which households exist. In this view, gender structures at the macro level are not merely the aggregation of smaller units such as households, but rather can exert an independent influence on them. For example, Blumberg and Coleman (1989) argued that gender inequalities at the macro level could “discount” the effect of women’s individual assets on household processes such as the division of housework; conversely, a greater degree of societal gender equality may enhance the effect of those resources. An alternative possibility was suggested by Calas-
anti and Bailey (1991), who argued that state provision of various services in Sweden reduced the relevance of individual resources to time spent on housework. By contrast, such resources may be more pertinent in the United States, with its comparatively weaker social welfare system and greater reliance on markets.

These competing ideas have received mixed support in the literature. Like the single-country research on the relationship between earnings and housework, cross-national studies have focused on the relationship between women’s housework and their earnings relative to their husbands or partners. Calasanti and Bailey (1991) found that relative income mattered more for housework in the United States than it did for Sweden. However, a recent analysis of data from 22 nations by Fuwa (2004) provided some corroboration for the argument of Blumberg and Coleman (1989). Fuwa (2004) found a stronger negative association in countries with greater equality between women’s share of domestic labor on the one hand, and their employment hours and egalitarian gender ideology on the other. But there were no significant differences in the relationship between women’s relative income and their share of housework between countries with high and low levels of gender equality. An earlier analysis by Baxter (1997) on data from five countries, including Sweden and the United States, also did not discover differences in the association between relative income and domestic labor.

Two other recent studies have investigated the relationship between women’s relative income and their housework time using data from more than one country (Bittman et al. 2003; Evertsson and Nermo 2004). The first found that the housework time of Australian married women whose earnings were less than their husbands’ varied inversely with their relative earnings, as predicted by the economic exchange model of the relationship between earnings and domestic labor. However, the housework time of women whose earnings were more than their husbands’ exceeded that of other women. This conforms to the gender display hypothesis, which predicts that women with unusually high earnings compared with their male partners’ will compensate for their gender-atypical earnings by spending more time on housework than other women. In contrast to this behavior of Australian women, Bittman et al. (2003) found that the housework time of U.S. married women fit the exchange model.

Their findings for the United States were contradicted by Evertsson and Nermo (2004) who reported that U.S. women’s housework behavior also fit the gender display model. However, they found that Swedish women’s domestic labor varied inversely with their relative earnings, in keeping with the economic exchange hypothesis. Both studies speculated that in countries in which high relative earnings for women were more “deviant,” women may compensate for their economic deviance by spending more time on
housework than women whose relative earnings were more gender typical. Although these studies did not explicitly draw upon the hypothesis of Blumberg and Coleman (1989), it could be argued that the prevalence of high relative earnings for women indicates the degree of gender equality at the macro level. Thus, high relative earnings for women may be discounted in countries like Australia and the United States compared with a nation like Sweden, where they are more common.

**Nation and Earnings Inequality among Women**

Because of its focus on women’s relative earnings, and more generally on gender inequality, none of the existing cross-national studies of housework has compared the implications of economic inequality among women for disparities in their housework time. Here we compare across three countries the disparities in domestic labor based on the inequality in women’s own earnings. In the spirit of the existing cross-national research on domestic labor, we describe briefly the different national contexts of economic inequality. We do not have the data to test the association formally between macrolevel indicators of inequality among women and differences in their housework time. Our more modest aim is, therefore, to suggest the theoretical and practical importance of this relationship and to motivate its further investigation.

An important determinant of earnings inequality among women is whether they are employed in the first place, and the distribution of part-time versus full-time employment among those who are. (Except where specifically noted, the following summary of the literature on inequality in the three countries is derived from Orloff [2002].) Among the countries in our study, Sweden has the highest rates of labor force participation and full-time employment among women, and Germany the lowest. These cross-national differences are generally understood in terms of the degree of state support for women’s labor force activity. Sweden is a dual-earner society that provides substantial subsidies for child care and other benefits to maximize the rates of women’s employment and full-time work among those employed. In contrast, Germany, with its high taxation of second incomes, limited state provision of child care, and a strong normative orientation toward in-home maternal care for young children, is described in the literature as a “male breadwinner regime.” The “market-oriented” approach of the United States, which stresses equal opportunity for paid work but lacks state provision of care services, has lower rates of women’s labor force participation and full-time employment than Sweden, but higher rates than Germany.

Earnings inequality among women in the labor force is affected by many of the same factors that shape it for male workers. These include the strength of labor unions, and the distribution of workers and range of earnings across jobs and occupations. Sweden is typically described as being “social–
democratic” in this regard. Its progressive tax system is designed to reduce extreme economic inequality and fund extensive social benefits. A long tradition of collective bargaining and a relatively high unionization rate may also help reduce wage inequality. Furthermore, the earnings gap among Swedish women may be dampened by their concentration in the public sector, which, on average, pays lower wages than the private sector. Germany’s more “conservative” regime also features high levels of taxation, but, in contrast to Sweden, the German tax system offers a disincentive to wives’ employment by imposing especially severe tax burdens on secondary earners (Laurin 2006; Sainsbury 1999). As a result, fewer women are in the labor market in Germany, and after-tax earnings inequalities among employed women are higher than in Sweden. The market-oriented or “liberal” United States, with lower levels of taxation and unionization, has the highest variance in earnings among the three countries we consider. Swedish women are less concentrated than U.S. women in managerial and other highly remunerative private sector occupations (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). The greater presence of women in high-paying private-sector jobs in the United States, and the higher wages in such jobs there, may contribute to the higher dispersion in their earnings. The ranking of the three countries with respect to dispersion in women’s earnings is clearly evident in Table 6.1, which shows mean earnings for all women and for those employed full-time.

National Differences in the Relationship between Women’s Earnings and Housework

The economic gap in housework time among women in a particular country is affected not only by the extent of earnings inequality there, but also by the degree to which women’s earnings are associated with their time spent on housework. Because our focus here is on earnings inequality, we do not estimate the magnitude of this relationship. However, we note that in a hypothetical nation in which women’s earnings had no relationship to their domestic labor, there would be no economic gap in women’s housework (as we have defined it) no matter how extreme the earnings inequality is in that country. As discussed earlier, the literature on household spending suggests that the relationship between women’s earnings and their housework time reflects, in part, their purchase of market substitutes for domestic labor. If this is indeed the case, then the magnitude of the relationship in a given country represents most directly the cost and efficiency of substitutes. The cheaper they are, or the more housework they can defray per dollar, the larger the association between earnings and housework time. This association could further represent the normative acceptability in a particular place of using earnings to buy substitutes for housework, the propensity of women there to do so, or a combination of all these factors. It may also be
affected by the housework burden in a given country. The more time women in a particular nation spend on domestic labor, the greater their need or scope for substitution using their earnings.

Cross-national differences in the earnings gap in women’s housework time could also arise from differences in the prevalence of market substitution for the most time-consuming household chores such as cooking and cleaning. In the United States, 8 percent of married and cohabiting couples hire housekeeping services, although much higher proportions consume meals not prepared at home (Treas and de Ruijter 2008). The proportion of German households employing cleaning persons regularly was about 7 percent in 2005 (author calculations from the 2005 GSOEP), and virtually no households report doing so in Sweden (author calculations from the 2000 Swedish Level of Living Survey). Because of relatively high labor costs in Germany and Sweden, there is a black market for domestic services, and the actual rates of their utilization may be higher than those reported (Focus 2004, referring to Bundesknappschaft estimates for Germany). In both nations, tax policy changes are either in place or underway to ease the hiring of household help. It is also possible that there are national differences in the acceptability of employing household help. The negative relationship between women’s earnings and housework may also be the result of factors other than outsourcing, such as lower standards of cleanliness for women with higher earnings. In that case, national differences in the size of the relationship between women’s earnings and housework may reflect a divergence in this class variation in standards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>FULL-TIME</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany (n = 2,271)</td>
<td>Sweden (n = 1,464)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s weekly housework hours</td>
<td>Mean 20.3 15.0 20.1</td>
<td>13.5 13.4 15.1</td>
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<td>SD 11.5 8.3 13.9</td>
<td>6.6 7.1 10.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s annual earnings ($)</td>
<td>Mean 14.8 21.1 20.8</td>
<td>28.4 26.2 36.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>(thousands)</td>
<td>SD 15.9 11.8 29.0</td>
<td>15.0 10.9 37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s weekly employment hours</td>
<td>Mean 20.8 30.7 23.8</td>
<td>42.1 39.8 41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 18.7 13.9 18.3</td>
<td>5.8 2.6 7.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

SD, standard deviation.
To summarize, the preceding discussion suggests two principal ways in which national or macrolevel factors could affect the earnings-based disparity in women’s housework time. First, the size of this disparity among women in a given country is affected directly by the degree of inequality in their earnings. It will therefore reflect all the macrolevel factors that increase or reduce dispersion in women’s earnings. Second, the disparity in women’s housework time based on differences in their earnings is related to the extent to which those earnings can be translated into reductions in domestic labor. That, in turn, depends on the costs of housework substitution, the availability of domestic services, and the cultural norms regarding substitutes such as food prepared outside the home and the employment of household help. This relationship between women’s earnings and domestic labor in a particular country may also be affected by the magnitude of the housework burden there.

METHOD

Data: Sample
We use three large, nationally representative surveys from each country. The German data are derived from the 1999 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a longitudinal household survey that began in 1984, and, since June 1990, has included residents of the former German Democratic Republic, or East Germany. The data for Sweden come from the Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU) for the year 2000. For our U.S. sample, we use the 1999 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal survey that began in 1968. From each of these surveys we selected samples of women, age 18 to 65, in marital or cohabiting relationships with male partners. Sample sizes are 2,271 for Germany, 1,464 for Sweden, and 1,888 for the United States.

Data: Measures
The primary substantive variables of interest are weekly housework hours and annual earnings. Following the existing quantitative literature on domestic labor, we focus on tasks such as cooking and cleaning, which are mostly done by women and have to be performed regularly. Our measure of housework time in Germany was constructed from responses to questions about the number of hours usually spent on washing, cooking, and cleaning on a typical weekday and both weekend days. From the Swedish survey we created a measure of weekly housework hours from separate questions about time spent on shopping, cooking, doing the dishes, and cleaning. In contrast to the more detailed information on weekly housework available in the surveys from the other two countries, the measure in the United States is
obtained from a single survey question about time spent cooking, cleaning, and doing other work around the house. We discuss the implications of this less comprehensive U.S. measure for our findings in the conclusion.

With respect to annual earnings, our focus is on labor market earnings, including those obtained from self-employment. Additionally, the Swedish measure includes reimbursement from employment-based insurance such as health insurance and parental leave insurance. Unlike the data from the two European countries, the U.S. data on employment hours and earnings were obtained retrospectively 2 years after the 1999 interview. They may, therefore, be subject to greater error as a result of recall issues than the earnings data from Germany and Sweden. We discuss in the conclusion the implications of this possible measurement error for our findings.

**Analysis**

We define the economic gap in housework time as the observed difference in each country between the average hours spent per week on domestic labor by women with the lowest and highest 10 percent of annual earnings in that country. We exclude women with zero earnings. Because the three countries differ in the proportions of women employed and employed full-time, we report the gaps separately for all women and for women employed full-time. Presenting separate results for women employed full-time also addresses the possibility that women with a greater taste for housework than paid work have low earnings because of a lower commitment of time to the labor force. We also compare the magnitude of this economic disparity with the housework gender gap in each country, defined as the average difference between the women’s and their male partners’ weekly housework hours.

**Results**

Table 6.1 shows weighted means and standard deviations of the central variables for two groups of women: an unrestricted sample and a subset of women employed full-time. The mean time spent on housework among all women is lowest in Sweden, reflecting, in part, the higher proportion of women employed full-time there. The cross-national differences in housework hours are smaller among women employed full-time. Note that the variance in housework time is consistently highest in the United States. With respect to employment, Sweden has the highest mean weekly employment hours among all women and, correspondingly, the largest proportion of women employed full-time.

Table 6.2 shows the crux of our story—namely, the disparities in housework time in each country between women at the low and high ends of the earnings distribution. The figures shown are the averages for the lowest and
highest 10 percent of earnings (excluding zero earnings). Separate $t$-tests show that these two means are significantly different in all three countries for all women and for women employed full-time. We note first that the gap is meaningfully large in each of the three countries, particularly among all women, and even among women employed full-time. Swedish women employed full-time with low earnings spend a half hour more on domestic labor daily than their peers at the high end of the distribution. Second, this gap is greatest in the United States. Among women employed full-time, the women with the lowest 10 percent of earnings spend, on average, a full additional hour per day on housework compared with women in the top earnings bracket. This gap is substantially larger than the cross-national differences in housework time among women employed full-time: On average, full-time working women in the United States spend less than a quarter of an hour more per day on domestic labor than their European peers.

Figure 6.1 compares the economic disparity in housework time among women with the gender gap in housework time, here defined as the average difference between the women’s hours and their partners’. The striped bars represent the gender gap; the solid ones, the disparity based on women’s earnings. The black bars are for all women and the gray ones represent women employed full-time. We observe that the gender gap is largest in Germany and smallest in Sweden for both groups of women. The economic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ALL</th>
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<th>FULL-TIME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10th Percentile</td>
<td>90th Percentile</td>
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<td>10th Percentile</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>166.0</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>144.0</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>142.0</td>
<td>124.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>74.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD, standard deviation.
All within-country differences in means are different from zero at a significance level of 0.01 or better. The $n$-values are different for the two groups of women as a result of weighting of the earnings percentiles. In nearly every case, the weighted 90th percentile is higher than the unweighted one, resulting in smaller (unweighted) $n$-values for women with high earnings. This is most noticeable for Germany.
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The disparity in housework time is smallest in Sweden among all women, and smallest in Germany among women employed full-time. It is highest in the United States among both groups of women. Furthermore, the economic disparity in housework time among all U.S. women is actually larger than the gender gap. In the other two countries, it is consistently smaller than the gender gap, but not trivial by comparison.

Discussion

Our objective in this study was to examine economic gaps in women’s housework time in their national context. Our findings are summarized in Figure 6.1. In all three countries, the size of this housework economic gap is appreciable compared with the housework gender gap. The inequality among women in their time spent on household labor is substantially larger in the United States, the nation with the greatest inequality in earnings, than in the other two countries. This is the case among all women and women employed full-time; among the latter, it amounts to an additional hour per day spent on household labor by women with low earnings compared with those with high earnings. As far as the comparison between the United States and the two European countries is concerned, our results show that larger inequalities in women’s earnings correspond to bigger economic disparities in housework time among them.

Furthermore, Table 6.1 shows that the economic gap in women’s housework time is wider in the United States primarily because American women...
with low earnings spend much more time on domestic labor than their German and Swedish counterparts. Comparing the two European countries, we see that the economic housework gap among all women is larger in Germany, which has greater earnings inequality than Sweden. However, it is smaller among German women employed full-time. This is because those with high earnings spend more time on domestic labor than their neighbors across the Baltic, whereas there is not much difference between the mean housework hours of women with low earnings in the two countries. The general descriptive pattern reported here is confirmed by multivariate models (not shown) controlling for women’s and partners’ employment hours, age, education, occupation, presence of young children, and cohabitation, although the economic and gender gaps in housework time adjusted for these controls are smaller.

We conclude that there is indeed a connection between economic inequality among women in a country and inequality in their time spent on domestic labor. Such a link is theoretically contiguous with the recent literature on the relationship between gender equality at the national and household levels. We do not formally test the hypothesis that macroeconomic inequality among women is associated with disparities in their performance of household labor. However, our findings imply the need for an investigation of the links between economic gaps in women’s housework and national factors such as taxation levels, subsidized child care, the occupational and earnings distribution of women, and social inequality more generally. If higher earnings are always associated with less time spent on housework, the economic housework gap may increase over time as earnings inequality among women increases. In the United States, for example, the ratio of the 90th and 10th percentiles of earnings increased from 3.4 to 4.6 for women working full-time (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005).

The familiar differences between Swedish social democracy and U.S. market-oriented liberalism give us an idea of the factors contributing to the economic disparity in women’s housework and what could be done to reduce this disparity. Our results suggest that reduced earnings inequality among women could lessen the economic disparity in their housework burden. The disparity could also be made smaller by reducing the costs of housework substitution, perhaps through state subsidies. Consider the extreme scenario in which the costs of substitution are completely subsidized. In that case, inequalities in women’s earnings would not be associated with disparities in their hours of domestic labor. In both Germany and Sweden, policies are currently in place or under consideration to subsidize partially, through tax breaks, the costs of hiring household help. The consequences of these innovations remain to be seen.
We turn now to some caveats. It is possible the relatively large economic disparities we observe in the United States result from the less detailed nature of the housework measure in the American survey compared with the ones used in the German and Swedish cases. However, our focus is on the housework gap between women at the two ends of the earnings distribution rather than the absolute time spent on housework by women with low or high earnings. Therefore, unless the U.S. measure is biased differently for the two groups of women, the size of the gap should be as credible as in the other two countries. For instance, it has been observed that housework time data obtained from a single retrospective question, as in the PSID, is likely to underestimate time spent compared with information obtained from several such questions, as in the German and Swedish cases (Evertsson and Nermo 2004, p. 1276). Our estimate of the economic gap in U.S. women’s housework would be biased if the amount of this measurement error is different for women with low earnings compared with those with high earnings. A more serious concern is the potential bias in our results for the United States resulting from recall error in the PSID earnings data, which was obtained 2 years after the housework information. Here, also, because our findings have to do with differences between women with low and high earnings, the bias should matter only if it is systematically different for these two types of women.

Substantively, we cannot say exactly how inequality in women’s earnings translates into a gap in their housework time. That is a necessary preliminary to understanding the national differences in the size of the gap in housework time between high- and low-earning women. A reasonable guess, supported by studies mentioned earlier, is that women use their earnings to purchase substitutes for domestic labor, such as prepared food and cleaning services. Because our data do not contain information on household expenses, however, we cannot be sure of this. It could also be that women with high earnings have different standards for housework performance than those with low earnings. It is even possible that the disparity in one country is the result of different phenomena from the gap in another. To address these issues, we would require data from each country with information on earnings, housework, expenses, and norms regarding domestic labor. We note also that the direction of causality in the relationship between earnings and time spent on housework cannot be established unambiguously with our cross-sectional data, and that other researchers have claimed that it operates in the opposite direction from the one we suggest here—that is, with housework time affecting earnings rather than vice versa (e.g., Hersch and Stratton 2002; Noonan 2001).

A second unresolved substantive question is exactly what constitutes inequality in earnings among women with male partners. Our focus here
has been entirely on the inequality in women’s own earnings. This is because multivariate models (not shown) for women’s housework in all three countries demonstrate that their partners’ earnings have no relationship to women’s housework. However, economic inequality among married and cohabiting women also depends on disparities in their male partners’ resources. Particularly in strong male breadwinner countries like Germany, women married to men with high earnings may have zero or low earnings themselves, but still avail themselves of market substitutes for housework. The scholarly debate regarding the connection between married and cohabiting women’s economic, or class positions and their male partners’ is complex and ongoing (see Sorensen [1994] for a review). We acknowledge this larger controversy without addressing it directly. With respect to their time spent on housework, women’s own earnings appear to be far more important than their male partners’ in all three countries. As noted in our review of the research literature, at least for the United States, women’s own earnings also matter more for the outsourcing of domestic work.

Finally, we note that the other determinant of the economic gap in women’s housework is the extent to which women’s earnings translate into reductions in their time spent on it, as captured by the size of the association between the two. We do not estimate these associations here, but note that a number of factors can affect the magnitude of the relationship between women’s earnings and housework. These include matters of culture, norms, or preference, such as women’s desire to use their earnings to cut down on housework, the acceptability of doing so in their milieu, and class-specific standards regarding domestic labor. The cost and availability of substitutes are also likely components of the association between earnings and housework. Regardless of its exact origins, the larger this association—that is, the more earnings are used to defray housework time—the bigger the economic gap in housework among women. Thus, the larger economic gap in U.S. women’s housework time may result, in part, from a greater ability or propensity among U.S. women to use their earnings to reduce their domestic labor.

CONCLUSION

Long the main object of inquiry in single-country studies of domestic labor, the housework gender gap has also been the central concern of the growing body of cross-national research. Our objective in this study is to add the economic gap in housework among women to the research agenda. That is, we wish to emphasize differences among women in their performance of housework associated with disparities in their earnings. In all three countries, women with the lowest earnings spend substantially more time doing routine household chores than those with the highest earnings. Moreover,
the magnitude of this disparity appears to be higher in countries with greater economic inequality among women. To put it differently, women with low earnings are at a more severe disadvantage in terms of reconciling their work–family conflicts compared with those with high earnings, in countries with greater variation in women’s earnings.

Future studies with data from more countries would be helpful in establishing the magnitude of this association and the cross-national variation in it. We expect the economic disparity in women’s household labor to increase over time. This is both because earnings inequality in all three countries is increasing (The Economist 2007) and because market substitution for housework is likely to become more commonplace. It is conceivable that, over time, this disparity among women will become comparable in size with the gender gap in household labor, as appears to be the case already in the United States. To contemplate this possibility is not to diminish the theoretical or practical significance of the gender gap, which is likely to persist and remain universal for at least the near future. Rather, comparing the economic disparities in housework among women across countries gives us another angle on the consequences of different national approaches to the regulation of economic inequality. It also serves as a reminder of the fault lines of class among women, even in countries like Sweden.

REFERENCES


PART III
THE CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON HOUSEWORK
Together with the increase in labor force participation rates of women, the structures of work in the family household have also changed. Household labor is composed of different types of work, which include housework, such as cooking, cleaning, and ironing, on the one hand; and care work, such as child care and care of the elderly, on the other. Housework and care work are connected in specific ways with the overall system of work organization in society and can be organized in different forms within and outside the family household. However, there are substantial differences between societies with respect to the ways in which household work is organized. The central question of this chapter is: Which theoretical framework is adequate for explaining cross-national differences in the ways in which housework and care work are organized in a society?

It has frequently been argued that the degree to which family policies support the public provision of child care constitutes the main explanation for cross-national differences in the ways in which household work is organized. There is no doubt that family policies contribute substantially to the explanation. However, as it is argued in this chapter, such an explanation is too restricted, because the organization of housework and care work in society is also influenced by cultural values and models that relate to the role of the family in society, the gender division of labor within the family, the participation of women and men in waged work, and the societal sphere in which care work takes place. Consequently, societies also differ in terms of the degree to which women wish to be “freed” from care responsibilities, as well as in the degree to which a model of the “caring father” exists. Both welfare state policies and individuals refer to such values and models to guide and evaluate actions. However, there is a complex relationship between the values to which welfare state policies are oriented and the values to which individuals and social groups relate in terms of their behavior. This complex relationship can best be characterized by time lags or by various contradictions. Therefore, a broader approach to explaining cross-national
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differences in the ways in which housework and care work are organized is required. In addition to considering the welfare state and other institutions, this approach also takes into account the contribution that cultural differences make to explaining cross-national differences. In this chapter, such an approach is introduced in relation to child care. In addition, the ways in which housework might be integrated is reflected upon. As a basic part of household work, child care is especially interesting, because it is particularly decisive in terms of the influence that it exerts on the degree that women participate in the labor force and the forms that their participation takes.

The first part of this chapter will outline briefly the ways in which child care is organized in European societies by identifying three distinctive patterns. In the second part, an explanatory framework for cross-national differences will be introduced—namely, the theoretical approach of the “arrangement of work and family” based on different cultural models of breadwinning and caregiving. This approach emphasizes the mutual, and in part contradictory, interrelations and dynamics among culture, institutions, social structures, and action, which form the societal context for the structures of care work in a society. The third part will outline how the differences in the cultural context and welfare state policies in different European societies, and the ways in which they interact make a particular contribution to explaining differences in the degree to which child care is organized in society and in the gender division of labor within the family. This analysis demonstrates that the broad typology of welfare regimes maps only imperfectly to the patterns for organizing child care, and that considering cultural models and welfare regimes together leads to a more satisfactory explanation of the societal organization of child care. The chapter will finish with some reflections on the possibility of including housework in this explanatory framework.

Given the focus on the care of children, I define family here as a social unit that is based on the relationship between at least two generations, which are defined in a society as parents and their children. The article is restricted to families in which one parent or two parents are living in the same household together with their dependent children who are in need of care.1

Different Patterns of the Organization of Child Care in European Societies

In western European industrial society in the middle of the 20th century, child care was organized in many countries in the context of the male breadwinner marriage.2 Its nature involved an informal, unpaid, and hidden type of work. Child care was seen as the main task of married women to be provided in the private family household, and this responsibility restricted
women from participating in formal employment to the same degree as men. Therefore, in modern industrial society, the gender division of labor excluded women, or at least marginalized them, in relation to the central sphere for social integration, income, and social security. During the transition to postindustrial society during the last two decades of the 20th century, substantial changes took place in European societies, as van der Lippe describes in this volume. The labor force participation of women increased in all areas in which it was previously low. Furthermore, the structures of care work also changed substantially.

Some changes also occurred in the gender division of work in the private household; these changes are the subject of several chapters in this book, particularly Sayer’s (Chapter 2). The responsibilities for care work in the family household have, to some extent, been redistributed between men and women, meaning that degendering of care work has taken place to at least some limited degree. The extent of male participation in this work varies extensively in international comparisons and is highest in the Scandinavian countries (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Döge and Volz 2004; Eydal 2005).

A massive shift of child care away from being strictly the parents’ responsibility took place in many western European welfare states as well. Care was taken over by various types of organizations, based in the state or municipal sphere, in the nonprofit sector, or in the market. The public sector and, as in the case of Germany, the nonprofit sector, were extremely important to the expansion of social services (Anttonen and Sipilä 2005; Geissler 2002; Theobald 2005). Indeed, with the exception of the United Kingdom, market-based provisions play a far smaller role than the other sectors for western European countries (Meyer et al. 2008). Like informal care work, care work that is organized as gainful employment is generally thought of as “women’s work.” Thus, the increase in formal child care was accompanied by a considerable increase in the number of jobs for women, particularly in the area of social services, and consequently by an increase in the number of women in gainful employment (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2002). As an area of employment, the social service sector is primarily female and one of the most prosperous areas in Europe (OECD 2002). In eastern European societies, in contrast, the current structure of child care is partly the result of converse processes. The tendencies of returning care from public arrangements to the private family household have at times been a component of the postsocialist transformation process (Michon 2006; Surdej and Slezak 2009).

Based on data from the European Social Survey and OECD for eight European societies, Table 7.1 shows differences in the patterns relating to the extent to which families use formal child care. Table 7.1 also highlights differences in the degree to which mothers participate in the labor force and
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in the share of their part-time work. Three particularly distinctive patterns emerge among the eight countries.

**Pattern A: Employment-Oriented Pattern on the Basis of Formal Child Care**

This pattern is characterized by the strong role of the employment of parents on the basis of external, formalized child care. It is typical for France, East Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Finland as well. In these countries, the share of parents who are using formal child care is relatively high. The employment rate of mothers with young children is high and the share of mothers with one child who work part-time is relatively low. It is common in Finland, France, and East Germany.
Pattern B: Dual Pattern on the Basis of a Combination of Employment and Family Child Care on a Part-time Basis

This pattern is based on a combination of external formal child care with parental child care in the family household, on the basis of part-time employment of mothers as the dominant form. It can appear in two somewhat different forms: (1) mothers of small children stay for a longer time outside the labor force on the basis of parental leave and work part-time afterward (as in West Germany and Norway) or (2) a short period of parental leave is followed by a period of part-time employment (as in the United Kingdom). This is a main reason why the employment rates of mothers with young children differ considerably between West Germany and Norway (between 18.0% and 21.7%) on one hand and the United Kingdom on the other (49.2%).

Pattern C: Employment-Related Pattern on the Basis of Informal Care

This pattern is based on a relatively high employment rate of mothers with small children and a low proportion of mothers working part-time. Different from pattern A, however, child care is mainly provided in informal forms. This pattern is common in Poland and Spain. In the following sections, cultural values and the policies of welfare regime types are evaluated as explanations for the three patterns of the organization of child care.

Explanation of Differences in the Organization of Child Care in European Societies in the Context of Culture and Welfare State Policies

The Approach of the “Arrangement of Work and Family”

The ways in which family and care are interrelated have been subject to historical change and, from a comparative perspective, differ substantially between national societies and at the regional level (Anttonen and Sipilä 2005; Kröger 2001; Siim 2000). In this section I introduce a theoretical framework for explaining why the organization of child care differs for different societies and in terms of historical change in postindustrial societies. This approach is the arrangement of work and family in society.4

By arrangement I mean a configuration, which can be more or less coherent or contradictory in itself, in the relationship between institutions and cultural concepts, as well as in the relationship of social groups of actors. It can be contested and subject to conflict and negotiation by actors with different levels of power, and it can change under specific circumstances. The particular arrangement of work and family in a society comprises the specific configuration of institutions, social structures, socioeconomic factors, and constellations of actors that refer to the relationship of family and work.
Values and cultural models (Leitbilder) regarding the relationship of family and work contribute to explaining the context-specific development of both the structural relationship of family and work, and the actual practices of social actors and their gendered nature. With their ideas and interests, the individuals refer, on the one hand, to cultural values and models and, on the other hand, to the institutional and social–structural framework. As is particularly emphasized in this approach, the interaction of different factors in the specific societal context should be taken into account to achieve an adequate explanation (Pfau-Effinger 2009a).

Using such an approach, the comparative analysis of arrangements of work and family is extended by an actor-centered perspective, and by a systematic analysis of the influence of cultural factors and the ways in which these interrelate with other factors. Culture is defined here as the system of collective constructions of meaning by which human beings define reality. It includes stocks of knowledge, values and ideals—in sum, ideas. As has also been argued by Lepsius (1990, p. 31), cultural values can be seen as “switches” on the pathways along which interests influence actions to be taken. These theoretical assumptions refer to the theories of Max Weber (1971), David Lockwood (1964), and Margaret Archer (1995). The approach is not normative, because it leaves space for cross-national variations in the ways in which such arrangements are shaped, and some combination of care responsibility and employment for mothers/parents is achieved.

In the following sections I will outline the way in which cultural values, welfare state policies, and their interaction can exert an influence on how child care is organized in a society. The focus of this chapter is limited to these explanatory factors as a result of limited space and because they can be seen as most relevant for the explanation of cross-national differences. However, the role of other institutions like the employment system and the labor market, as well as the role of actors’ constellations, should also be considered.5

Cultural Family Models upon Which Arrangements of Work and Family Are Based

It is my argument that arrangements of family and work can be comparatively analyzed and classified by the dominant family models upon which they are based. Such cultural models of the family include cultural values regarding different elements of the family structure. These relate to (1) the relationship of family members with the employment system, (2) the appropriate spheres for the upbringing of children, and (3) the adequate gender division of labor within the family. It is possible that one specific family model is dominant in a society or that different family models coexist or compete. Family models can be contested between different actors and are
subject to change. According to a classification model that I developed, at least four family models can be distinguished in postindustrial European societies (Pfau-Effinger 2004a, p. 6; 2009a):

1. *The male breadwinner/female part-time care provider model.* This model rests essentially on the vision of full integration of women and men into paid economic activity. However, this model assumes that women, as mothers, may interrupt their gainful activity for a few years, after which they combine employment and responsibility for child care through part-time work, until their children are no longer considered to require particular care.

2. *The dual (part-time) breadwinner/dual (part-time) care provider model.* In this model, it is considered desirable that both parents be employed part-time and share a part of the child care with one another, while entrusting the other part of child care to an institution outside the family.

3. *The dual breadwinner/external care model.* This model posits, in principle, that all women as well as men can be employed full-time, and that child care is essentially the responsibility of institutions outside of the family. In the majority of these countries, the state is seen as primarily responsible for organizing access to these services.

4. *The dual breadwinner/extended family care model.* Here, extended family networks are mainly seen as responsible for family care. This notion is related to the family form of the “complex family household” (Flaquer and Escobedo 2009), in which other adult relatives besides the children’s parents are supposed to contribute to child care. Accordingly, it is not expected that the welfare state provide child care to any considerable extent.

It is argued here that differences between the dominant family models contribute to a substantial degree in explaining cross-national differences in the ways in which child care is organized. Within a societal arrangement of work and family, different family models can be particularly relevant. In West Germany and East Germany, for example, two distinctly different family models remain dominant up to the present day. This is mainly the result of the different developmental paths in the two countries after World War II (Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 2002). It is important not to regard the classification as static, but rather to consider the processes for change within such an arrangement. The ways in which new cultural models are addressed, having developed at a given time in the population, is strongly influenced by the conflict and negotiation processes taking place in between the social actors.

**Welfare State Policies That Influence the Organization of Housework and Care Work in Society**

Welfare state policies constitute another relevant element explaining how child care is organized in a society. In interaction with the cultural family models described earlier, welfare states influence the degree to which care
work is provided within and outside of the family. A particularly important question is the extent to which the welfare state assumes the social tasks of child care and to what degree and at what quality it supplies these services (see also Esping-Andersen 1999; Evers and Olk 2006). Furthermore, if child care takes place outside the family, welfare state policies are relevant in determining the main sphere in which child care is provided, whether it is in the nonprofit sector or the market. Also differing between welfare states is the degree to which social rights are connected to care—that is, rights to receive care and rights to give care (Knijn and Kremer 1997). Through particular schemes for paternity leave, the welfare state can also influence the degree to which fathers participate in family child care. The state is also an employer and in this role can influence the labor force participation of mothers and fathers. The welfare state therefore represents an important arena for social conflicts and negotiation processes with respect to the arrangement of work and family (see also Mósesdóttir 2001).

It should be noted that the ways in which welfare states and other institutions refer to such cultural models can differ in the context of time and space. The relationship can be orderly or can display discrepancies and lags. It is possible for discrepancies to exist between the provision of child care by the welfare state and the actual demand for child care. For example, in West Germany, this arises when the state is still oriented toward a more traditional family model and state policies do not sufficiently take into account the change in the cultural orientation of the majority of the population. The opposite is also possible: State policies can, for example, offer generous schemes for parental leave with relatively high child care allowances, but the take-up rates may be relatively low, because the schemes do not match with the cultural orientations toward child care (e.g., Haataja 2005).

According to the “welfare regime” approach of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), which is particularly popular in comparative social policy research, welfare state policies toward child care differ in the context of different state welfare regimes. The general features of the different regime types are described as follows: In the social–democratic welfare regime, social rights, based on cultural principles of egalitarianism and solidarity, are universally available and of high quality. Policies aim to achieve the leveling of social hierarchies. The liberal welfare regime, by contrast, is based on neoliberal ideas about individual responsibility and a largely laissez-faire state policy toward markets; consequently, social rights are typically means tested and are of comparatively low quality. This tends to cause social–structural polarization between groups of the employed. Finally, with its policies, the conservative welfare regime tries to reproduce the existing hierarchical structure of social inequality among groups of the employed. Social rights are of medium quality and are essentially limited to employed people.
These differences, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) argues, go hand in hand with specific differences in the way in which the state intervenes in the labor market and in the family, particularly with respect to the extent that it promotes the formalization of care. Thus, in the social–democratic welfare regime, women tend to be fully integrated into employment on the basis of a strongly developed state social service sector and a comprehensive formalization of informal care. Instead of promoting the participation of women in employment, conservative welfare regimes use financial transfers to promote their participation in unpaid informal care in the family. Liberal welfare states tend to produce high levels of women’s employment, made possible by child care services offered by the market, but accessible largely to the middle classes. In addition to Esping-Andersen’s approach, two more welfare regime types have been introduced: the postsocialist welfare regime, which is often based on a contradictory mix of neoliberal and traditional welfare values, and the Mediterranean welfare regime, in which the family is assigned priority for the provision of social security and social services (see Arts and Gelissen 2002).

The welfare regime approach, however, is not sufficient to explain cross-national variations. This inadequacy relates to the A, B, and C patterns for the organization of child care that I outlined earlier. According to Esping-Andersen, we would expect pattern A (employment-oriented pattern on the basis of formal employment) to be characteristic for the social–democratic welfare states, which are represented among our eight countries by Denmark, Finland, and Norway. In fact, these countries have established comprehensive social rights to full-time public care provisions for children of all age groups. Furthermore, the quality of public care provisions in these countries is the highest in Europe (Anttonen and Sipilä 2005; Daune-Richard 2005; Fagnani and Letablier 2005). This would give mothers the option of complete and full-time participation in formal employment. We would expect pattern B (dual pattern on the basis of a combination of employment and family child care on part-time basis) to be typical for the conservative welfare regimes of France, and West and East Germany.

In the social–democratic states of Finland and Norway, however, a clear pattern A is only evident for Finland. And, in contrast to expectations, pattern A is also dominant in two conservative welfare regimes—namely, in France and, even more strongly, in East Germany. The organization of child care in the social–democratic welfare state of Norway, by contrast, bears a closer resemblance to pattern B (which is also characteristic for West Germany and to some degree for the United Kingdom), but with considerably lower formal child care usage. This means that the differences in the welfare regimes alone cannot explain the differences in the patterns of the societal organization of child care. Nonetheless, pattern C, the employment-related
pattern on the basis of informal care, does aptly characterize the organization of child care in the Mediterranean and the postsocialist welfare regimes of Spain and Poland.

According to the “arrangement of work of family” approach that is introduced here, how a specific cultural family model interacts with a specific welfare regime merits particular attention in the explanation. Together, these form a main part of the explanatory framework for understanding individual behavior. According to Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), each type of welfare regime is based on a specific set of cultural values about the general role of the welfare state in society, about its relationship with its citizens, and about redistribution and what is “just.” Therefore, the quality of social rights—that is, the generosity and the strength of welfare state provisions—differs between welfare regimes. Each family model, on the other hand, is based on values that relate to the societal organization of child care, as outlined earlier. Both value systems interact, but they can also vary relatively autonomously in relation to each other (Pfau-Effinger 2005b).

**Integrating Cultural Family Models and Welfare Regime Policies to Explain Patterns of Child Care Organization**

**Pattern A: Employment-Oriented Pattern on the Basis of Formal Child Care (France, East Germany, Finland)** In France, East Germany, and Finland, the dominant cultural model of the family is a dual breadwinner/external care provider model with a high appreciation of the idea of gender equality. This means that both women and men, aside from a certain period of maternity leave and parental leave, orient themselves toward full-time employment during active parenthood. In the social–democratic welfare state of Finland, the basis of the model is the comprehensive and high-quality public care provisions (Anttonen 1997; Julkunen 1999; Julkunen and Nätä 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2004a). This model is also dominant in the conservative welfare regime of France, albeit with a less egalitarian basis (Daune-Richard 2005; Martin, Math, and Renaudat 1998; Veil 1997). France has a long tradition of appreciating public child care as well as having high women’s labor force participation (Daune-Richard 2005; Fagnani and Letablier 2005). Traditionally, these countries already had above-average full-time employment levels for women (OECD 2000). The number of women who work only part-time for family reasons today is generally low (7% in France at the end of the 1990s) (European Commission 1998, p. 12). In Finland and France, an even higher share of couples would prefer to organize their care work–employment relationship on the basis of the dual full-time breadwinner model. In Finland, both parents are working full-time in 49.3% of the couples with children younger than 6 years, but 80.3% of couples would
prefer to work in this form (OECD 2001, p. 136). In France, the model of both parents of children younger than 6 years working full-time is practiced by 38.8% of the couples but preferred by 52.4% (OECD 2001, p. 28).

As a carryover from socialist times, a dual breadwinner/state care model still prevails in East Germany, too. Mothers in East Germany behave according to this cultural model, even if this contradicts the aims of German family policies, which were based on the traditional family model of West Germany (Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 2002). However, through their strong action in collective associations, citizens in East Germany have managed, during the transformation, to retain high public child care provisions for children younger than the age of 3 years in East German federal states and municipalities, meaning that the public child care provision is considerably higher there than in West Germany. Fully 16% of children younger than 3 years participated in public child care in East Germany, but only 3% in the West; among children age 3 to 6 years, 87% in East Germany, but only 60% in West Germany, received public child care (data from Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit [IAB] project 3-523, 2000 [after Engelbrech and Jungkunst 2001]).

**Pattern B: Dual Pattern on the Basis of a Combination of Employment and Family Child Care on Part-time Basis (West Germany, Norway)**

The male breadwinner/female part-time care model is the dominant cultural model in the countries where child care is organized on the basis of pattern B, and the model contributes substantially to explaining this pattern. This is true for women in West Germany, which has a conservative welfare regime; as well as for women in Norway, with a social–democratic welfare regime; and Great Britain, with a liberal welfare regime (Dale and Holdsworth 1997; Meyer and Pfau-Effinger 2006). In West Germany and Norway, full-time parental leave for longer than 1 year, and part-time work by mothers thereafter, is seen as the best way to combine the values of a “good childhood” with mothers’ labor force participation (Ellingsæter 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2004a). As is shown by findings of a representative attitude survey that was conducted by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 2001 at the beginning of the 21st century, the most popular cultural model of the family in West Germany is based on the marriage of a male breadwinner and a female part-time caregiver. About two thirds of all respondents opted for this model (Engelbrech and Jungkunst 2001). Although a high share would prefer that the man work full-time and the wife work part-time (41.8%), only 31.9% are actually working this form.

Which societal sphere is seen as responsible for the provision of child care differs with the type of welfare regime. In Germany, child care is mainly provided by professional staff in organizations of the nonprofit sector, but
it is mainly financed by the state. Norway, with its social–democratic welfare regime, also matches this pattern of child care organization. This can be explained by the specific combination of the cultural model of the dual (part-time) breadwinner/dual (part-time) caregiver model, which is based more on egalitarian principles than the male breadwinner/female part-time caregiver model (Ellingsæter 1999). In reality, it is mostly women who work part-time. Different from the other countries, however, Norwegian mothers on part-time leave are not financially dependent on a male breadwinner. Instead, the generous parental leave scheme provides them with an earnings replacement that gives them financial autonomy.

**Pattern C: Employment-Related Pattern on the Basis of Informal Care**  
(Spain, Poland) The cultural model of the family that is dominant in Spain resembles the dual breadwinner/extended family care model. As Lluis Flaquer and Anna Escobedo (2009) outlined for Spain, this model is based on the notion that both parents are employed full-time while other adults, who live in the same household in the context of the “complex family,” care for the children. Part-time work plays a rather marginal role in this model. This is reflected in the working time preferences of couples. In 25.6% of the couples with children younger than 6 years, both parents are working full-time. However, 59.7% of couples would prefer to work in this form. In only 6.3% of couples with children younger than 6 years is the father employed full-time and the mother part-time. The share of those who would prefer this form is not much higher (11.6%) (OECD 2001, p. 136). With respect to this dominant family model, Poland is a similar case (Surdej and Slezak 2009). However, the realization of this model is only possible as long as there are adults in the family who are not employed. With the increase in the labor force participation rates of women, including older women, it is becoming increasingly difficult in both countries to maintain this model. In Spain, as a consequence, there is a strong trend to substitute informal child care by caring relatives with undeclared child care by immigrant women within the private household (Flaquer and Escobedo 2009).

**The Role of Undeclared Work as a Precarious Element in the Organization of Child Care**

If the availability of family caregivers represents a threat to pattern C, a lack of formal child care may also be perceived as a problem. Even in those countries where pattern B is dominant and parents do not orient themselves toward comprehensive, full-time, formal child care provisions, the existing supply of public child care is often seen as insufficient. This is especially true for countries with pattern C, where the increase in women’s labor force
participation has contributed to a reduction in potential family caregivers, but public child care provision is nearly completely lacking.

Therefore, in the countries outside the social–democratic welfare regime, the employment of nannies in the private household, often on the basis of undeclared work by immigrants, helps to bridge the discrepancies between the time demands of the employment system on the one hand, and the time structures of public child care on the other (Hillmann 2005; Pfau-Effinger et al. 2009b). This caregiver employment takes place predominantly on the basis of market-based wages in dependent, undeclared employment. Undeclared employment includes any employment that is paid but not formally declared as gainful to the authorities and is, therefore, carried out illegally. Insofar as fairly reliable data on this are available, the proportion of undeclared work for child care in private households is especially high in the southern and eastern European countries, moderately high in the continental European countries (where it is more often used for cleaning than for child care), and very low in the Scandinavian countries.

In the Scandinavian countries, a “service culture” is not strongly anchored in cultural terms because of the pronounced egalitarian ideals. In the other countries except for Poland, cultural support for casual domestic employment has historical roots. In Poland, the “service culture” was able to establish itself relatively easily in the cultural vacuum created by the introduction of the market economy (Pfau-Effinger 2009b). In short, reliance on the market to overcome the limitations of family and public child care assumes a broader culture that is receptive to this solution.

Reflections on the Possibility of Applying the Explanatory Framework to Housework

Similarities and Differences between Care Work and Housework

The similarities and differences between care work and housework should be reflected upon. Care work differs substantially from housework in its particular features. As was emphasized by feminist thinkers, care work is deeply embedded into a social relationship. The main features of care work are influenced by this context. The time structure of care work is substantially based on the need, which includes the emotional and physical needs of those who are cared for. Therefore, the time demand for care work is comprehensive and requires the caregiver’s continuous attention to the person for whom she or he is caring (England 2005, Himmelweit 2002). Care work can be outsourced to other spheres of society. However, it may be the case that the recipient of care, such as a child, participates in negotiation processes and tries to incorporate his or her own wishes regarding the choice
of caregiver on the basis of personal emotional and physical experiences and preferences. The degree to which the wishes of the care recipient are taken into consideration, and the degree of dependency of the person in need of care, vary among different societies (Anttonen and Sipilä 2005).

In some ways, housework is more restricted to the sphere of the family household than is care work. This is mainly true for the cleaning of the house or the apartment. Other work, such as cooking, can be outsourced by employing staff, by consuming ready-made dishes that are offered by market enterprises, or by eating out in restaurants. In addition, chores like washing or ironing can, in principle, be performed by hired staff within the household or by market-based enterprises offsite.

The outsourcing possibilities for housework may suggest that housekeeping tasks are endowed with less personal meaning and social resonance than care work, but one should not put too fine a point on it. As some research reports, doing housework can be interpreted by the household’s members as caring activity (DeVault 1991). Also, it should be mentioned that the boundary between housework, child care, and “leisure” is not always clear. Both types of work may also include elements of pleasurable leisure. For example, playing with children or cooking a special meal for a group of friends has pleasurable dimensions. In addition, the boundary between child care and housework is not always clearly defined. Housework can be an element of care work: Cooking a meal for a baby, for example, is an element of care work as well as of housework. Furthermore, housework and child care are sometimes carried out simultaneously. Laundry may get folded while the children’s homework is supervised. Bearing in mind the distinctions and similarities in care work and housework, it is worth considering whether an explanatory approach that illuminates the former can be profitably applied to the latter.

**Integration of Housework into the Explanatory Framework**

The question here is whether the explanatory framework of the “arrangement of work and family” is adequate for explaining cross-national differences in the organization of housework. There are substantial similarities. As far as it is provided within the family context, housework is often integrated into the same complex of cultural values as child care in terms of ideas about the role of the private household members to provide the work and the way in which child care is allocated according to the gender division of labor within the family household. To take an example from family models, it can be assumed that when family models are based more on a male breadwinner model, housework, like child care, will be allocated primarily to women. In contrast, it can be assumed that when family models are based on a more egalitarian dual-breadwinner model and are linked to cultural
values of gender equality, both men and women are seen as responsible for
the provision of housework as well as child care. However, as this chapter
emphasizes, such family models are still far from realized as social practices
in the family, and women are still the main providers of informal or semi-

Welfare state policies are primarily directed toward the organization of
care work and less toward the organization of housework. Therefore, their
effect on housework is often only indirect and caused by the relatively close
connection of care work and housework for parents of young children. Be-
cause the responsibility for child care and the responsibility for housework
in families with dependent children are often closely connected, it can, how-
ever, be assumed that parental leave, which includes specific incentives for
paternal leave, not only contributes substantially to increasing fathers’ share
in family child care, but also their share in housework.

The differences that exist in some main features of child care and house-
work should also be regarded in the explanatory framework for cross-na-
tional differences. I will discuss this in relation to two cultural dimensions of
the societal organization of housework: the degree and forms of outsourcing
and the gender division of labor.

The Degree and Forms of Outsourcing
As it was argued, child care is embedded in a social relationship and is often
organized on the basis of cultural notions about what constitutes a “good
childhood” and “good parents.” These values that are not particularly re-
related to housework—particularly tasks such as cleaning, washing, and iron-
ing—or they are typically less well defined. Thus, ideas about rational and
efficient household organization have a stronger role in the organization of
housework than child care. This is one reason why undeclared work of em-
ployees in the family household, particularly by immigrants, is substantially
more important in housework than in child care in those European countries
where it is used (Pfau-Effinger, Flaquer, and Jensen 2009).

In housework, compared with child care, other sets of values may play a
role. Today, in countries where traditions of a “servant culture” exist on the
basis of social inequality, the use of employees, often in undeclared work,
for cleaning and other household tasks is often highly accepted. This is the
case, for example, in the Mediterranean countries and in continental Euro-
pean countries like Germany, France, and Great Britain. This is clearly dif-
ferent in the Nordic countries. Here, it contradicts the moral values of the
middle classes to act as employers of household workers in one’s own family
household (Jensen and Rathlev 2009; Jolkkonen, Kovalainen, and Koistinen
2009). Mainly, household workers are only accepted in those cases in which
employees of the municipality provide housework in the private household,
which is a common service for elderly people in Denmark and Sweden (Sze-behely 1998).

The Gender Division of Labor in Housework

It seems that housework has remained more gender segregated than child care. In some respects, this can be explained by the fact that child care, and the need for the “active father,” has been the subject of public debate and reflection in many European countries since the 1990s (Eydal 2005). In contrast, the gender division of labor with respect to housework has received less attention as an issue in public debate. This gender segregation in housework reflects, to a substantial degree, the gender segregation in the occupational system in employment. It also is based on deep cultural values relating to the definition of activities as “male” or “female,” which may differ cross-nationally. However, change may lead to the redefinition of activities with respect to their gendered nature. I take the example of Finland, which is a relatively egalitarian society. Women are more active in cooking and cleaning. In contrast, a higher share of men do the building and repair work, accompany children to leisure activities, and take care of the family pet. Shopping seems to be a gender-neutral activity: The share of men that do the shopping is nearly as high as the share of women (Melkas 2002; Niemi and Pääkkönen 2001). Therefore, in analyses of household work, cultural constructions of “female” and “male” tasks should be considered in the explanatory framework.

Conclusion

There are clearly cross-national differences in European societies in the ways in which household and care work is organized. In this chapter, a theoretical framework for the explanation of such differences was introduced. It is based on the assumption that the specific ways in which cultural, institutional, and socioeconomic factors interact in the specific “arrangement of work and family” in a society are crucial for the explanation of cross-national differences. The three patterns for the organization of child care in European societies was used as an example. As was shown, the ways in which welfare state policies on the one hand, and cultural models of the family on the other, interact can contribute to explaining the differences between these patterns of organizing child care. Having introduced the explanatory framework for understanding cross-national differences in child care, its possible utility for explaining country differences in the organization of housework was next considered. Because there is some relationship between the division of child care and the division of housework, state policies that affect child care may
have some indirect effect on housework, too. To analyze housework fully, however, additional sets of cultural values should be taken into account. These factors include the degree to which a tradition of a “servant culture” exists within a country, as well as the degree to which specific household tasks are defined as “female” or “male” and the extent to which change is underway.

NOTES

1. It should be taken into account that the age at which children are seen as “dependent” and “in need of care” can differ between countries, even in legislation (Pfau-Effinger 2004a).

2. Contradicting assumptions of modernization theory and many feminist theories, the male breadwinner family model played a role in modern industrial society only in a part of western European societies. For a historical explanatory model for such differences, see my article in the British Journal of Sociology (Pfau-Effinger 2004b).

3. Part-time employment plays an important role in the integration of mothers into the phase of active mothering in those countries in which the participation of women in gainful employment was below average for a long time (Geissler and Pfau-Effinger 2005; Kremer and Schiffbänker 2005).

4. This is another variant of a societal “arrangement” that I have developed as a theoretical approach for analyses of historical change and cross-national analyses in relation to “gender arrangements,” “care arrangements,” and “arrangements of work and welfare” (Pfau-Effinger 1998; 2004a; 2005a, b; 2009a).

5. My book Culture, Welfare State and Women’s Employment in European Societies (Pfau-Effinger 2004a) includes a comparative historical analysis of the interrelations of the development of culture, welfare state policies, labor market structures, family structures, and the role of different types of social actors in explaining cross-national differences in labor force participation in Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland.

6. In some parts, two “traditional” models continue to exist, even if they are no longer dominant in any of these societies (Pfau-Effinger 2004a, b). These include a family model, which I define as the family economy model. According to the ideas characterizing the family economy model, men and women work together in their agricultural or craft business, and both men and women play an important role for the survival of the family economy. Children are regarded as elements of the family economy and therefore are expected to work in the family business as soon as they are physically able to do so. The housewife model of the (male) breadwinner family is another traditional model. It is based on the assumption of a general separation of “public sphere” and “private sphere,” and on complementary fields of work and action for both genders: The man is primarily responsible for work in the public sphere, where he provides for his family through gainful employment; the woman is primarily responsible for the private household,
including housework and child care, and she is financially dependent on her husband. This arrangement is based on a cultural construct of “childhood” according to which children require special care and extensive individual support. Care and support are first and foremost regarded as the responsibility of private households. Complementary to this concept, there is the cultural construct of “motherhood,” according to which it is mainly the task of the mother to raise her children and care for them in the private household.

7. The concept of “social rights” comes from the theory by Marshall (1964) about the historical development of citizenship. In this theory, the history of modern societies is seen as a process, during the course of which people were able to extend their basic rights. Feminist researchers used Marshall’s theory in part as a foil to articulate inequalities and injustices in the rights of women and men that result from the special situation of women in many countries (e.g., that women are mainly responsible for caring tasks) (see also Lister 2003, Siim 2000).

8. Whether this is legally viewed as “undeclared work” depends on specific features of nonregistered employment (e.g., length of time, amount of earnings); the laws on this vary considerably across Europe (see Pfau-Effinger, Flaquer, and Jensen 2009).

9. This is the result of collaborative research in a research project in the Fifth EU Framework Programme that I directed titled Formal and Informal Work in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Their Changing Relationship and Their Contribution to Social Integration. The chairs of the country team were Per Jensen and Jens Lind, Aalborg University (Denmark); Pertti Koistinen, University of Tampere (Finland); Birgit Pfau-Effinger, University of Hamburg (Germany); Traute Meyer, Southampton University (Great Britain); Alexander Surdej, Economic University of Warczow (Poland); and Lluis Flaquer, Autonomous University of Barcelona (Spain). The research to which I refer here was based, among other things, on 215 semistructured guided interviews in middle-class households with children younger than 6 years in cities and their suburbs in Finland, Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, Poland, and Spain.

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Beliefs about the needs of children and about appropriate modes of mothering exert a powerful moral force in American society, influencing parents’ perceived options, their feelings of self worth, and ultimately their decisions about how to organize work and family lives. The dominant American ideal, recently dubbed “intensive motherhood” (Hays 1996), represents children as vulnerable and precious beings whose proper care demands an extraordinary commitment of time, emotion, and nurturance by one primary caregiver, preferably their own mother (Phoenix, Woollett, and Lloyd 1991; Zelizer 1985). Like other cultural ideologies, intensive motherhood derives much of its power from its naturalized, taken-for-granted quality.

Although social expectations and personal feelings of extreme maternal devotion are pervasive, the appropriate enactment of this devotion remains the subject of much emotionally charged controversy in the contemporary United States. One particularly intensive variety of motherhood requires that women forgo paid employment and dedicate themselves exclusively to their maternal roles. From this perspective, women’s interest in paid employment conflicts with children’s need for around-the-clock mothering. This model of full-time maternal care is rejected on principle by many women, especially the young, the highly educated, and the nonreligious, and it is unfeasible for the many others who lack the requisite financial or personal resources. However, even those American women who do not actively embrace ideals of full-time mothering are cognizant of this cultural schema and know that others may hold them morally accountable to it (Blair-Loy 2004; Hochschild 2003; Lareau 2003; Taylor 1996). It is in fact not uncommon for social movement activists, policy makers, religious leaders, and public intellectuals to represent this as the only ethical or socially viable form of mothering.

But although specific practices may be naturalized within local contexts, previous research shows that norms about maternal care, familial gender roles, and child-rearing styles vary a great deal across time, space, and demographic groups (Ariès 1965; Evans and Kelley 2001; Kremer 2006; Fuller 2007;
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Gottlieb 1993; Lareau 2003). Comparativist scholars have suggested that ideals of motherhood are influenced by national institutional structures and social policy arrangements that legitimize certain family forms and make certain child care arrangements more or less viable. Exploring such variability can help contextualize dominant cultural ideals and practices, and provide insights regarding the individual and structural factors that are associated with alternative conceptualizations of motherhood. Normative understandings of motherhood are important because they help shape women’s public sphere roles and children’s early life experiences, which in turn influence other divisions of domestic labor.

The primary goal of the current analysis is to provide a detailed description of variability in women’s attitudes toward maternal employment across 32 industrial, transitional, and developing countries and territories. We focus on women’s views because we believe that they provide an especially good measure of the normative penetration of ideals of full-time maternal care. Application of multivariate logistic regression models allows us to examine international differences after controlling for demographic factors that are known to be correlated with gender role attitudes (i.e., women’s educational attainment, employment status, religiosity, age), and to determine the extent to which observed patterns of cross-national variation map on to standard classifications of welfare state regimes.

Although we do not have the comparative data necessary to assess arguments about attitudinal effects of specific policy measures or social expenditures formally, we do draw some preliminary conclusions about these relationships based on information drawn from secondary sources. Results are consistent with arguments suggesting that institutional and social policy structures help shape cultural understandings of motherhood and childhood, and that these understandings in turn help sustain path-dependent trajectories of policy development (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Mahon 2002a; Morgan 2006; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1999b). We consider implications for mainstream and feminist theories of the welfare state.

DATA, METHODS, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Data are from the 2002 Family and Gender Roles III module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). National surveys were administered between 2001 and 2004. Three countries (Bulgaria, Russia, and Taiwan) were omitted because of missing information on religiosity, an important demographic variable. Countries considered are predominantly advanced industrial market economies, but our sample also includes seven formerly socialist countries of eastern and central Europe, and four middle-income developing countries. Results presented here are based on unweighted samples.
We consider cross-national variability in support for full-time mothering based on two indicators: (1) respondents’ beliefs that mothers should not be employed “when there is a child under school age” and (2) respondents’ beliefs that mothers should not be employed “after the youngest child starts school.” These are the most direct and unambiguous available indicators of belief in the desirability of full-time motherhood, an economically costly form of child rearing that depends upon a full-time breadwinner.

Table 8.1 shows country scores on indicators of support for full-time maternal care. Values give the proportion of a country’s respondents who agree with the given statement. Much cross-national variability is evident. With respect to mothers of preschool children, Israel and New Zealand occupy extreme ends of the distribution: 10% of women in Israel agree that mothers with very young children should stay home, compared with a full 63% of women in New Zealand. In all countries there was more support for full-time mothering of younger than older children, and the view that women with school-age children should stay home was held by only a minority of women (15% on average compared with an international average of 38% with respect to preschoolers). Nonetheless, we also find large cross-national differences regarding care of older children, with values ranging from 2% in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden to 32% in the Philippines. In the United States, support for full-time maternal care is slightly above the international mean with respect to preschool children (42%), but below the mean with respect to school-age children (5%).

The low values shown in Table 8.1 for Sweden and Denmark are unsurprising in light of the reputedly gender-egalitarian cultures characterizing Scandinavian welfare states. Other values, particularly the high percentages of women advocating stay-at-home mothering of preschoolers in many English-speaking countries, were unexpected. Similar patterns of cross-national variability were found for a sample that included male respondents.

Before further consideration of these international differences, it is useful to determine whether they can be attributed to differences in the sociodemographic composition of the respective national populations. Past research suggests that support for gender-differentiated family roles is greater among older persons, highly religious persons, and those without college degrees (Knudsen and Wærness 2001; Morgan 2006; Sundstöm 1999). The stronger support for maternal employment in Nordic countries, for example, may be partly attributable to low levels of religiosity or high levels of educational attainment in those societies.

To understand better the nature of observed cross-national differences, we compute a set of multivariate logistic regression models. This allows us to calculate, for each country, the predicted probability of espousing full-time maternal care while holding constant the relevant individual-level attributes.
The Cultural Influences on Housework

The explanatory variables included in our regression models were selected based on results of previous attitudinal research on motherhood and gender roles. Age is measured in years, and all other covariates are “dummy coded,” with the value 1 indicating presence of the corresponding attribute.

Table 8.1
Means on attitudinal variables: Women, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country [Regime]</th>
<th>Mothers of Preschoolers Should Stay Home</th>
<th>Mothers of School Children Should Stay Home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia [L]</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria [C]</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Flanders) [C]</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil [D]</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile [D]</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus [C]</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic [S]</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark [SD]</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland [SD]</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France [C]</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, East [S]</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, West [C]</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain [L]</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary [S]</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland [L]</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel [L]</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan [C]</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia [S]</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico [D]</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands [C]</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand [L]</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland [L]</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway [SD]</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines [D]</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland [S]</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal [C]</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic [S]</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia [S]</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain [C]</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden [SD]</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland [C]</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States [L]</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social–democratic</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly socialist</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data are taken from the 2002 wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).
Means can be interpreted as the proportion of women agreeing with the corresponding statement.

C, conservative regime; D, developing regime; L, liberal regime; S, formerly socialist regime; SD, social–democratic regime.
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and the value 0 indicating its absence. Highly religious persons are defined as those attending religious services at least once a week. Those coded 1 on the “university degree” and “employed” variables reported having completed a university degree and having a paid job, respectively. Respondents coded 1 on the “married” variable reported being married or “living as married.” The presence of one or more children at home is coded from information on household composition. To determine whether employment differentially affected attitudes for women with and without children at home, we include an interaction term, “child × employed,” in our models. Information on the employment histories of respondents’ own mothers was used to construct an additional dummy indicator: Did your mother ever work for pay for as long as 1 year, after you were born and before you were 14?

Means for all covariates, pooled and by country and regime, are shown in Table 8.2. For all variables but age (measured in years), means can be interpreted as the proportion of respondents with the respective attribute (i.e., the proportion coded 1). On the religiosity variable, for example, the pooled mean of 0.24 indicates that 24% of all respondents attend services once a week or more. In Denmark, the corresponding value is only 2%; in Mexico and Ireland, it is 65%.

What predicts support for full-time maternal care?

Table 8.3 shows results from a series of multivariate logistic regression models where the dependent variables are the two attitudinal measures described earlier. Values give covariate effects on the logged odds of holding the belief in question; the exponent of these values give the multiplicative change in the odds corresponding to a 1-unit increase in the covariate. For example, according to the “age” coefficient in the first column, the log-odds of advocating full-time maternal care of preschoolers increases by 0.015 point as respondents’ ages increase by 1 year. The exponent of this value (exp(0.015) = 1.015) tells us that the odds of holding this belief grows by 1.5% with each year of age.

Three models are presented for each attitudinal indicator. The first (model a) includes individual-level sociodemographic covariates only, the second (model b) adds variables identifying country of residence (with the United States the omitted reference category), and the third (model c) includes individual effects and variables representing five “welfare regime” types (liberal, conservative, social–democratic, formerly socialist, and developing, with liberal the omitted reference category). Our classification of welfare regimes, shown in Table 8.3, is discussed later.
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Effects of Individual-Level Attributes

We turn first to the specifications that include sociodemographic variables only (models Ia and IIa). Higher education greatly reduces women’s support for full-time maternal care, whereas personal religiosity increases support. Having a university degree, for instance, more than doubles the odds that a woman will find it acceptable for mothers with school-age children to work for pay. High religiosity—specifically, attending religious services at least
Beliefs about Maternal Employment

Table 8.3
Espousal of full-time maternal care among women in 32 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mothers of Preschoolers Should Stay home&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Mothers of School Children Should Stay home&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model Ia</td>
<td>Model Ib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>–0.601***</td>
<td>–0.608***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly religious</td>
<td>0.327***</td>
<td>0.258***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>–0.291***</td>
<td>–0.392***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child in household</td>
<td>0.297***</td>
<td>0.252***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child × employed</td>
<td>–0.365***</td>
<td>–0.290***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (y)</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother had job</td>
<td>–0.133***</td>
<td>–0.210***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.478**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>–0.035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Flanders)</td>
<td>–0.949***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>–0.615***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>–0.380**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>–1.173***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>–0.292*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>–1.070***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>–0.311*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>–0.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, East</td>
<td>–1.834***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, West</td>
<td>–0.096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.500***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>–0.248*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>–0.627***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>–1.853***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.285*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>–0.385*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>–0.691***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.827***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>–0.595***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>–0.056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>–0.336**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>–1.057***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>–0.557***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>–1.219***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>–0.095</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>–0.299***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social–democratic</td>
<td>–0.731***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly socialist</td>
<td>–0.214***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>–0.348***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–1.072***</td>
<td>–0.585***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G² (df)</td>
<td>1078.64 (8)</td>
<td>2139.41 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>–1000.03</td>
<td>–1756.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>United States is the reference category for models Ib and Iib.

<sup>b</sup>Liberal regime is the reference category for models Ic and Iic.

<sup>c</sup>N = 18,506

<sup>d</sup>N = 18,530

Values are additive coefficients from logistic regression models. G² gives the difference in –2LL between the respective model and the constant-only model. Except for age, all covariates are dummy coded, with 1 indicating presence of the respective attribute and 0 indicating its absence.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

BIC = –G² + df(ln(N)).
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once a week—works in the opposite direction, significantly increasing belief in full-time maternal care for both preschoolers and school-age children. This may mean that different understandings of childhood and/or motherhood are inculcated within university and religious institutions, that educational and religious institutions attract persons holding different ideological beliefs concerning the role of women in society, or both. These findings are consistent with those from previous American and international research on gender role ideologies (Evans and Kelley 2002; Knudsen and Wærness 2001).

As expected, effects of motherhood on attitudes depend upon current employment status. For example, the odds of advocating stay-at-home mothering of preschoolers are nearly twice as high among nonemployed mothers as among employed mothers.13 Although these cross-sectional data do not allow us to assess the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship, we presume that it is bidirectional (i.e., that women’s attitudes about appropriate maternal practices influence their propensity to combine motherhood with paid employment, and that women’s experiences as either employed or stay-at-home mothers influence their attitudes about maternal employment). Among childless women, employment reduces the odds of espousing full-time maternal care. Being married seems to make little difference to women’s beliefs about appropriate child-rearing practices.14

Also consistent with past research, we find that younger women and women whose own mothers were employed are generally more supportive of combining market work with motherhood (Brayfield, Jones, and Alder 2001; Knudsen and Wærness 2001).

To assess possible differences by country in the predictors of beliefs about appropriate mothering, we also ran a set of 32 single-country models for each dependent variable. These models (not shown) yield slope coefficients that are either consistent in direction to those displayed in Table 8.3 or statistically nonsignificant. We thus find little evidence of important cross-national differences in these individual-level relationships.

We now return to our earlier question concerning the compositional dependence of cross-national differences in normative understandings of motherhood. In particular, we wish to know whether the differences revealed in Table 8.1 persist after we have taken into account international differences in the sociodemographic variables discussed earlier. For example, are women with similar values on age, education, religiosity, employment status, and other relevant attributes more likely to support full-time maternal care if they live in New Zealand than if they live in Israel?

How Do Norms of Motherhood Differ by Country?
Models Ib and IIb in Table 8.3 allow us to examine cross-national differences while holding sociodemographic attributes constant. This information
can be garnered from the strength and direction of the 31 dummy “country” indicators. Because the omitted reference category is the United States, a positive value on a particular country term indicates a stronger propensity for women to hold this belief in the respective country than in the United States; a negative value indicates a weaker propensity.

Country effects shown in Table 8.3 reveal rank orderings that are roughly consistent with those for the unadjusted percentages displayed in Table 8.1. We find, for instance, the same set of highest and lowest scoring countries on both dependent variables. This result tells us that the international differences described earlier are not simple artifacts of differences in respondents’ demographic attributes, but hold even net of such compositional differences. Cross-national variability is substantial even if we consider only advanced industrial countries. The odds of supporting full-time mothering of preschoolers are, for instance, more than three times higher among U.S. women than among their demographically comparable counterparts in Sweden.15

How can we explain these considerable attitudinal differences even among countries with similar traditions of feminist mobilization and comparable levels of postindustrial development and affluence? Scholars of welfare state and gender regimes have suggested that ideals of good motherhood and beliefs about children’s needs are influenced by prevailing institutional and policy arrangements that set the context for family decisions and make certain child care arrangements more or less viable (Esping-Andersen 1999; Kremer 2006; Mahon 2002a, b; Pfau-Effinger 2000, 2004; Sainsbury 1999b). When consolidated, public policy regimes gain constituencies and may become inscribed in national culture. Existing family arrangements and systems of public provision thereby come to be taken for granted as natural and desirable. In the following section we consider the extent to which ideals of maternal care cohere within categories of standard welfare state classification.

Exploring Regime Effects

Welfare state regimes refer to the different ways in which welfare production is allocated between the state, the market, and the family. The most influential typology, which distinguishes three basic regime types (liberal, social–democratic, and conservative), was put forward by Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen in his 1990 classic, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Policy logic in liberal regimes gives primacy to the market, with individuals and families expected to care for themselves or purchase services. Benefits are modest, means tested, and aimed at a small group of welfare recipients.16 Nonparental child care is provided mostly by low-wage workers employed in private-sector markets. The liberal cluster is primarily comprised of Anglo-Saxon countries, with the United States representing
the ideal/typical case. In social–democratic regimes, found in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries, taxes are high, benefits are universal and are paid to individuals, and state policies aim to promote equality at a relatively high material level (as opposed to covering minimal needs). Policies are based on “universal earner” principles, with the aim of promoting full employment of women and men in part through heavy state investment in child care services and parental leave allowances. Conservative regimes are mostly continental European countries, with (West) Germany as the ideal/typical case. Labor force participation is an important source of entitlement in conservative regimes because benefits are generally conferred on heads of households and are often linked to occupational status and earnings. Policies aim to temper negative effects of unfettered market competition through transfers to families. High male wages, employment-based pension funds, and progressive joint taxation promote family divisions of labor between a full-time domestic caregiver and a full-time breadwinner.

Although Esping-Anderson’s (1990) analysis focused on advanced capitalist societies, the data collected for the ISSP allow us to examine norms of motherhood in formerly socialist and developing economies as well. We therefore add two categories to Esping-Andersen’s original three. Our fourth “regime” is comprised of seven eastern and central European countries that share a communist past and a recent postsocialist market transition. Marxist doctrine, with its avowed allegiance to principles of gender equality and even the “withering away” of the family, provided a strong ideological basis for state efforts to facilitate female employment through provision of child care and other services. However, resource shortfalls and precommunist legacies of care often meant considerable gaps between ideological commitment and actual services (Michel 2006).

The fifth regime type considered here is comprised of four developing countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines). Because this group is restricted to middle-income, largely Roman Catholic societies—three Latin American and one East Asian—it can by no means be regarded as representative of all developing countries. However, these four do share with other developing countries a relatively small tax base and a limited state capacity to buffer risk and provide social welfare services to individuals and families. Moreover, all of these countries have been exposed, since at least the 1980s, to pressures from international financial institutions (e.g., The World Bank, International Monetary Fund) for neoliberal restructuring of their economies and a reduced state role in welfare provision. Child care policies in developing countries are also influenced by concepts of early care and education propagated by such multilateral organizations as the United Nations’ Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (or UNESCO).
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Since publication of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) *Three Worlds*, numerous alternative classification systems have been proposed by welfare state scholars and feminist theorists. Although compelling arguments have been advanced that France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Mediterranean region, the Antipodes, and/or Japan constitute distinct national types (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Castles 1996; Huber and Stephens 2001; Jones 1993; Leibfried 1992; Miyamoto 2003; O’Connor 1999), we provisionally follow Esping-Andersen (1997, 1999) in assigning all of these to the conservative category.18 Israel has been described as a hybrid of liberal and social–democratic regime types (Sabbagh, Powell, and Vanhuysse 2007). We classify it as “liberal” based on observations by Ben-Arieh, Boyer, and Gajst (2004). We will assess arguments about the cultural distinctiveness of these and other national societies by examining within-regime variability in beliefs about maternal employment. Our operational classification of countries by regime type can be seen in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.

Models Ic and IIc in Table 8.3 allow us to ascertain the extent to which patterns of cross-national variability in support for full-time maternal care map on to our classification of regime types. Effects are measured relative to the liberal category. For example, the value 0.343 in the last column tells us that the odds that women will advocate full-time maternal care of school-age children are about 41 percent greater in conservative than in liberal regimes (exp(0.343) = 1.409), holding constant other variables. All regime effects are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

Consistent with the predictions of standard welfare state regime theories, results show that women in social–democratic countries are least likely to advocate full-time maternal care of children in either age group. We suspect that a strong state role in harmonizing family and work obligations, subsidizing costs of quality child care, and disseminating alternative normative conceptualizations of childhood and motherhood contributes to an erosion of support for full-time mothering of preschoolers in social–democratic regimes. In other words, state policies have helped propagate a normative “universal worker” ideal and a less mother-centered understanding of childhood.

In liberal welfare states, normative models of motherhood appear to depend strongly on children’s ages. Employment of mothers with school-age children is deemed relatively unproblematic in liberal regimes, with only social–democratic regimes showing weaker support for full-time mothering in that age group. However, we were surprised to find that it is in the liberal, not conservative, regimes where women are most likely to believe that mothers with preschool children should “stay home.” Cultural tendencies for individualistic attribution of preferences and outcomes in liberal countries,
combined with a weak state role in facilitating (and legitimizing) female employment, may mean that maternal labor force participation is widely understood as a “choice”—and perhaps one that places a mother’s personal interests ahead of her children’s. Market- and school-based care provisions for older children are reasonably compatible with at least part-time maternal employment in liberal regimes. In contrast, irregular (and in some cases even half-day) school schedules greatly increase structural and normative pressures for stay-at-home mothering of school-age children in such conservative-group countries as West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (Bird and Gottschall 2004; Buchmann and Charles 1995; Hagemann 2006).

Regression coefficients for models Ic and IIc provide no evidence that the Marxist critique of bourgeois family norms has resulted in an across-the-board weakening of women’s support for full-time mothering in the formerly communist countries of eastern and central Europe. Women’s attitudes toward child rearing in fact differ little in the aggregate from those in conservative state regimes. This suggests that state-imposed norms of maternal employment are not automatically internalized. We may also be witnessing an ideological backlash. Given frequent shortages of goods and services, and the absence of serious state efforts to increase men’s participation in domestic work, mothers’ “double shift” was often onerous during the communist era (Bicskei 2006; Heinen 2002; Michel 2006). As a result, some eastern and central European women may now view the male breadwinner family as relatively emancipatory, especially where public investment in child care was inadequate to support the state-prescribed dual-earner families. The relative weakness of the feminist movement and the symbolic association of “gender equality” with the communist state may also increase support for western-style male breadwinner family models in these contexts.19

In developing regimes, women’s attitudes are quite distinctive with regard to school-age (but not preschool-age) children. The odds of supporting full-time maternal care of children in the older age group are in fact nearly nine times higher in developing than in social–democratic societies,20 although still only a minority of women in developing countries advocate stay-at-home mothering of these children. The difference between more and less affluent societies in this regard may be attributable to the poor conditions facing many workers in developing countries (Heymann 2006). Women are strongly overrepresented in the unregulated and poorly paid informal sector of less developed economies, especially in Latin America. When their parents work long and unpredictable hours, children are often left unsupervised after school.

To determine whether effects of individual-level covariates vary across regime types, we have run a series of regime-specific models (not shown). In only one case did a statistically significant coefficient deviate in sign from
those shown for models Ia and IIa. The exception concerns the interaction of motherhood and employment. Being an employed mother in a developing country makes women more, not less, likely to advocate full-time maternal care of preschoolers. This may again reflect differences in the nature and meaning of female labor force participation in more and less economically developed countries. Mothers who believe that full-time maternal care is advantageous can more often afford to stay at home with their preschool children in affluent than in developing societies.21

The relative predictive power of models displayed in Table 8.3 can be assessed by comparing the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics across specifications.22 The preferred model is that with the smallest (i.e., the most negative) BIC score. Not surprisingly, the best fit is obtained when attitudes are allowed to vary freely by country (i.e., in models Ib and IIb). Nonetheless, regime distinctions do substantially improve prediction relative to the individual-effects models, especially with regard to beliefs about mothering of older (i.e., school-age) children. Comparing BIC scores between the regime- and the country-effects models suggests greater within-regime cohesion of attitudes concerning school-age than preschool-age children. As discussed later, state and private provisions for the care of very young children (e.g., early education and child care services, maternal and paternal leave policies) vary a great deal even within regime types.

Within-regime variability in attitudes toward maternal employment is evident in Figure 8.1, which displays adjusted country effects garnered from models Ib and IIb, grouped by regime. Bars represent, for each country, the predicted probabilities of espousing full-time maternal care, holding constant individual-level factors (see equation in note 5). Specifically, values give probabilities for a hypothetical 30-year-old employed woman who is single, has no children at home, has no university degree, is not highly religious, and whose own mother was employed.23 The corresponding representation of regime effects (based on coefficients from models Ic and IIc) can be found in Figure 8.2, where bars represent predicted probabilities for each regime.

Figure 8.1 reveals considerable within-regime heterogeneity in support of full-time motherhood. In the following section, we consider these and other country-level differences in connection with recent literature on welfare states and family policy.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WELFARE STATE THEORY

Comparativist scholars see both material and cultural significance in distinctions among welfare state regimes. The material effects of variability in state-funded social services and income transfers are obvious. The cultural effects are the taken-for-granted understandings of work, gender roles,
Figure 8.1. Espousal of full-time maternal care: Probability of agreement, by country.

Note: Values are predicted probabilities of agreement with the corresponding statement, calculated from models Ib and IIb of Table 8.3. Probabilities are for a hypothetical 30-year-old employed woman who is single, has no children, has no university degree, is not highly religious, and whose mother was employed. The top and bottom bar graphs are presented with different scales to facilitate inter-country comparisons within each panel.
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family relationships (including the nature of childhood), and the role of the state that congeal over time. These normative understandings in turn strengthen public support for specific brands of welfare statism, resulting in path-dependent trajectories of social policy development. Regime-specific cultures of the market, the state, and the family are thereby crystallized, as suggested in Esping-Andersen’s (1999) observation that: “Genetics clearly do not create preferences and beliefs. What might account for this is society itself with all its institutions, incentive systems, and inscribed norms of proper conduct” (p. 172).

Family policy experts and feminist scholars have, however, challenged the material and cultural coherence of the Esping-Andersen typology on the grounds that it pays insufficient attention to within-regime variability in state-sanctioned gender relations and family structures. The mainstream welfare state literature suffers, they argue, from a preoccupation with income maintenance and job security of core workers (“decommodification”) and glosses over important differences in the degree to which national social policies facilitate female employment and help ease burdens associated with family care (Daly 2000; O’Connor 1999; Orloff 1993, 1996; Sainsbury 1996). For example, in countries where the state seeks to increase female labor force participation (or stem fertility declines), generous child care services

Figure 8.2. Espousal of full-time maternal care: Probability of agreement, by regime.

Note: Values are predicted probabilities of agreement with the corresponding statement, calculated from models Ic and IIc of Table 8.3. Probabilities are for a hypothetical 30-year-old employed woman who is single, has no children, has no university degree, is not highly religious, and whose mother was employed.
are provided, and dominant normative understandings of childhood and parenthood do not include long periods of full-time maternal care. When, on the other hand, welfare policy is built around a male breadwinner model, the state supports lengthy maternity leaves and/or subsidizes the (male) family wage to allow mothers to withdraw completely from the labor force. The state-sanctioned gendered division of earning and caring roles is thereby legitimized and naturalized (Mahon 2002b).

In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss existing evidence on within-regime variability in state provision of child care services, a key indicator of “defamilialization” (i.e., loosening of households’ welfare and caring responsibilities). We then consider the extent to which these policy differences correspond to the patterns of cross-national variability in attitudes that are revealed in Figure 8.1.

Among countries classified as “conservative” in the Esping-Anderson typology, much heterogeneity in family policy provisions has been documented. The French and Belgian states are commonly identified as exceptional within this cluster because they provide preschool education for all children age 3 to 6 years and offer relatively good publicly funded services for younger children. The Dutch state has recently been moving toward a relatively generous provision of child care support as well, although it long resisted loosening of its strong familialist traditions (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1999; Morgan 2006). Substantial differences are also found among the highly familialist societies in the conservative group. For example, the southern European countries of Italy and Spain have relatively well-developed systems of public preschool that accommodate most 3- to 5-year-olds (Mahon 2002a), whereas Japan (sometimes described as a “Confucian” welfare state) is characterized by high rates of dependency on multigenerational families and very little in the way of publicly funded preschool or child care (Jones 1993).

Significant internal variability in state support for maternal employment has also been observed within the social–democratic group, where Norway provides the least generous support for public child care (Leira 1992; Sainsbury 1999a); and within the liberal group, where Australia and Canada have been identified as better providers of maternity leave and child care coverage (Mahon 2002a; O’Connor 1999).

The comparative literature likewise suggests much heterogeneity among formerly socialist societies. Both during and after the communist era, child care coverage has been good in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), but relatively poor in Poland and the region that is now the Czech Republic, perhaps because of the continuous cultural influence of Catholic religious doctrine in the latter two regions. Hungary appears to have fallen somewhere in between Poland and the GDR with regard to child care policy
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(Hagemann 2006; Heinen 2002; Mahon 2002a; Michel 2006). Slovenia, a relatively affluent country in the group, developed an extensive system of public care and education for young children that has been kept more or less intact throughout the transition period (Stropnik 2001).

Evidence is also emerging that “varieties of welfare capitalism” exist within the developing world (Pribble 2006; Rudra 2007). This heterogeneity is attributable in part to cross-national differences in exposure to the global economy and pressures from international financial institutions for neoliberal-style structural adjustments (Rudra 2002, 2007). Although available information on child care and preschool coverage does not allow systematic comparison across our developing countries, some features of Brazilian society would seem to support more generous provisions. These include a more inward-directed development strategy, more universalistic welfare state traditions (which, however, fall considerably short in practice), and the expressed commitment of the Brazilian state and the national feminist movement to expanding child care provisions.

To what extent do these national differences in family policy map on to patterns of within-regime variability in women’s attitudes? Within both the social–democratic and conservative regimes, we find that support for full-time maternal care tends to be weaker in countries that have been identified as having the most extensive public-sector provisions for child care and education. Danish and Swedish women are, accordingly, less likely than their Finnish and Norwegian counterparts to support full-time maternal care of children regardless of age. With respect to school-age children, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands stand out within their conservative group as particularly supportive of maternal employment. French and Dutch women are, however, no less likely than their counterparts in other “conservative” countries to support full-time maternal care of very young children. This age dependence may be attributable to state subsidies for lengthy maternity leaves in France and the Netherlands. Women in the highly familialist countries of the Mediterranean region (i.e., Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus) and Japan show no greater tendency to support stay-at-home mothering than do their counterparts in other conservative states.

Within the liberal group, we find much heterogeneity but no consistent pattern of cross-national variability across indicators. Attitudinal patterns are strongly dependent on the age of the child. With regard to employment of mothers with preschool children, the odds that a woman will support stay-at-home mothering is, for example, several times stronger in New Zealand than in Israel. Both countries fall close to the liberal group average with respect to care of school-age children, however. Israeli women’s views on the care of preschool children may be attributable to that country’s long tradition of community-based education (often religiously oriented) for
preschool-age children. We have no ready explanation for the very high value in New Zealand on the same measure. The difference between Australia and New Zealand with respect to employment of mothers with very young children may be partially attributable to the relatively well-developed Australian system of child care supports that grew out of a feminist–labor alliance during the 1970s and ’80s.

In the group of formerly socialist societies, we find correspondence of attitudes with national cultural traditions as well with the types of institutional support for female labor force participation that were developed under communism. East German and Slovenian women, for example, view maternal employment considerably more favorably than their counterparts in Poland and the Czech Republic, where the historical influence of Catholic religious doctrine on family practices and state policies was evident even during the communist era. This contrast highlights the resilience of traditional customs and cultures in the face of massive institutional transformation. But the large differences observed between East and West German women with respect to maternal employment suggest that family policy regimes can have enduring normative effects. Attitudes in the East and West may eventually converge in reunited Germany, but our data point to strong cultural legacies from socialist institutions in the Eastern Länder (see also Rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004; Rudd 2000). The odds of advocating full-time maternal care of school-age children is, for example, nearly five times higher for West German women than for their counterparts in the East, who showed roughly similar patterns of employment prior to World War II.

Turning to the group of developing nations, Brazilian women are less likely to object to maternal employment than their counterparts elsewhere in the developing world. As suggested earlier, this difference may be attributable to the stronger government and popular support for publicly funded early-childhood education and the weaker influence of neoliberal antistatism in Brazil. A broader sample of developing countries is necessary before any general conclusions can be drawn about this group.

Women’s views about maternal employment indeed vary across standard welfare state regime types (Figure 8.2), presumably because their experiences with state policies related to family welfare supports, taxation, and employment influence their understandings of what constitutes “normal” motherhood and childhood. These understandings in turn help sustain feedback loops and path-dependent trajectories of policy development within regime types. But our results also provide support for feminist critiques, which hold that standard typologies of welfare state regimes obscure cross-national variability in defamilialization of caring responsibilities. Norms of maternal care documented here do in fact correspond to important within-regime differences in child care and family policies. A strong state role in
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harmonizing market and family roles may help disseminate “family values” that legitimate a greater public-sector role in the care and education of young children.

Future research should use over-time data and multilevel modeling to explore further the spatial variability in norms of motherhood. Application of over-time data (for either qualitative or quantitative analysis) would allow researchers to identify more clearly the direction of causal relationships and to gain a better sense of the relative importance of attitudinal divergence and convergence in global economies and societies. More rigorous examination of the intermediary mechanisms driving observed patterns of cross-national variability may be facilitated by a formal multilevel modeling approach. The theoretical literature points to a number of macrolevel covariates that might be relevant in this regard. These include rates of female labor force participation, levels of economic prosperity, urban concentration of the population, timing and speed of industrialization, preschool enrollment rates, service-sector size, strength of the feminist movement and leftist parties, and female representation in parliaments. Given recent evidence of significant micro/macro interactions in the determination of household divisions of labor, researchers should also attend carefully to how national and regional factors may mediate effects of individual-level variables on norms of motherhood.

CONCLUSION

Our analyses support the following empirical conclusions: First, beliefs about the appropriateness of maternal employment vary a great deal cross-nationally, even among women with similar configurations of sociodemographic characteristics. Second, some of this cross-national variability in beliefs about mothering corresponds to differences in welfare state regime types. And third, within-regime variability corresponds to differences in national family policy provisions that have not yet received much attention from mainstream welfare state scholars. These findings are consistent with arguments positing a coconstitutive relationship between welfare state regime types on the one hand and societal understandings about work, gender roles, and childhood on the other. They also suggest that feminist scholars are right to call for greater attention to within-regime variability in policy efforts aimed specifically at reconciling market and caring work.

There is much evidence that individual behavior and household divisions of labor are strongly conditioned by welfare- and family-policy regimes and the associated norms of motherhood (Cooke 2007; Esping-Andersen 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Lewis 2006; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Mayer 2001). The very low rate of maternal labor force participation in
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contemporary West Germany, for instance, reflects the interaction of powerful ideological and structural forces:

[M]others abide by the institutional steering of their life courses prescribed for them by legislation and backed up by normative expectations of colleagues, friends, and families. These dual measures—the external policy instrument and the expectations of their normative environment—combine to produce a nearly insurmountable prescribed pattern for the labor-market participation of mothers with children under three years old: that is, they stay at home. (Bird and Gottschall 2004, p. 296)

The overdetermination of German stay-at-home motherhood stands in stark contrast to the normative and institutional environment in Sweden, where:

Swedish policy makers effectively legislated the demise of the male breadwinner family in the late 1960s and early 1970s, making it financially onerous for one parent to be home full-time. . . . This created strong demand for the continued expansion of the Swedish day care system while softening divisions between advocates of working mothers and defenders of the male-breadwinner model. (Morgan 2006, p. 114)

Both of these accounts recognize the mutually constitutive relationship between established social policy regimes and normative expectations regarding maternal employment and the role of the state. Countries are by no means culturally homogeneous, but they do clearly differ in what Kremer (2006) calls dominant “ideals of care.”

Although international differences in state-sanctioned ideals of motherhood and the family are striking, it is possible that the worldwide diffusion of neoliberal ideology and trends toward regional integration and economic globalization may alter the logic of path dependence in national welfare state provisions. Rianne Mahon (2002b), for instance, suggests that the expansion and institutional formalization of the European Union has contributed to a growing “hybridization” in family policies and injection of new ideas into national societies. Such tendencies could imply a gradual convergence in normative ideals of care across countries and regime types.

In interpreting results of our analyses, we have suggested that notions regarding where and by whom child care should be provided are attributable in part to shared experiences with national welfare- and family-policy regimes. These experiences congeal into common normative understandings of motherhood, childhood, and the role of the state, and they influence the extent to which mothering is seen as compatible with paid employment. The resulting cultural understandings of motherhood and childhood are reflected in the actions and agendas of policy makers, employers, and social movement activists, and they are manifested in subsequent waves of policy development. An active state role in harmonizing market and family obli-
gations legitimizes maternal employment and public child care and further increases demand for policies that defamilialize care. A powerful feedback loop is thus completed.

NOTES

We thank Lynn Prince Cooke, Claudia Geist, and the volume’s editors for helpful comments.


2. American and international studies indicate, for instance, that nonemployed, partnered women do a larger share of routine housework than their employed counterparts (Bianchi et al. 2000; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005).

3. We have also computed weighted models with very similar results. Any significant differences are noted.

4. Responses were taken from the following survey question: Do you think that women should work outside the home, full-time, part-time, or not at all under the following circumstances: after marrying and before there are children, when there is a child under school age, after the youngest child starts school, after the children leave home.” We do not distinguish between full- and part-time employment because of tremendous cross-national variability in definition and prevalence of part-time work.

5. Although we considered other survey items, many of them tapped into multiple attitudes and therefore present ambiguities of interpretation and cross-national comparison.

6. As expected, men are generally more likely to espouse full-time maternal care than are women.

7. The logistic regression equation takes the following form: \( \log\left(\frac{P_i}{1 - P_i}\right) = a + bX_i \), where \( i \) denotes the \( i \)th sample respondent, \( P_i \) represents the probability that respondent \( i \) holds the belief in question, \( a \) is the model intercept, and \( bX_i \) represents a vector of covariates (\( X_i \)) and their slopes (\( b \)). Predicted probabilities are calculated as \( \frac{e^{(a + bX_i)}}{1 + e^{(a + bX_i)}} \).

8. Women reporting “full-time,” “part-time,” or “less than part-time” activity are counted as employed. Overall, less than 2% of women reported working “less than part-time.” Most of these women are from countries where part-time employment is defined as 15 to 35 hours per week (10–29 hours in Great Britain and Denmark, 10–39 hours in the Philippines). The “less-than-part-time” category also includes a small number of women who were temporarily not working.

9. The “household composition” variable is not available for Slovenia, Israel, Cyprus, and Brazil. For Australia, the total given on this variable appears to include missing values. For these four countries, we determined presence of
children based on variables giving the numbers of preschool- and school-age children in the household.

10. Although we would have liked to control for differences in economic class position, such comparisons were unfeasible as a result of complications involved in determining class positions of nonemployed and marginally employed women.

11. Multiplying a coefficient by \(-1\) gives the effect on the log-odds that a woman disagrees with the respective statement (i.e., finds maternal employment acceptable).

12. \(\exp(0.878) = 2.406\).

13. \(\exp(0.297)/(\exp(-0.365 + 0.297 + -0.291)) = 1.927\). Because we have included main and interaction terms for employment and the presence of children, the main “employment” effects pertain to women with no children at home, and the main “child” effect pertains to nonemployed women.

14. When sample weights are applied, the positive effect of marriage becomes statistically significant in models Ia and IIa, and the effects of having children (for both employed and nonemployed women) become statistically significant in model Ic.

15. \(\exp(1.219) = 3.384\).

16. Qualification for means-tested benefits is based on financial need. Universal welfare benefits, in contrast, are targeted toward all those who fall within particular social categories (e.g., families with children, citizens older than age 65, the unemployed).

17. To allow for greater investment in primary education, these organizations tend to emphasize low-cost, nonformal provisions for young children (Rosenberg 2003).

18. Esping-Andersen (1997) in fact describes the current Japanese welfare state as a hybrid system, which fuses the corporatism and familialism of the conservative regime with the market emphasis of the liberal regime. Because our focus is on family-related policy and values, we classify Japan as a conservative regime. We follow Esping-Andersen’s 1999 typology in classifying the Dutch welfare state as conservative. See Kouloumou (2006) on family policy in Cyprus.

19. Although no clear link is evident between the strength of women’s movements and the extensiveness of family policy provisions (Morgan 2006), feminist organizations undoubtedly have an ideological and agenda-setting effect within their respective national contexts. See also Sainsbury (1999b) on different strands of feminism and their policy implications.

20. \(\exp(1.412)/(\exp(-0.778) = 8.935\).

21. We also note the following interregime differences in strength of covariate effects: Coefficients for religiosity tend to be smaller in developing and liberal countries, and the presence of children (among nonemployed women) is a weaker predictor of attitudes in developing and socialist regimes.

22. Application of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) allows us to consider both parsimony and explanatory power in selecting the best-fitting model. By this standard, inclusion of country or regime effects must be justified on the
basis of improved model fit. The computational formula for BIC is shown in the footnote to Table 8.3. For more information, see Raftery (1995).

23. We have also computed regime-specific models for which parameter estimates for all individual-level covariates are allowed to vary across regime types. Country effects for these models correspond very closely to those shown in Figure 8.1 for the pooled models.

24. In Esping-Anderson’s (1999) terms, therefore, Homo liberalimus, Homo familius, and Homo socialdemocraticus become culturally dominant in the respective welfare state regimes. These ideal typical homines exhibit, he argues, preferences and cultural logic that are both reflected in and promoted by the corresponding policy regimes.

25. Decommodification refers to the “degree to which the individual’s typical life situation is freed from dependence on the labor market” (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, p. 40). Feminist scholars have pointed out that women who specialize in extramarket care work are dependent on families, rather than markets, for their welfare. Their independence therefore requires not decommodification, but a lessening of their reliance on families (Orloff 1993). Esping-Andersen (1999, pp. 60–67) acknowledges important intra-regime difference in relations between the family and the state, but argues that his original classification of regimes remains useful for capturing some differences in state efforts to defamilialize caring responsibilities.

26. A familialist system is one in which public policy is organized around the presumption that families will carry the principle responsibility for members’ welfare.

27. Regarding provisions in France and Belgium, see Bussemaker and van Kersbergen (1999); Meyers, Gornick, and Ross (1999); Mahon (2002a), and Morgan (2006). Important ideological dissimilarities with the Nordic countries have been identified. In particular, programs in France and Belgium are intended to increase fertility and improve early childhood education more than to facilitate maternal employment and promote gender equality.

28. All-day supervision for nursery-, preschool- and school-age children was provided on a universal basis in the former GDR. This supported—some would say enforced—female labor force participation rates that were high even compared with other socialist countries. Although child care provisions have been scaled back in the East German Länder, they continue to be considerably more generous than in the West (Rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004).

29. Insulation of the economy from international competition allows greater state discretion to intervene in the economy and expand its role in provision of social services. Interestingly, Rudra (2002) finds that exposure to international markets decreases state welfare spending in developing, but not developed, countries.

30. The Brazilian feminist movement has placed priority on child care since the 1970s. The national constitution of 1988 mandates federal government provision of free daycare and preschool to all children younger than 7 years of age. This policy has not yet been implemented, however. Similar gaps between de jure and de facto coverage have been identified with respect to other sorts of universal
entitlements in Brazil. On Brazilian social policy, see Connelly, DeGraff, and Le- vison (1996); Huber (1996); and Barrientos (2004).

31. Northern Ireland is a notable outlier on this indicator. Even there, only a small minority of women object to employment of mothers with school-age children.

32. The Israeli welfare regime has both liberal and social–democratic ele- ments (Sabbagh, Powell, and Vanhuysse 2007). With regard to attitudes toward employment of women with very young children, Israeli women look more like their Nordic than their liberal counterparts.

33. In a comparative analysis of family life in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, Baker (2001) notes that child care provisions for infants are in especially short supply in New Zealand. She also describes strong social pressure for at-home mothering in both Australia and New Zealand.

34. Because our models control for individual religiosity, we here refer to societal-level effects. The policy provisions and norms of family life that grow out of the dominant religious doctrine are presumed to influence attitudes of even those persons who are not highly religious.

35. \(\exp(0.896)/(\exp(-0.667) = 4.773.\) See also Cooke (2007) on divisions of domestic labor in East and West German Länder.

36. See also Geist (2005) on interregime differences in the gendered division of domestic labor.

38. Variability within regions of Switzerland, Hungary, and the United Kingdom have, for example, been described by Bühler (1998), Bicskei (2006), and Wincott (2006), respectively. See also Duncan (2000).

37. Recent comparative analyses suggest that living in a country character- ized by conservative family policies or low rates of female employment may imply more gendered divisions of housework regardless of an individual woman’s employment status or personal attitudes (Breen and Cooke 2005; Fuwa 2004; Hook 2006).

REFERENCES


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Marriage makes headlines. Although the majority of people around the world have experienced marriage as a part of their daily life, marriage is not a mundane subject. We are fascinated by changes in marriage, which is apparent by the coverage the changes receive in newspapers around the world. In July 2007, Hong Kong, a *South China Morning Post* headline read, “The challenge of finding ‘Mr. He’ll Have To Do’ in 2036.” In London, the *Guardian* reported “Number of marriages at new low.” In Cape Town, South Africa, the *Cape Times* discussed “Explosion in fake weddings to foreigners ‘a national crisis’.”

Marriage is more than a private, personal relationship. It is a social institution or “a dominant system of interrelated informal and formal elements—customs, shared beliefs, conventions, norms, and rules—which actors orient their actions to when they pursue their interests” (Nee 2005, p. 55). As other chapters regarding the division of household labor demonstrate, our intimate relationships, including marriage, are not all that unique to us. We tend to marry similar to how other people around us marry. This is because we do not merely act as independent actors in our interpersonal relationships. Rather, our most private relationships and actions within them are shaped by, and in turn reinforce, the larger institutional system of marriage.

Marriage, an institution that has always shown the stamp of the particular culture, is undergoing changes that are reflected in new practices, rules, and beliefs. Although the pace of change differs from country to country, sociologists point to a broad-based shift in the values that underpin the marital institution—that is, in the fundamental principles that motivate people to marry and that contribute to the success of marital relationships. This chapter leverages on this cross-national variation in the meaning of marriage to test a hypothesis about the implications of changing cultural beliefs about the institution of marriage for the domestic organization of the household. I examine cross-cultural variation in the institution of marriage and how dominant beliefs about marriage within countries are associated with the
division of housework in marriages. In particular, I apply the theoretical work of Anthony Giddens (1991, 1992) to study if the intimacy-based institution of marriage is related to a more flexible and less traditional division of housework between women and men.

THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE

Jennifer Brigid O’Malley was married last evening to Michael Patrick Dillon. The Rev. David P. Callahan, a Roman Catholic priest, performed the ceremony at St. Mary’s Church in Franklin, Mass. . . . The couple met in 2003 while working for Mr. [John] Edwards’s first presidential campaign, Mr. Dillon in the press department and Ms. O’Malley in the field. (Wedding/celebrations, 2007)

As this wedding announcement highlights, one institutionalized pattern in marriage is for people to marry people like themselves. We talk about the serendipitous fortune of finding our one true love. In reality, there isn’t too much unanticipated about our mates. We tend to marry people of similar social classes and educational levels, and common ethnic or religious backgrounds (Kalmijn 1998). For example, in Canada, a country known for its open immigration policies and ethnic diversity, only 3 percent of unions are “mixed,” or comprised of partners from different visible, ethnic groups (Milan and Hamm 2004).

The practice of marrying people from common backgrounds, or homogamy, is often believed to enhance marital success. When individuals come from a similar background, it is argued, there is a shared history that increases compatibility in values and makes it easier to build and continue intimate relationships. Homogamy is not solely about shared values and compatibility, however. Social pressure to marry within a particular group is also related to reproducing and maintaining boundaries between dominant and threatened social classes, ethnic groups, and religions. Couples who cross these lines can experience discrimination and negative reactions from family and others. This can add pressure to a marriage, leading to lower satisfaction and stability (Amato et al. 2003; Fu, Tora, and Kendall 2001; Heaton 2002). Yet there is also evidence that working through these challenges can make relationships stronger (Heller and Wood 2000; Rosenblatt, Karis, and Powell 1995).

Marriage has also been socially defined as an indicator of a secure and successful life (Cherlin 2004; Edin 2000; Edin, Kefalas, and Reed 2004).

Until their marriage last fall, Elana and James Nanscawen weren’t fussy about their living situation. Their one-bedroom rental in the financial district was perfectly adequate, if small. . . . By spring, though, they were growing impatient to buy a bigger place. (Cohen 2007, p. 6)
As described in this article from the real estate section of the newspaper, adequate income and housing for building a family life are believed to be ingredients of that security and success. These institutional beliefs influence individual choice to marry. Studies in North America find that people often choose not to marry if they believe that they do not have sufficient material resources to make a marriage last long term (Edin, Kefalas, and Reed 2004; Smock, Manning, and Porter 2004).

Indeed, a lack of adequate resources can serve as relationship stressors, leading to decreased satisfaction and increased likelihood of divorce (Bradbury and Karney 2004; Huston and Melz 2004). The accumulation of shared resources, including a house, children, and joint bank account, also increases commitment to the relationship, because they make it more cumbersome for the couple to split up, even if one of the partners no longer wants to stay (Johnson, Caughlin, and Huston 1999; Treas 1993).

“What’s keeping people together is their love and commitment for each other,” Professor Musick said, “and that’s fragile . . . the evolving rules of marriage provide both opportunities and pitfalls . . . There may be greater potential to find fulfillment in relationships,” she said, “but that possibility and the expectations that come from it may lead to greater disappointment for some” if the expectations aren’t fulfilled. (Roberts 2007, p. 1)

This newspaper article summarizes a relatively new pattern in the institution of marriage. Burgess and Locke (1945) described the shift from institutional to companionate marriages. During the period when marriages were culturally defined as institutional, the focus was not the individuals in the marriage or their feelings toward each other. On the contrary, it was the relationship of the extended families, and the political and economic interests between them, that the marriage brought together. With the shift to companionate marriages, the institutional focus of marriage turned to the individuals in the marriage and their feelings of love toward each other (Coontz 2005). With this new approach to marriage, individuals were expected, however, to sacrifice their individual identity for the couple identity. In companionate relationships, a rigid, gendered division of labor existed, and satisfaction was expected to come from successfully fulfilling one’s socially prescribed gender roles within marriage, even if it entailed a suppression of individual needs or desires (Cherlin 2004).

Anthony Giddens (1991, 1992) proposes that a new transition in the institution of marriage is taking place. Relationships, including marriages, he argues, are shifting to become pure relationships, which are increasingly centered on intimacy. It is a balanced, reciprocal partnership that forms the basis and continuation of these relationships. Individuals do not sacrifice but rather maintain their own identity and independence, and pursue
self-development while in these relationships (Cancian 1987). With the increased focus on intimacy, relationships take on new forms and dynamics, including more flexibility and equality in the division of housework.

In marriage institutionalized as pure and intimacy based, according to Giddens (1992), there is less focus on marrying someone from the same social backgrounds. Partners are not chosen based on social criteria such as social class, ethnicity, or religion. Everyone is free to pick any partner without external restriction. In these relationships, a “shared history” comes not from a common background or social position, but develops through a process of exchange, communication, and interaction with each other over time. Partners grow to know each other and become compatible. Likewise, it is through “mutual disclosure” that partners begin to trust and develop attachment to the pure relationship. This process replaces the role that similar backgrounds and social pressures once played in fostering trust and holding couples together.

Nonetheless, Giddens (1992) acknowledges that intimacy is a weaker glue than external pressures. As a result, marriage is becoming less secure and more likely to end through divorce. At the same time, however, people increasingly want the marriage to end if they are no longer receiving the intimacy and associated support that now is expected to come from relationships. In this changed institution of marriage, people want—and now have the option to find—intimacy elsewhere.

Associated with this, when the accumulation of resources in marriage was previously viewed as enhancing stability, in the context of intimacy-based marriage, children and homes form “inertial drag,” making it harder to leave the relationship when people are no longer having their needs met (Giddens 1992). In other words, when lifelong stability is no longer the expectation or goal, stabilizing investments in the union are more costly than beneficial. Thus we see a trend toward partners, particularly those who are cohabiting or in pure relationships, keeping their incomes in separate bank accounts and even maintaining separate homes (Levin 2004; Treas and Widmer 2000; Vogler 2005).

The emphasis on intimacy as the basis for marriage also changes dynamics between partners in the relationship, according to Giddens (1992). Intimacy leads to a process of democratization and negotiation. Previously, the institution of marriage was characterized by set hierarchies and roles, largely based on gender. With changes in marriage, these set roles are replaced by an ongoing process of discussion and bargaining to decide who does what in the relationship. As a result, “a division of labour might be established, but not one simply inherited on the basis of preestablished criteria or imposed by unequal economic resources brought to the relationship” (Giddens 1992, p. 195). Under these dynamics, we would expect the division of housework to be less defined by traditional gender roles and more equally shared.
In the years since Giddens’ work on pure intimate relationships, there have been few empirical tests of his theory. Gross and Simmons (2002) focus on individual approaches to marriage and cohabitation in the United States and find evidence for greater autonomy and relationship satisfaction among individuals in pure relationships. However, they do not test to determine whether pure relationships are related to greater equality in the relationship. Rather, they include the division of household labor as an indicator in their measure of pure relationships. Some evidence for Giddens’ ideas comes from studies that find that the division of housework is less traditional and more equal between women and men in cohabiting relationships—those relationships that often fit the definition of pure relationships (Blumstein and Schwartz 1985; Davis, Greenstein, and Gerteisen Marks 2007).

Jamieson (1997) is skeptical of Giddens’ work on intimacy-based relationships, including the argument that an increased emphasis on intimacy in relationships will lead to gender equality. She acknowledges that couples, as Goodnow and Bowes (1994) found, can develop an intimacy, caring-based democratic process of negotiating housework that results in ungendered assignment of household tasks and thereby “do things differently.” Yet she notes that, for the most part, this is not the standard in marriage or cohabitation. She cites a wide range of studies that show that although there might be differences in the degree of inequality, the division of housework remains unequal today despite changes in women’s roles, reported egalitarian gender ideologies, and the option to cohabit rather than marry. Indeed, she highlights, intimacy itself is often unequal, with women doing more of the emotional work than men (Cancian 1987; Hochschild 1989).

There is evidence that greater equality in the division of housework can make partners, particularly women, feel closer, happier, and more satisfied, including sexually, in their relationship (Amato et al. 2003; Gottman 1999; Pimentel 2000). But is an institutional focus on intimacy as the expectation for marriage related to more equality? To test this idea, I move back from this individual-level analysis of relationships and focus on the institution of marriage characterizing a culture. I examine whether a country-level, institutional focus on intimacy in marriage is related to how couples within the context divide the housework.

**STUDY OF GIDDENS’ IDEAS**

In this section, I test Giddens’ ideas by looking at institutionalized beliefs about the institution of marriage. There are two parts to the study. First, I present data on how countries vary in their beliefs regarding marriage. Second, I consider whether greater focus on intimacy-based marriage within countries is related to a less gendered division of housework between spouses.
Dominant Beliefs about Marriage across Countries

What is culturally defined as important in marriage? Is intimacy considered important to marriage in all countries? Or do some cultures continue to place the most importance on marrying within one’s own social background and having adequate resources? In other words, are there different patterns across countries in the system of beliefs, practices, and rules about marriage? In this first part of my analysis, I want to measure how countries differ regarding the institution of marriage.

One source of data to do this is the integrated European and World Values Surveys. The European and World Values Surveys are cross-nationally comparative surveys based on nationally representative samples of individuals in more than 80 countries from North and South America, Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Australia (Inglehart et al. 2004). Data come from the early to late 1990’s. People were asked to answer the following question: Here is a list of things which some people think make for a successful marriage. Please tell me, for each one, whether you think it is very important, rather important, or not very important for a successful marriage?"2

A. Faithfulness
B. An adequate income
C. Being of the same social background
D. Mutual respect and appreciation
E. Shared religious beliefs
F. Good housing
G. Agreement on politics
H. Understanding and tolerance
I. Happy sexual relationship
J. Sharing household chores
K. Children

To understand variation across countries in shared beliefs about marriage, each country received an aggregate score of the percentage of people within the country who believe that each of the previous qualities are very important. I then used factor analysis to examine patterns in what is believed to be important in marriage across countries. Are some qualities considered more important in some countries and less important in others? Are there common themes across countries in what are considered key ingredients for marriage? Table 9.1 shows the patterns that I found across countries.3

Three types of patterns in marriage beliefs appear across countries. First, countries where many people believe having the same social background is very important to marriage are also countries where many people say that sharing religious beliefs and agreeing on politics is very important. These countries place greater emphasis on marital homogamy, or marrying people
with a common background. In the second set of countries, resources are seen as central to a successful marriage. Not only are many people likely to report that adequate income is very important in these countries, but also that good housing and children are essential for marriage. A third pattern reflects Giddens’ concept of pure or intimacy-based relationships. In these countries, marriage is believed to be best if based on equal exchange. These are the countries where people respond that interaction-based qualities are very important: faithfulness, respect and appreciation, understanding and tolerance, happy sexual relationship, and sharing of household chores.

Table 9.2 shows how each of the countries rank with regard to the patterns in marital beliefs. Some countries are consistently high or low on the scales. For example, Chileans place high importance on all marital criteria, whereas Finns give minimal importance to any of the criteria. The other countries tend to vary quite a bit across the measures. In Sweden, marriage is defined as intimacy based, with low importance placed on homogamy or resources. Japan and Brazil are just the opposite. In these countries, lower importance is placed on intimacy and higher importance is placed on homogamy and adequate resources. Northern Ireland and the United States rank high on both intimacy and homogamy, but lower on the importance of resources. Russia ranks high on the need for adequate resources. In general, there is a tendency for less importance to be placed on the need for resources in wealthier countries, there is greater emphasis placed on shared social background or homogamy in countries with histories of social class inequalities and religious and racial tensions, and there is more importance placed on intimacy in marriage in countries where there is less pressure overall to marry, as seen by later age at marriage and nonmarital births. The measures of homogamy and resources are most highly correlated \((r = 0.59)\), whereas intimacy is only weakly correlated with resources \((r = 0.15)\) and moderately correlated with homogamy \((r = 0.40)\).4

Having established different patterns in beliefs, I now take a closer look at the intimacy measure, the focus of Giddens’ work. Countries vary quite a bit on the importance they place on intimacy. This is apparent when examining the separate indicators of intimacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homogamy</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Intimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same social background</td>
<td>Adequate income</td>
<td>Faithfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared religious beliefs</td>
<td>Good housing</td>
<td>Respect and appreciation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on politics</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Understanding and tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Happy sexual relationship and tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing household chores</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in Table 9.3, nearly all the Americans and northern Irish report that faithfulness is very important to a successful marriage. In comparison, just under three quarters of Russians and Japanese place similarly high importance on faithfulness. Russians, along with Portuguese, likewise place comparatively lower importance on respect and appreciation, understanding and tolerance, and a happy sexual relationship. At the same time, 95% of the Dutch report respect and appreciation as very important, 87% of Swedes place high importance on understanding and tolerance, and 77% of Mexicans say that a happy sexual relationship is very important. Of particular interest in this chapter, lesser importance is placed on sharing household chores, but there is also substantial variation across countries. Only 10% of Japanese say that sharing household tasks is very important to a successful marriage. In Poland, 55% report that sharing housework is very important.

These five indicators—faithfulness, respect and appreciation, understanding and tolerance, satisfying sexual relationship, and need to share housework—together comprise the measure of the extent to which marriage is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homogamy</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Intimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Institution of Marriage

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defined as preferably intimacy-based within the country. As outlined earlier, Giddens (1992) predicts that marriage emphasizing intimacy should lead to a less traditional division of labor between partners. This idea is tested in the next section of this chapter.

**Table 9.3**

*Indicators of intimacy-based marriage*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intimacy</th>
<th>Faithfulness</th>
<th>Respect and Appreciation</th>
<th>Tolerance and Understanding</th>
<th>Sexual Relationship</th>
<th>Sharing Housework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percent of respondents reporting a quality is very important for success in marriage.*

Within countries where marriage tends to be defined as intimacy centered, are women less likely to do the housework and men likely to do more? We enter this section with some support already for this argument. In the general cross-national patterns of beliefs about important qualities for marriage, sharing of household chores correlates with other measures of intimacy. As Giddens (1992) predicts, intimacy in marriage is associated with valuing more equal and flexible roles in the relationship. But is intimacy-based marriage also associated with actual behaviors related to housework—in particular, a less traditional division of tasks?
In this part of the analysis, I combine the country-level measure of intimacy-based marriage with individual-level data on the division of housework and the characteristics of partners in intimate relationships. The goal is to test whether couples are less likely to divide the housework along traditional gender roles within countries where the institution of marriage is intimacy based. The analysis consists of two steps. First, the individual characteristics of partners are used to explain the division of housework. Then, controlling for these individual-level characteristics, I examine whether the division of labor between partners becomes less traditional across countries as greater emphasis is placed on intimacy in marriage in the culture overall.

The individual-level data are from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Family and Changing Gender Roles module. The ISSP consists of cross-nationally comparative surveys. Data on individual-level variables and the macrolevel intimacy measure are available for 27 country contexts: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany (East and West), Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Only married couples are included in the analysis, for a total of 17,647 respondents across these countries.

In the ISSP, the division of housework tasks between spouses is measured using the following question: In your household, who does the following?

A. Does the laundry
B. Cares for sick family members
C. Shops for groceries
D. Does the household cleaning
E. Prepares the meals

The responses, recoded to reflect the gender of the partner, include

1. Always the man
2. Usually the man
3. About equal/both together
4. Usually the woman
5. Always the woman

The answers to the questions were summed and the mean score of given responses was used as the household score for each respondent. The scores range from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating that the man does all the housework and 5 indicating that the woman does all the housework.

This task-based measure of women’s and men’s involvement in traditional female tasks is used instead of a relative hours of housework measure because Giddens’ argument focuses on gender negotiation and flexibility in
tasks, which is best indicated by men’s involvement in traditionally women’s tasks rather than their overall housework hours.

Across the 27 countries, the average division of housework score is 3.98, indicating that women do more of the housework than men. There is significant variation across countries. Housework allocation is most traditional in Japan where the average score is 4.3, approaching women always doing all the tasks all the time. Housework is most equal in Sweden, Finland, and the United States, where average scores are 3.7. It is important to note, however, that even where housework is comparatively equal, women do most of the housework. A score of three would indicate equality on housework tasks, and no country in the study approaches that level of equality. And in no country do men do more of the housework tasks than women.

The first line of Table 9.4 shows the average division of housework across countries, controlling for individual- and country-level characteristics. The next six lines of Table 9.4 show the characteristics of individuals that are associated with more or less traditionalism in the division of housework. A positive sign indicates that if a characteristic is present or has a higher value, women do more of the housework relative to men. A negative sign means a less traditional division of housework or the more housework men do.

As shown in Table 9.4, the results are consistent with the research literature on the division of household labor (Fuwa 2004; Nomaguchi and Milkie 2003; Geist, Chapter 11, this volume). The older a person is, the more traditional the division of labor. Women are more likely than men to report gender inequality in housework. As Claudia Geist emphasizes in Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model testing the relationship between individual characteristics and country-level measures of intimacy-based marriage on the division of housework</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average division of housework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman makes more than man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a university degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has children at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes women should work for pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country characteristic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution of marriage based on intimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+ ) indicates that if a characteristic is present or has a higher value, women do more of the housework relative to men. (–) means a less traditional division of housework or the more housework men do.
men report that they do more of the housework than women report men doing. When women earn more than their male partners, they do less of the housework and men do more. People with university degrees report a less gendered division of labor than those with less schooling. When children are present in the household, women do more of the housework. When people believe that women should work outside of the home for pay, the division of housework is less traditionally divided between women and men.

In the final stage of the analysis, I add the country-level measure for an intimacy-based institution of marriage. I use hierarchical linear modeling, which makes it possible to examine whether the division of housework is less traditional in those countries where marriage is defined as intimacy based, controlling for the individual characteristics that explain the division of housework (Hox 1995).

As shown in the last line of Table 9.4, the average score on the division of housework measure is lower in countries where it is generally believed that marriages are best based on understanding, respect, support, and equal exchange. In other words, the housework is less traditional and more equally shared when the marriage is institutionalized as intimacy based. This supports Giddens’ (1992) hypotheses about pure relationships. When the institution of marriage shifts to focus on intimacy, it is likely that relationships will be more democratic, characterized by negotiation of arrangements between partners through open exchange and discussion rather than set roles imposed on the relationship by external norms and practices.

Jamieson (1997), however, is also correct. An increased institutionalization of intimacy-based marriage seems to make the division of housework less gendered and more equal, yet far from ungendered and equal. As noted before, in all countries women, on average, do more the housework than men. Institutionalized norms and expectations of intimacy decrease inequality by 0.06 on the housework measure for each 1-unit increase on the intimacy measure, on which there are 4 units across the countries. As Jamieson (1997) notes, gender inequality in the division of labor is rigid, persisting over time and place, regardless of cultural and demographic changes (Brines 1994).

Discussion of Intimacy-Based Marriage

So what should we conclude about the trend toward intimacy-based marriage? Some people view this cultural trend as weakening the institution of marriage characteristic of an individualistic culture concerned primarily with personal and immediate gratification (Amato 2004). Others see these changes as an improvement in the institution of marriage. Intimacy-based marriage can be interpreted as freedom from the structural and patriar-
chal constraints of institutional or companionate marriage (Amato 2004). Changes in marriage have always raised concern and debate (Smock 2004). As Giddens (1992) notes, there are undoubtedly simultaneous benefits and costs to pure relationships, and the consequences of intimacy-based marriage are complicated. In this conclusion, I consider some of the ideas raised in the debates around these recent changes in the institution of marriage.

In many cultures, social networks are weakening, and we have less contact with neighbors and friends (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2006; Putnam 2000). Intimate relationships in some places have become the primary and often only source of emotional and social support. Indeed, it has been argued that marriage, when defined and practiced as intimacy based, actually reinforces this situation. Marital relationships now take people away from other social ties, weakening community with other relatives, neighbors, and friends (Gerstel and Sarakisian 2006). As a result, the quality and quantity of social ties vary by marital status, with never-married and divorced people reporting less integration and support (Acock and Hurlbert 1993; Umberson et al. 1996).

In this new context, a marital work ethic has developed (Hackstaff 1999). Marriage is defined as not as a given, permanent relationship but something to work on continually and improve. This is apparent in the growing culture of marital therapy, filled with media advice on improving the love and interaction in marriage. Some have argued that this approach to marriage has created an idealized image of marriage that is unattainable (Gillis 2004). The efforts can and do fail, and as a result, we see more people ending relationships and ending them sooner than before. But the institution itself is not obsolete. The majority of people still couple and marry at some point in their lives. In this new context, individual relationships are supposed to dissolve when they are not meeting the needs that the relationship is supposed to meet (Giddens 1992).

The institution is also changing so that the needs of both partners are being met more equally. Part of this process lies in the patterns in housework. It has been argued that men traditionally received more emotional, as well as health and economic, benefits from marriage, with married women experiencing more distress and depression than married men (Bernard 1972; D’Arcy and Siddique 1985; Mugford and Lally 1981; Schumm et al. 1985; Waite and Gallagher 2000). These discrepancies are at least associated in part with traditional inequalities in the division of housework and the external imposition of roles based on gender (Freidan 1963). Gender gaps in emotional benefits, for example, should decrease when housework is shared, because women’s happiness increases as men do more of the housework, whereas men lose some of their satisfaction as they do more (Amato et al. 2003). The increased sharing of housework in intimacy-based marriage, as
highlighted in the following news story, should thus lead to more equal sharing in the benefits of marriage.

The Miel family had fish last night—prepared by Marciano Miel, and on the table by the time his wife got home from work. The 36-year-old avionics technician was up before dawn yesterday for his eight-hour shift at Bombardier Inc. At 3:30 p.m., he picked up his son, Quin, from daycare, shopped for groceries and then performed the nightly miracle that was previously the preserve of mothers: cooking dinner with a hungry, active 20-month-old underfoot. (Galt 2006, p. B1)

As the institution of marriage changes over time and across cultures, the debates and discussions regarding the consequences will undoubtedly continue, inspiring newspaper headlines of concern and surprise. If the institution of marriage becomes increasingly intimacy based, however, what currently is quite newsworthy, like the previous story of a man doing the unpaid work in the family, might well become a mundane pattern of everyday life.

NOTES

1. The data come from the 1999–2000 wave for 20 of the countries. Seven countries were not included in this wave and so data from the 1990 wave were used. When data were available for both waves, results were usually quite consistent over time.

2. Some responses were excluded because of missing data or lack of fit with other indicators. These include willing to discuss problems, spending time together, talking a lot, same ethnic background, and living apart from in-laws. A measure of intimacy was created—adding the items willing to discuss problems, spending time together, and talking a lot—for the countries where data were available. It is nearly perfectly correlated ($r = 0.97$) with the measure of intimacy used here.

3. Results are based on principal components analysis. Confirmatory analysis reveals three factors with eigenvalues more than 1. Loadings of the items on the factors range from 0.68 to 0.94. Cronbach alphas on the three scales range from 0.84 to 0.89.

4. Some readers may wonder whether a relative importance measure for each dimension is more appropriate. The questions in the European Values Survey/World Values Survey do not ask respondents to rank “importance” and so they are not necessarily doing so. Furthermore, as shown in the results, high importance might be placed on all three areas in some countries. Theoretically, the concern of this chapter is with the importance of intimacy, regardless of how important resources and homogamy also are. Empirically, the components developed with the relative measures are less clear. The factor analysis with the original absolute indicators results in high loadings with three clear dimensions.

5. Germany is combined for the country-level measures, but East and West Germany are separate for individual-level data in the multilevel model.
6. The analysis was also run with a version of the intimacy measure that does not include the sharing of housework item to be sure that the effect was not primarily attributable to attitudes toward sharing the housework. The two versions of the measure are highly correlated ($r = 0.98$) and result in similar findings. The results presented here use the measure based on the five indicators including the sharing of housework. The model was also run with the United Nations Gender Empowerment Measure and divorce rates on the country level. The effects of intimacy-based marriage did not change.

REFERENCES


This chapter considers a puzzling discrepancy in two macrolevel findings from the research on housework in Germany. On the one hand, there has been high stability in traditional patterns of the division of household labor between German women and men, as numerous studies show (Bundesministerium 2003; Künzler et al. 2001). On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that individual gender ideologies and gender relations have been changing. A growing number of women and men have modernized attitudes toward maternal employment (Adler and Brayfield 2006) and the sharing of housework (Künzler 1999). To understand this contradiction between liberalizing gender attitudes and persistently traditional behaviors, this chapter draws on social psychological theory and qualitative interviews with married and cohabiting couples to study the microlevel processes that support or discourage the renegotiation of housework arrangements. We address the following questions: How can the discrepancy between attitudes and behavior be explained? What can we learn about it from a comparison between East and West Germany, where different norms pertaining to gender roles and gender relations were apparent (Braun, Scott, and Alwin 1994; Trappe 1995; Treas and Widmer 2000) and still are (Künzler 1999; Scheller 2004)?

Explanations developed in the past do not match the empirical findings described. According to one approach advanced by prominent feminist authors (Beck-Gernsheim 1992; Hochschild 1989), the reason for the very slow change in the division of housework is that there is a “cultural lag” between modernized economic realities (namely, women’s growing labor force participation) and the persistence of traditional gender ideologies. This explanation contradicts the empirical evidence of changing ideologies. A second explanation cannot hold either, although it at least acknowledges the change in individual attitudes. This change of individual attitudes, so the line of the argument goes, does not result in a change of behavior, because latent gender norms undermine the intellectual agreement over equal shar-
Pair Relationships and Housework

ing of household matters (Koppetsch and Burkart 1999). This explanation is not satisfactory, because it does not answer the question of how traditional gender norms can override new attitudes.

The stability of the labor division between heterosexual partners is especially puzzling if one agrees that individualization—as a process freeing individuals from traditional institutions and reintegrating them in new ones—has advanced, particularly during the past decades (Beck 1992; Lesthaeghe and Sirkyn 1988). Like Yodanis notes in Chapter 9, we observe that new attitudes of partners have contributed to a quantitative and qualitative change in the prevalence and meaning of marriage (Meyer 2006; Nave-Herz 2002). This is at least true for West Germany. The East German situation is more ambiguous for two reasons: (1) the economic independence of partners during the German Democratic Republic (GDR) era partly changed traditional gender ideologies, and (2) the rapid economic and cultural change after 1990 discredited explanations that assume a certain mutual dependency between normative and economic factors in society. Since the 1960s, the prevalence of marriage has declined and the number of unmarried couples has increased (Nazio and Blossfeld 2003). Since the 1970s, fertility rates have been low (Conrad, Lechner, and Werner 1996). Rates of illegitimate births are steadily rising. There are increasing numbers of succession unions that give rise to step-parent relationships. Furthermore, pair relationships have been established in which partners consistently maintain two separate households. Despite these changes in couples’ relationships, the division of housework, a core activity within couples, seems hardly affected by these developments. This puzzle suggests the need to examine individual coping with housework and the housework-related interaction processes between the partners to gain a better understanding of the microlevel process that links the attitudes and behavior of partners. Our aim is to explain the stability of the labor division in pair relationships and to explore the possibilities for initiating long-term change in housework patterns.

After describing housework as the interaction of individual behavioral strategies, this chapter introduces a typology developed from qualitative data. The typology integrates the three different pair integration modes in modern relationships and their corresponding housework-related behavior. The differences in the three types between East and West Germany are emphasized. In the end we will face another paradox. We can show that traditional couples in the East are, on a pragmatic basis, more egalitarian in behavior, as we would expect on the basis of the relatively traditional gender ideologies that they endorse. These findings suggest that change in housework patterns is more complex than described in research to date. Cross-national and comparative research can help to explain the trajectories of change in housework patterns.
The Cultural Influences on Housework

HOUSEWORK AS INTERACTION OF INDIVIDUAL COPING STRATEGIES

If we investigate housework in Germany from a comparative perspective, we have to reflect on the persisting differences in family cultures between the eastern and western part of the country that developed during the more than 40 years of separation for both regions. There are more unmarried couples in East Germany, and far more children are born in a nonmarital union—about 50% compared with 26% in the West (Meyer 2006, p. 341). In East Germany there are many more employed full-time women with children (Engstler 2001). The “child-related marriage” (Nave-Herz 2002)—meaning the coincidence of birth of first child, marriage, and women cutting back on employed work—is a social phenomenon in the West, but not in the eastern part of Germany (Huinink and Reichart 2008; Klaus and Steinbach 2002). According to our own analyses, the probability of a nontraditional division of household labor in different kinds of living arrangements differs between East and West Germany: In East Germany, this depends on the institutionalization of the relationship (married or not) whereas in West Germany it depends on whether there are children within the household (Huinink and Röhler 2005, p. 136). This means not only that a majority of East Germans rejects marriage as an institution in which to bring up children, but also that marriage is the living arrangement that divides persons who implement a traditional labor division from persons who do not. West Germans usually marry if they have children, but even if couples with children stay unmarried, they establish traditional housework arrangements (see also Gupta 1999).

In the search for more satisfying explanations of the dynamics of the household labor division in pair relationships, it seems useful to look in closer detail at the microlevel housework-related pair interaction. The structural, cultural, and institutional differences between East and West Germany call for a new theoretical framework for investigating change in housework patterns. This framework must refer to housework as a result of individual action and interaction between the partners, and it must recognize the changing affective basis of modern pair relationships (Giddens 1992; Luhmann 1986). By emphasizing adaptive coping, this chapter demonstrates why the housework arrangements of individual couples persist or change against a backdrop of societal institutions.

The basis of our theoretical model of housework-related coping behavior is widely used social psychological theories on coping with stress (Lazarus and Folkman 1984) and on adaptive control behavior (Heckhausen and Schulz 1998; Hoff and Lempert 1990; Rotter 1966), as well as social constructivist theories on emotion management and the use of gender-typical
strategies (Hochschild 1983, 1990). Our approach reflects the behavioral, the cognitive, and the emotional aspects of individuals’ dealings with housework. Our assumptions are as follows:

The particular division of housework that has been established within a relationship is perceived and evaluated by the actor according to his or her expectations. Stress occurs if the expectations concerning the labor division between the partners are not met. Then, negative emotions occur that have to be managed. That is, strategies of developmental control are used to diminish the cognitive and emotional dissonance between the real housework situation and the ideals related to the person’s self-concept that determine personal expectations. The self-concept of a person contains ideals like being an orderly person, being a cooperative partner, being competent in certain household tasks, or being especially interested in some of them or not.

Emotion management is necessary in both primary and secondary control strategies or ways of coping. A strategy of primary control is seen in an action undertaken to change the division of housework according to individual expectations. A strategy of secondary control is used if a cognitive restructuring takes place to adapt to the circumstances, and the expectations are accommodated to the existing division of housework (Heckhausen and Schulz 1998). In the first case of taking action, emotion work is used to prepare for a certain action to alter the domestic arrangements; for example, feelings of love may be suppressed to be able to engage in an argument with the partner. In the second case of adaptation, emotion management helps to adapt one’s own perception to the contents of the self-concept and the situation; for example, anger about the partner’s limited participation in housework may be suppressed, and positive feelings about his engagement in other spheres of the relationship may be highlighted (see Röhler 2006a, pp. 114–143). A key point here is that changing housework arrangements or persevering with unsatisfactory ones both place demands on individuals.

Individuals use these different coping strategies with housework, and they are guided by certain mechanisms that are part of their self-concepts, as will be explained later in this chapter. The individual coping behaviors of the partners interact with each other and lead to an outcome at the pair level—namely, stability or change in the labor division within the household. With this concept, we provide a model for answering the questions of why an unsatisfactory traditional division of housework persists unchanged through individual action and of how the emotional, cognitive, and structural aspects work together in this process. In particular, we will investigate whether East and West Germans, given their different contexts, pursue the same strategies.
Modern love is an emotion based on a complex cultural program, as Yoda
danis describes in her discussion of marriage in Chapter 9. In very general
terms, love can be described as the longing to live one’s life in the bodily
zone of another person (Dux 1994). With this general definition as back-
ground, three important dimensions can be distinguished (compare Huinink
and Röhler 2005, 23 ff.).

First, love is an emotion that calls for physical closeness and sexual
interaction. It generates a deep emotional bond that aims at acknowledging
all aspects of the other’s personality. As an emotion, love frames rational
behavior because of the exclusive relevance of the loved partner. Even short-
term irrationality can be perceived as long-term rational, because it facil-
tates costly decisions and investments yielding beneficial consequences only
in the long run—for example, in the decision to raise children (Frank 1988).
Second, love is a symbolic code of communication (Luhmann 1986) that al-
 lows expressing, generating, simulating, and rejecting emotions. This is the
 cultural norm of romantic love that demands openness and authenticity in
the interaction of the partners. Third, love can be understood as a resource
for identity construction. It gives the loved person unconditional and au-
thentic recognition that is essential for personal integration. Love is a special
form of social capital. Love can only be used as resource if both partners
love each other. This is because of the extremely particularistic character of
love (Foà and Foà 1980): Only if both partners appreciate each others’ love
can each feel acknowledged as a “whole person” and realize intimacy, the
concurrence of souls (Giddens 1992). Self-affirmation, therefore, can only
be accomplished if the partner is fully acknowledged, too, because only then
can the signs of love passed on by the partner be used for identity construc-
tion (Honneth 1995).

Giddens (1992) describes the transformation of romantic love into pure
love. Romantic love stands for the traditional “bourgeois” marriage and
pure love equals exchange-oriented egalitarian unions. This definition of
love seems too narrow because it applies only to certain types of relation-
ships that we call affectual–traditional and affectual–associative (described
later). Instead, all kinds of modern relationships rely on modern romantic
love as we defined it. Giddens (1992) points out, and we follow him with
this, that modern love not only makes people exclusively orientate toward
another person, but it also lets them map out a mutual future that allows the
affirmation of the self. This modern love is essential for all kinds of pair rela-
tionships nowadays. We assume that even in conflicting relationships, there
must be at least remnants of this kind of love, because such a relationship
could not be stabilized over time only through habitation, companionship,
and so forth. Identity construction supplied by love has become a central reason why partners enter and stay in modern pair relationships.

Before elaborating the model with material from our study, we briefly introduce the empirical data on which our analyses rely.

**DATA AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION**

We apply the problem-centered interview (Witzel 1995), a method of data collection that has gained some prominence in qualitative research in Germany. Focusing on a single topic, we generated narratives that allowed the reconstruction of housework-related coping episodes. This interview method was combined with a standardized questionnaire that included scales for measuring sociopsychological factors in the coping model (e.g., gender ideologies, locus of control, control strategies, self-esteem, pertinacity, and flexibility) and dimensions of the partnership presumed to influence the perception and dynamics of housework issues (quality of the relationship, satisfaction with it, exchange orientation, and communal orientation).

The sample includes 64 heterosexual couples (or 128 interviewed persons) in different living arrangements (married or unmarried, with or without children, socialized in East Germany [former GDR] or West Germany [old Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)]). For an overview, see Table 10.1. The underlying assumption of this sample construction was that differences in housework-related coping behavior could be identified with respect to these characteristics. Analysis of these data validated a typology of pair interaction over the division of housework that is outlined in the next paragraph.

**GENERAL TYPES OF HOUSEWORK-RELATED PAIR INTERACTION**

The interpretation of the interview material started from a complex theoretical framework that differentiates between three types of housework-related coping behavior. In opposition to the mainstream of research on housework, one that focuses on the volume and share of work done within the household and neglects the impact of the specific type of interaction in intimate relationships, these three “ideal types” (Idealtypen after Weber [1978]) take into consideration the interplay of love and household activities. We applied here a typology of social relations that was established by Max Weber (1978, pp. 40–43), who distinguished between associations (Vergesellschaftung) based on rational reasons (means–ends calculations) and communal relationships (Vergemeinschaftung) based on emotional bonds (affectual reasons) or traditional norms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of socialization</th>
<th>GDR/GDR&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (30 couples)</th>
<th>FRG/FRG&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (30 couples)</th>
<th>GDR/FRG and FRG/GDR (4 couples)</th>
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<td>One household (24 couples)</td>
<td>Two households (“living apart together”)</td>
<td>One household (24 couples)</td>
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<td>Household integration</td>
<td>Married (12 couples)</td>
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<td>Cohabiting (12 couples)</td>
<td>Married/Cohabiting (6 couples)</td>
<td>Cohabiting (12 couples)</td>
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<td>Married/Cohabiting (6 couples)</td>
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<td>No children (32 couples)</td>
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<sup>a</sup>The survey consists of 64 pair relationships (128 individual interviews).

<sup>b</sup>GDR, East Germany; FRG, West Germany
The main assumption of the classification presented here is that all contemporary partner relationships are based on the modern code of romantic love as described earlier; that is why the partners’ feeling that they belong together can be described as founded on an affectual reason in the Weberian sense. Because they are love based, all kinds of contemporary pair relationships can be considered as affectual communal relationships (affektuelle Vergemeinschaftung [Weber 1978, p. 40]). This assumption is not a banal one. Although the importance of love for modern relationships is widely acknowledged (Giddens 1992; Hahn and Burkart 1998, 2000), the interplay of romantic love and housework-related interaction has not been systematically considered in research to date.

Although all pair relationships in the western world are based on the same type of love, there are differences in the ways of dealing with the housework issue and, dependent on that, in how work and love interrelate. Weber’s terminology is used here not only to classify modern pair relationships as affectual communal ones (in short, affectual relationships), but also to differentiate the housework aspect and grasp the interrelation of love and work. For categorizing the housework aspect, we use Weber’s differentiation between communal relationships based on traditional norms and associations based on exchange orientation (Interessenausgleich), and based on association of preferences (Interessenverbindung).

Thus, three possible ways of interrelating love and housework can be distinguished. A distinction can be made between affectual–traditional relationships (affektuell–traditionell), in which traditional gender roles dominate the housework-related behavior; and affectual–associative relationships (affektuell–vergesellschaftet), in which individualized partners deny the relevance of strict gender roles and want to share housework equally. Yet another relationship type can be called affectual–pragmatic (affektuell–pragmatisch). Each person tries to organize the household according to his or her own personal preferences, which means that justice or equality is not a primary aim of the partners. The latter type is especially interesting, because individualization is not linked to the pursuit of equality, but rather to the free pursuit of individual preferences. The affectual–pragmatic relationship is a case that has not been considered previously in the research on traditional versus egalitarian couples. The three types, which were all represented in the data, can be described in more detail.

As one variant of the interrelation between pair integration and housework-related interaction, the affectual–pragmatic type opens new perspectives on the future of housework. Individuals in these relationships are highly individualized. Housework organized according to each partner’s preferences fits their individualistic practices of self-realization. For the integration of the relationship, the sharing of work between the partners is unimportant.
as long as both can follow personal preferences, even if this entails large inequality of workloads. The mode of integration is not justice, but rather the acknowledgment of the partner’s self with all his or her idiosyncrasies, including attitudes toward housework. There is no reason to negotiate over fairness. Instead, it is important to acknowledge all facets of the other partner’s self that are important to that person. The relationship concept of these partners is an association of two autonomous people who give each other sufficient freedom to pursue self-realization.

With this type of relationship, the partner who has the least interest in household activities has an advantage, because this person can wait until the other one gets active and, thus, profit from the partner’s greater interest in domesticity. This is because most products of housework—like a clean kitchen or a tidied up living room—are public goods within the relationship (Huinink and Röhler 2005, p. 17). The partner cannot easily be excluded from enjoying them. This mechanism supports, even in this individualized context, a traditional division of household labor. As a result of gender socialization, women have higher standards for and derive greater satisfaction from housework (Allen and Hawkins 1999; DeVault 1991; Hawkins, Marshall, and Meiners 1995). Thus, they have a greater interest in household labor and its outcomes.

Gender differences in standards and interests are one reason for the persistence of the traditional division of household labor. They offer a more convincing explanation of the prevalence of the traditional labor division even in egalitarian unions than the concept of “latent gender roles” (Koppetsch and Burkart 1999), because they reflect seriously the empirical evidence of fading gender roles. Because the prevalence of traditional gender ideologies has declined in all western countries (Künzler 1999), it is not convincing that they should, nonetheless, be latent operant. Instead, our study shows that mechanisms like lower or higher interests in certain household activities lead to traditional arrangements despite the modernized attitudes and behavioral strategies of the partners.

The partners in the second type of pair relationship, the affectual–associative, are individualized, too. However, they are also exchange oriented and understand their relationship as a balance of give and take. They negotiate about the just share of the work to be done and its payoffs. If they do not come to an agreement, this might give them cause to separate, because the affective part of the relation is quite strongly connected with the instrumental part. Even if both partners agree on how to share equally, they often fail for different reasons in daily life. This is relevant for the coping behavior of the partners. Individuals use secondary strategies of control to reconcile the egalitarian ideals from their self-concepts with their unequal practice of housework. According to our data, some partners achieve this by
devaluing household labor as unimportant to the equality theme in their relationship. Others create myths of equality that ignore the facts (for a good example of such a myth see Hochschild [1990]).

The principle of least interest is relevant in affectual–associative relationships, too, even though the connection is not as strong as in the affectual–pragmatic type of relationship, because the individual interests are bound by equality norms. However, differences of interest in certain household tasks can easily lead to conflict because partners are exchange orientated and therefore refuse to invest more in housework than the partner. This relationship type is highly affected by the birth of children (Huinink and Röhler 2005), which leads to a considerable shift to a more traditional division of household labor. Then, these unions have to undertake even greater effort to hide inequality through myths of equal sharing or to disconnect housework and equality issues in their self-concepts.

The affectual–traditional type involves relationships in which partners act according to overtly held gender roles. Here the interaction of partners’ strategies stabilizes traditional housework arrangements. We can describe two subtypes that were clearly distinguished in our data. One is to be found in middle-class couples where housework is part of the “affectual” romantic love arrangement, and, thus, the man’s (symbolic) involvement in housework is taken as a sign of love (Gager 1998). In these couples, the household and household labor is an important aspect of the pair’s affectual communal integration (Vergemeinschaftung). The husband has to show his concern about household tasks, responsibilities that include not only fulfilling his traditional gender role duties but also “helping” his wife readily with her tasks if she asks. The maintenance of a comfortable home is a shared goal for the partners, and contributing to it is the best way to show one’s love to the partner. In this relationship type, love and housework go hand in hand. By contrast, the second affectual–traditional subtype is represented by the working-class family where spheres are strictly separated by gender; the man is the breadwinner and the woman is the homemaker. In this subtype, the household is only a context for adequate gender role display, and, therefore, there is no linkage between housework and emotions of romantic love.

A NEW NEED FOR RESTRUCTURING AND STRUCTURING MECHANISMS

The existence and the characteristics of the three types prove that the decline of gendered social role demands does not automatically lead to equality in the division of household labor as hoped by feminist researchers in the 1970s and later. Instead of a linear development toward greater equality, a more complex conclusion can be drawn: The implementation of modern
relationship codes results in a new need for restructuring in pair relationships, because old role structures have been disappearing and new ones are not yet in place. Equal sharing of housework is only one possible outcome, but for different reasons, it is the most demanding possibility for a new housework structure. To make this argument more plausible, we discuss structuring mechanisms that are part of the person’s self-concept and guide housework-related coping strategies. The interactions of the strategies, used by each partner, result in specific patterns of labor division within the household.

Several mechanisms represented in our data work together in meeting the need for structuring in pair relationships, and they lead to different results (Röhler 2006a, pp. 284 ff.):

1. First are gender ideologies—specifically, normative models about what men and women are supposed to do or not to do. Gender ideologies can contain traditional role models, role change models, or egalitarian models. The egalitarian ones face grave problems in implementation, as several studies have shown (Huinink and Röhler 2005; Koppetsch and Burkart 1999).

2. Competencies of the partners are another possible criterion for deciding how to divide housework. Because human capital and competencies differ between partners, an efficient division of labor could be established based on these differences (Becker 1991). A competence-focused labor division, however, still leaves work for which neither partner is competent. This remainder could be given to the partner who is less reluctant to do it, could be shared equally, or could be substituted with purchases of personal services and market goods.

3. Another strategy is to take the preferences of the partners into account. Each partner only carries out tasks that he or she likes or at least does not mind doing. Again, the similar problem arises of how to share the activities both partners dislike.

4. As an alternative, the lesser interest of one partner—a result of lower standards for order and cleanliness or a lower value placed on housework—can be a basis for the decision about dividing the household labor. A low or high interest in housework is not necessarily dependent on the self-concept of the individual, but can also be a result of instrumental interests in certain household goods. In one case in our sample, for example, the man’s working place was the common household of the partners. Because he was there all day and had to organize his work tasks efficiently, he was strongly interested in high standards of order. This strong interest was strictly the result of his working situation and was not a part of his self-concept. He denied being a very orderly person. The partner with lower interest can profit from the housework done by the more strongly interested partner, and the more this partner pretends to be disinterested in this household public good, the greater the partner’s profit. If the lower interest is authentic, however, there is no profit at all
for this partner. To make demands for equal sharing of work could be seen as unfair to the less interested partner.

5. An additional mechanism works as a result of the transaction costs associated with changing the housework division in a couple. These costs can be considerable and are widely neglected in the research on housework so far. New skills and motivations must be learned. Time-consuming discussions about standards, evaluations, and fairness have to be undertaken. To avoid forgetting the new arrangements, daily routines and habits have to be changed (Kaufmann 1999).

6. Last, “doing gender” strategies may be used by the individuals to stabilize their self-concept as man or woman (West and Zimmerman 1987). If masculine and feminine identities are related to housework, they tend to stabilize traditional patterns of housework, because domestic interactions offer images and behavioral routines for being a “real man” or “real woman” in the realm of the home. Less often, female or male identity can be constructed through nontraditional behavior, if modernized self-concepts are held by the individuals.

These six structuring mechanisms—gender ideologies, competences, preferences, interests, transaction costs, and identity construction—interplay in a complex way in each relationship in the process of establishing and changing a certain labor division within the household. They play different roles in the three relationship types. Based on the empirical findings of our analyses, we may describe the interaction between love as the basis of relationships and the housework-related coping behavior using the structuring mechanisms (Röhler 2006a, pp. 287 ff.). Our account stresses the most important mechanisms for each relationship type, so not every mechanism is discussed for every type. Furthermore, for systematic reasons, we consider relationships in which both partners hold the same attitudes and therefore rely on similar mechanisms. This is based on the reasoning that partners who share attitudes are the ones who enter relationships in most cases.

In affectual–pragmatic relationships, the modern code of romantic love is fully developed and applies to all areas of the relationship, including housework. This code includes giving highest priority to the loved person, acknowledging the loved one as a unique individual, and communicating in an authentic style (Huinink and Röhler 2005, pp. 19–32). The development of the selves of the partners and the pursuit of their common interests are in the foreground. Individual preferences are, therefore, the main guidelines for the relationship, and this is true for the division of housework, too. Competencies play a certain role, but only if they correspond with liking the activity in which one is competent. The principle of least interest is in place, but it does not lead to conflict, because not being interested in a certain household task is a preference that has to be respected and is not a matter for discussion.
in the understanding of both partners. Even if the division of household labor is very unequal between the partners, no stress and related coping behavior will occur as long as this inequality is consistent with the preferences of the partners. In our data, one woman acknowledged the effort her partner put into housework, because she knew that it was a meaningful activity for him whereas she considered it a waste of time for herself. She recognized his preference for household labor, although she had different preferences. This example shows that the basis of an affectual–pragmatic relationship is the acknowledgment of each other’s preferences to value the partner as a unique personality.

Because partners in affectual–associative pair relationships have modernized gender ideologies, their behavior is guided by gender norms of equality. In heterosexual relationships, housework shared between a man and a woman becomes a cardinal policy issue as a field of fairness between the genders. That is why discrepancies in certain areas of housework have a high potential for conflict in these relationship. Strategies to resolve or at least to avoid conflicts include substituting personal services and market goods for the partners’ housework and sharing the rest on 50/50 terms. The principle of least interest is also important in affectual–associative relationships. Differing interests between the partners can be a source of conflict, because a fair division can only be negotiated if there is agreement on standards, and the overall amount of housework is consensual. In our data, some couples find housework too bothersome (i.e., the transaction cost too high and the emotional work too onerous) to fight over, but tend to establish a traditional labor division even though they acknowledge the irony of their situation. Their shared irony is a means for the partners to reassure each other that the ideal of gender equity is not being given up, but only postponed because of the difficulties of realizing this ideal in daily life. In our data, both partners in one couple were completely aware that his doing the bicycle repairs for her was traditional behavior and not in line with their egalitarian understanding of their relationship; however, they admitted that they could not help it. They used a traditional way of structuring household labor, because it was the least costly one to them given their competencies and habits. In mocking their gender-typical behavior, they attached a new meaning to it. By pointing out the humorous incongruity in their situation, they confirmed their relationship code against the empirical evidence.

Traditional gender ideologies are the guidelines for housework-related behavior in affectual–traditional pair relationships. Conventional gender roles dominate competencies and preferences, although they are apt to align with one another. The role behavior is ritualized in separated gender spheres, as is seen among unskilled, working-class people. Another variant follows the image of “gender characters” (Koppetsch and Burkart 1999),
whose complementary competencies work together in making a comfortable home. Although couples of this subtype refer to competencies, this reference is strictly bound to essentialist gender qualities because it assumes that men and women have certain and different competencies within the household. In this subtype, love and housework are the result of the same principles: The man and the woman bring, by nature, different competencies to establish a harmonious relationship.

**Comparing East and West German Couples**

In light of these models, we can compare East and West Germany by analyzing the narratives of individuals who grew up in the GDR or FRG before German reunification in 1990 (see Table 10.1). The differences in individual coping strategies for housework, as well as differences in the interaction of these individual strategies on the pair level, can be interpreted in part as result of pre-1990 socialization processes in two different cultures, and in part as a result of different experiences after the reunification in 1990. Experiences after the reunification have differed for East and West Germans, because the two distinctive cultures continued to persist and because the West German institutional structures that were implemented in East German society met with completely different conditions—in particular, a weaker economy. The East–West comparison focuses on the differences in the prevalence and characteristics of the three types of interrelation between love and housework-related behavior, as observed in our data. Although all types can be found in western and eastern parts of Germany, our analysis shows that there are two major differences in the housework-related coping behavior between East and West Germans.

One difference in housework coping relates to the different degree of individualization in the two parts of Germany. The affectual–associative interaction type is more common and its characteristics are more distinct in West Germany, especially among highly educated persons. These individuals have a strong exchange orientation that motivates them to negotiate even against the interests of the partner to minimize their own input into housework and to maximize their own benefits from the production of household goods. The affectual–associative East Germans are much more reluctant to carry negotiations to an extreme, but rather try to integrate the interests of their partners in their strategy. These differences in behavior seem to support the plausible expectation that West Germans would follow more individualized self-concepts. They see themselves as being more independent in their pair relationship and they allow an agreement only on the basis of giving room to both partner’s preferences. East Germans are more willing to subordinate their preferences under a shared collective norm. These interpretative results
are reproduced with the standardized data from our study. By combining codes established from narrative passages with questionnaire answers in a mixed-methods analysis, we demonstrate for our limited sample that West Germans have a stronger individualistic orientation, whereas a communal orientation gains more ground among East Germans (Huinink and Röhler 2006).

The second difference is that the affectual–traditional type of relationship is more widespread in East Germany. In addition, it is found in all East German socioeconomic groups, whereas it is associated only with certain educational and status groups—namely, the working class—in West Germany. Despite the dominance of the affectual–traditional interaction type in East German relationships, the division of housework is somewhat more egalitarian there. The time partners invest in housework is more balanced and men are engaged in traditionally female domains of housework (particularly child care, but also cooking and cleaning). This is the result of a less ideological approach to household labor that enables men to participate in housework even when they hold traditional gender ideologies. The weaker importance of gender ideology does not mean that the household production is free from a set of agreed gender norms couples have to follow. However, in West Germany, traditional ideology and practice are more closely tied together than in East Germany, as Cooke (2006) has reported. This leaves fewer opportunities for men and women to act with disregard to gender roles than is the case in East Germany. In our data, we found a traditional East German couple where the man was unemployed. Despite the clear traditional division of labor and well-separated gender spheres that both partners described, he had no problem telling us that he, for example, cleaned the bathroom because he had more free time than his full-time employed wife. However, his conservative gender ideology was not affected by his dissonant practice (Röhler 2006b).

One structural explanation for the East–West differences in the data builds upon the degree of labor force participation of women in the former GDR and FRG, including contemporary rates of full-time employment. In the GDR, full-time employment was the normal working status for men and women since the early 1970s, and private lives had to fit these requirements. The management of family life was bound into strict time schedules: getting up early, bringing the children to the day nursery, working in the firm, picking up the children and doing shopping, doing housework, enjoying some leisure time, and preparing for bed. These tied time schedules fostered rule-structured behavior in the East Germans’ daily lives. Even though the rules did not always follow traditional gender norms and allowed for exceptions in behavioral conventions to manage the strict time schedules, this fact did
not encourage a critical gender discourse on time use to develop. However, rule-structured behavior made it possible to disregard gender roles on a practical basis. Men had to contribute to get all the household tasks done in time. Thus, both partners participated in housework and child care, although the women remained in charge of managing family life.

In keeping with these reflections, our mixed-methods analysis shows that East Germans—indeed of characteristics of their gender ideol-
gegies—take for granted labor market participation of married women and mothers, whereas West Germans hold a stable ideology of housewife—motherhood (Huinink and Röhler 2006). This finding corresponds with empirical evidence from representative studies in Germany showing that the full-time work of mothers, in particular, is more considered and realized in East Germany than in West Germany (Dornseiff and Sackmann 2003).

Thus, the different degree of labor force participation in former FRG and GDR caused differences in self-concepts between the East and the West that have persisted after the reunification of the two countries. Of course, another part of the explanation is that families in the East faced greater economic necessity after reunification, so they still have to accommodate working wives. But the full picture can only be drawn if we recognize that the structural conditions of the GDR era formed egalitarian attitudes toward women’s employment and caused pragmatic behavior with respect to gender roles.

Another explanation for the differences between East and West Germans is a cultural one. Competition between individuals was much lower in East Germany than in West Germany because of their different policy regimes. The state policies in the GDR did not encourage individuals to claim their interests, but rather to subordinate them to the working collective and its norms (Scheller 2002). Pair relations were a means for individuals to protect themselves from the pressure of public norms, but the communal orientation that was propagated for public and private life influenced the behavior in all spheres of society. Official policy statements called upon the men (and also the children) to “help” the women with household labor. They did not emphasize traditional gender rules, although they were implicitly present. Thus, men were “allowed” to participate in typically female household activities. In West Germany, people are raised to fight for their individual interests and for their status in society. Traditional pair relationships follow the societal status order, too, meaning that men are expected to be superior and women subordinate. It is not as easy for traditional West German men to engage in housework, because they lose status, power, and their “gender honor” when they do “women’s work” around the house (Koppetsch and Burkart 1999).
CONCLUSION

Despite the new need for restructuring after traditional role behavior fades, change in the division of housework labor is difficult to bring about. The mechanisms that replace traditional roles (like competencies, preferences, interests, transaction costs, and identity construction) result in more differentiation in housework patterns. Nevertheless, traditional patterns will not necessarily decline, because housework will fall to the partner who has more domestic competencies, more favorable and stronger preferences, a higher interest or lower transaction costs in household labor, or an identity that is linked more closely to household issues. This is true mostly for the female partner who is socialized to identify with the household and related activities, and has often higher standards, competencies, and interests in doing housework. Women’s typically greater identification, interest, standards, competencies, and housework management abilities lead to arrangements between the partners that maintain a traditional pattern of labor division.

In sum, it can be argued that, despite the greater variety of housework patterns, processes of everyday interaction in pair relationships stabilize traditional housework arrangements, even in those couples where partners have modernized gender ideologies and love relationships. Early feminist research in the United States addressed the mechanisms we found here and their unequal distribution among spouses (Mainardy 1968). Although Mainardy (1968) pointed to competencies, preferences, male and female identities, housekeeping standards, and the principle of least interest as underlying mechanisms, her classic paper failed to take men’s position seriously. Different standards, for example, were seen only as a male excuse not to share the work around the house. Our findings add to this view that different standards are a call for negotiation between the partners about the definition and amount of housework as a precondition for any agreement on fair sharing.

Our results give us an answer to the paradox from the beginning of this chapter why so little change in traditional housework patterns has taken place despite individual gender norms being widely modernized. Our answer avoids the shortcut of arguing that latent gender norms are the reason for the stability of the traditional gender division and points instead to different mechanisms in the self-concepts of the individuals that guide their housework-related coping behavior.

However, these new mechanisms also have the potential to individualize couples’ arrangements and, thus, bring about even greater variety on the micro level in spouses’ interaction. Specifically, the spread of the preference-based affectual–pragmatic type of pair interaction can cause greater differentiation in housework patterns. Whether this differentiation will foster
nontraditional housework arrangements will depend, in part, on supporting (or nonsupporting) structures in society. For example, the availability of day nursery care or equal opportunities for men and women in the labor market can work to balance partners’ negotiating power about sharing housework. Second, the direction that the development of housework division takes will depend on institutional mechanisms that educate men and women in housework and parental abilities. Only if the level of interest, competencies, and standards is more equal does an equal sharing of housework have a chance to develop in a pair’s daily interaction.

The results of our qualitative analyses can be related to newer quantitative studies that have investigated the process traditionalizing the division over the duration of the pair relationship. For West German couples, not only do traditional couples become more traditional by increasing specialization, but also nontraditional couples undergo a process of traditionalizing their labor division from the beginning. This is consistent with U.S. results that find men doing less housework and women doing more when they marry or begin to cohabit (Gupta 1999). It also parallels Australian reports for the transition to cohabitation, marriage, and parenthood (Baxter, Hewitt, and Haynes 2008). Some change is the result of normative changes from egalitarian to complementarity norms with the birth of the first child. In other words, the understanding of fairness shifts from an equal sharing of housework to the complementary specialization of the women as mother and housewife, and the man as the earner and provider (Grunow, Schulz, and Blossfeld 2007).

We show that influential factors include not only norms, but also other mechanisms like standards, competencies, and interests in regard to housework. These subjective and skill mechanisms have been largely neglected so far by quantitative research and need more investigation. In a cross-national analysis, however, Treas (2008) points to these factors to explain why wives in more traditional marriages are less likely than other married women to turn to their husbands in an emergency for even casual household help. The comparison between East and West Germany shows that even under the same institutional setting, different individual strategies and outcomes are possible. For further investigation of the prospects of labor division within pair relationships, not only norms and economic power relations (Fuwa 2004) have to be investigated, but also different family cultures (Yodanis 2005; and in this volume) and mechanisms on the behavioral level that have been proved to influence the labor division in couples (Breen and Cooke 2005).

We can see from our analysis in this chapter that housework is deeply embedded in modernized romantic love relationships that function more and more on the basis of the full acknowledgment of the partner’s personality in all its aspects. However, if we ask how love works together with
housework coping and partner’s daily interaction, we get different types of love–housework interrelation with characteristics that vary dependent on the context. As we learned, in East Germany, affectual–traditional couples (as a result of GDR socialization) find more pragmatic ways to do housework, and this results in more egalitarian housework patterns. In West Germany, the ideology and the practice of housework are more closely tied together, and traditional ideology does not allow for egalitarian behavior. This faces us with another paradox. Under specific conditions, traditional relationship codes can go along with egalitarian behavior. Our results point to the need for cross-national comparative studies to understand how context affects the behavioral manifestation of housework-related interaction styles.

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Pair Relationships and Housework


PART IV
THE EVALUATION OF CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH ON HOUSEWORK
The fact that women do more housework than men has been documented in a broad variety of countries. Whether the focus is on hours of housework or on who is responsible for the stereotypically female tasks that make up the bulk of household chores, studies of North America, Europe, and Asia all find that women perform a larger share of housework than their partners (Bianchi et al. 2000; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; Haas 1981; South and Spitze 1994; van der Lippe 1994). Studies in the United States have gone further and show that couples do not always agree on how much work each of the partners does around the house (e.g., Kamo 2000). In particular, wives do not report as much household work to be done by their husbands as the latter claim for themselves. Gender disparities in reporting have obvious implications for a better understanding of the allocation of labor in the home. We do not know, however, whether the gendered reporting patterns identified for the United States represent another example of “American exceptionalism” or whether they are one instance of a more universal reporting asymmetry for this type of data.

To the extent that different countries—or different sorts of countries—display different patterns of gender reporting disparities, these biases have the potential to distort our understanding of household labor in cross-national context. Although these reporting differences present a methodological challenge, they also present a significant opportunity to enhance our understanding of gender inequality. Gender discrepancies in reporting may arise from a number of different social processes. They may signal genuine misperceptions arising from men’s and women’s distinctive standpoints, or they may be self-serving distortions and thus reflect contested gender relations.

In this chapter I present data on the gender gap in reporting for 35 countries. Although my analyses cannot provide a final assessment of the extent and the consequences of housework reporting differences, the results from this chapter can assist researchers in weighing the implications of gender
reporting gaps for their own cross-national comparisons. To gain greater understanding of the social processes underlying the reporting gap, I compare the housework reporting gap across countries in three different ways:

1. I relate the gender reporting differences for housework hours and for housework tasks to country-level gender inequality.
2. I examine gender reporting differences regarding the perceived fairness of the division of labor and relate it to macrolevel gender inequality.
3. I examine the interrelatedness between fairness assessments and housework reporting gaps, to consider whether gendered housework reporting gaps relate to contentiousness in gender relations.

**HOUSEWORK MEASUREMENT**

Women universally perform more household labor than men. The gender imbalance in the amount of household labor done by men and women, however, varies across different types of housework (Blair and Lichter 1991). Proponents of a gender perspective have argued that different housework tasks take on gendered meanings and are, thus, a way to enact normative gender relations (South and Spitze 1994; Twiggs, McQuillan, and Ferree 1999). Women are predominantly responsible for routine and repetitive housework tasks, which also take up the majority of total housework time (Twiggs, McQuillan, and Ferree 1999). However, Twiggs, McQuillan, and Ferree (1999) also point out that there is a hierarchy within the gender-typed tasks. For example, although both laundry and washing dishes are usually considered female-typed housework activities, men are much less likely to do the laundry than the dishes. Because of the gender typing of specific tasks, measures of the division of household labor have not only addressed time spent in housework, but also responsibility for specific tasks—measured either in terms of (estimates of) the actual time or as reports on who does the task more often.

As Sayer demonstrates in Chapter 2, men’s and women’s housework hours are becoming more similar over time across many countries. Along the same lines, there also seems to be a decline in the gender typing of different tasks, although this convergence and desegregation of domestic labor occurs slowly (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny and Robinson 1988).

Although the study of domestic labor has become an established field within the social sciences (see Coltrane [2000], Marini and Shelton [1993] and Shelton and John [1996] for a review), there is an ongoing debate about the limitations and advantages of different measurements of housework and the division of housework between partners. One of the challenges of measuring housework lays in the blurry line between routine and leisure activities (e.g., preparing dinner vs. trying a new recipe for fun). Moreover, there is great potential for doing multiple housework tasks at the same time (e.g.,
multitasking in the form of doing a load of laundry while cooking dinner). This makes accurate reporting of time spent in domestic labor rather difficult for most respondents. In addition, because housework is so integral to everyday life, recollection problems may be more severe than for other activities or events that stand out more in respondents’ memories.

Juster, Ono, and Stafford (2003) as well as Lee and Waite (2005) have undertaken systematic comparisons of three different approaches to measuring both housework and the domestic division of labor. These three approaches include retrospective reports of housework time, the time diary approach, and the experience sampling method. A fourth approach to measuring housework is examining the primary responsibility for a number of different tasks. Rather than focusing on time spent on housework, respondents, usually only one per household, are asked who is responsible for specific tasks. The advantage of this measure is that it reflects the division of labor within a household. It does not, however, provide information about the actual amount of housework performed.

The most prevalent approach to measuring housework time is respondents’ retrospective survey reports of housework. Either one or both partners are asked about the time spent on total housework over some period (e.g., the previous week) or, alternatively, are asked about the time spent on specific housework activities. This approach has the advantage of being easily implemented, especially if information is collected from only one respondent per household, who may also report on the activities of other household members. Combining housework time across all tasks into one summary measure seems to be less effective in efforts to understanding variation in housework or in linking housework to other measures of well-being (Coltrane 2000). However, if only because of multitasking, double counting may be a problem when absolute time spent is asked for a number of different tasks separately (Lee and Waite 2005).

Another measurement method that is often considered superior is the “time diary” approach. Respondents are asked to record their time use for all activities, usually for the previous day. Although these reports are regarded as more accurate than survey questions, this method is very time intensive and, consequently, more expensive to carry out. Juster, Ono, and Stafford (2003) show that time diary measures and traditional survey questions correspond closely when the activities measured occur regularly and are externally structured, and if the trend over time, rather than a specific level, is of main interest.

Lee and Waite (2005) introduced the experience sampling method (ESM), which they describe as a “diary-like” method. Respondents wear a device that prompts them to report their primary and secondary activities eight times a day (at random intervals spread out over the day). Comparing
their measure with the more established approaches discussed earlier, they emphasize the potential for underreporting in task-based measures. Lee and Waite (2005) point out that different housework measures produce significantly different estimates: ESM-based measures yield significantly lower housework time estimates than survey measures. They also find that the gap between husbands’ and wives’ reports of one another’s activities differs across measures. The largest gender gap in housework is found based on wives’ retrospective survey reports, and the smallest is obtained based on ESM estimates that only count primary activities.

**Gender Discrepancies in Reporting of Housework**

Because few studies interview both partners, most analysts have to rely on only one person’s report about couples’ domestic division of labor and partners’ time spent on housework tasks. If information is collected from both partners, there is usually some discrepancy between the two reports, and reports from both partners are often averaged in an effort to improve the reliability of the measures (Coltrane 2000). Generally, differences in housework reports between partners can stem from different sources: overestimation of one’s own housework, overestimation of the work of one’s partner, underestimation of one’s own housework, or underestimation the work of one’s partner. Self-reports on overall time spent have been found to be particularly prone to overreporting (Coltrane 2000). Both men and women in the United States have been found to inflate their reports, but it is thought that men do so more than women (Coltrane 1996; Kiger and Riley 1996; Marini and Shelton 1993; Press and Townsley 1998).

Granbois and Willett (1970) found reporting differences between spouses to be randomly distributed rather than associated with systematic individual or couple characteristics. Nevertheless, there are a number of possible theoretical reasons underlying the reporting differences between partners. Given how strongly gendered the measured activity is, social desirability factors may lead individuals to over- or underreport the housework they are doing. Kamo’s (2000) results suggest that both social desirability and resentment toward household labor play a role in the reporting biases. No clear explanation has been found for the fact that husband–wife reporting discrepancies are stronger for men’s housework hours than for women’s (Kamo 2000). One speculation is that men overestimate their own contributions to fit better the model of a supportive husband, even though they may not do much work at home. Of course, some of the housework reporting discrepancies may be a result of a lack of information. But although these reporting differences may in part reflect the fact that partners do not know exactly how much housework the other is doing, they may offer a glimpse
Men’s and Women’s Reports about Housework

at the contentious issue of domestic labor as it relates to power and conflict within a couple.

GENDER DISCREPANCIES IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE FAIRNESS OF HOUSEWORK

An unequal division of labor can lead to feelings of unfairness if the inequality is seen as unjustified. When examining the perceived fairness of household labor arrangements, evidence suggests that women are more prone to feel that the division of labor is unfair to them, whereas men may be more likely to judge the distribution of tasks as fair (DeMaris and Longmore 1996). However, the criterion for judging an arrangement as fair is not an equal division of labor. Lennon and Rosenfield (1994) find that men evaluate housework arrangements as fair if they contribute 36% or more, whereas women perceive the division of household labor to be fair if they do 66% or less. Of course, individuals’ gender ideology is another major determinant of whether inequalities in housework are perceived as inequities (Greenstein 1996).

There has been extensive research on the possible consequences of perceived unfairness. Many studies have focused on the negative mental health impact of an unfair division of labor (Frisco and Williams 2003; Glass and Fujimoto 1994; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Ross and Mirowsky 1988; Ross, Mirowsky, and Huber 1983). Moreover, perceived injustice can also have implications for a broad range of everyday emotions (Lively et al. 2008). Fairness evaluations are important because not only unfairness (that is, inequity at the expense of oneself) has a negative impact on emotions and well-being, but being aware of doing less than the fair share (being unfair to one’s partner) also takes a toll (Lively et al. 2008).

MEN’S AND WOMEN’S REPORTS OF HOUSEWORK AND PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS

No systematic comparative research investigates whether there is cross-national variation in the extent of the housework reporting differences between men and women. Discrepancies in reports of housework and perceptions of fairness of domestic labor arrangements may provide a reflection on how contested the domestic division of labor is. Moreover, examining these issues in a comparative perspective provides the unique opportunity to situate the gender discrepancies in reports of housework and fairness in a larger context.

Cross-national variation in housework reports, the gender gap in housework reporting, and fairness evaluations can be expected as a result of the
different social contexts in which housework is performed. Numerous studies, including the chapters in this volume, have shown that context matters for housework and the couple’s division of labor above and beyond individual and couple characteristics (Baxter 1992, 1997; Coltrane 2000; Fuwa 2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Geist 2005). Although Baxter (1997) finds only a limited impact of macrolevel gender equality on the division of labor, a number of studies suggest that policies may influence how gender roles are defined in the family (Fuwa and Cohen 2007). I have found in a previous study (Geist 2005) that women’s individual-level assets are less effective in reducing their housework in less egalitarian countries, a finding consistent with Fuwa (2004). In this book, this message of contextual influences is spelled out in Chapters 4, 7, and 8, among others. These findings argue for likely cross-national variation in social desirability standards for housework and different gender role contexts in which men and women report their housework. Consequently, it is only logical to expect variation in the gender differences in housework reporting and assessments of fairness as well.

HYPOTHESES

In this chapter I assess whether there are systematic context patterns in the gender discrepancy in housework reporting. In particular, I am interested in how the context of gender inequality may shape reports. Inegalitarian societies are generally characterized by women’s specialization in housework and men’s focus on market work. There is reason to believe that men and women may agree more about what they each do around the house in these unequal societies. Whether strict gender specialization is “efficient” (Becker 1981) or whether women’s economic dependency on husbands helps to frame female housework responsibilities as part of a package deal, couples are apt to accept the existing division of labor. Sharp differentiation in the roles of men and women will encourage people to compare their household responsibilities with those of others of their gender, instead of using their partner as point of reference. In societies with traditional gender roles, women lack established cultural frameworks for scrutinizing who does what and interpreting traditional housework patterns as unfair. Moreover, they lack incentives to misreport their own and their partner’s efforts strategically to highlight injustice. Therefore, I expect the gender reporting gap to be smaller in less gender egalitarian countries and larger in more egalitarian environments.

Of course, one could also make the alternative argument that unequal societies encourage greater gender reporting gaps. Men might minimize their household helping and women inflate their domestic efforts to present a
socially desirable image of following traditional gender roles. To the extent that men and women in gender inegalitarian societies do not share the same skills sets or take on the same chores, they may be less reliable reporters on how much time it takes the partner to do the household work (Treas 2008). Moreover, the greater volume of housework that falls to women in these societies might, in and of itself, cause them to see unfairness and grudgingly overstate their efforts and understate their husband’s. In short, it is possible that less gender egalitarian societies will show greater, not fewer, gender disparities in reports about housework than will more egalitarian societies. This leads to two alternative hypotheses:

H1a: Gender discrepancies in reporting of housework time and tasks are smaller in countries with more gender equality.

H1b: Gender discrepancies in reporting of housework time and tasks are larger in countries with more gender equality.

As noted earlier, the societal context of gender equality has various features that might either encourage or discourage women from interpreting the household division of labor as unfair. Therefore, two alternative hypotheses can be stated:

H2a: Gender disparities in perceptions of housework fairness are smaller in societies with more gender equality.

H2b: Gender disparities in perceptions of housework fairness are larger in societies with more gender equality.

These arguments, of course, hinge on the assumption that household arrangements and societal context give rise to situations that affect men and women differently. At least under some conditions, housework may become a contentious area of gender relations. Women, who are disadvantaged in the division of housework, may become resentful, even if men do not perceive injustice in their housekeeping arrangements. It is reasonable to expect that gender differences in housework reporting are linked to these gender differences in perceptions of fairness. Specifically, I hypothesize the following:

H3: Gender discrepancies in housework reporting are larger when gender disparities in the perception of housework fairness are larger.

DATA AND MEASURES

Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2002, I describe men’s and women’s reports on housework time and the division of household tasks for 35 countries, which includes East and West Germany
as two countries because they were surveyed separately. The ISSP is an ongoing program of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social science research; this particular module focuses on issues pertaining to family and gender issues. I first examine the gender gap within each country in reports of housework time, followed by an investigation of the division of labor for specific tasks. Moreover, I compare men’s and women’s views about the fairness of the household division of labor cross-nationally.

I restrict the sample to respondents who indicate that they have a partner, regardless of their marital status. Because information on sex of partner is not available, all coupled respondents are assumed to have partners of the opposite sex. I only include observations from those who live in a household with at least two adults and provide complete information on their own and their partner’s housework along with information about the division of labor and fairness. This results in 25,963 observations from 35 countries. Sample sizes vary by country, ranging from 266 for East Germany to 1325 for Spain.

**Absolute Housework: Self and Partner Measures**

Respondents were asked: On average, how many hours do you personally spend on household work, not including child care or leisure activities? They were further asked how many hours the partner spends doing housework in a typical week. Both measures were truncated at 50 hours per week for the purpose of this study. For housework time, general measures seem to work better, whereas the division of work is better assessed by asking respondents about specific tasks. A general measure of housework time avoids the problem of double reporting pointed out by Lee and Waite (2005), who suggest that reports of housework time that are based on sums for specific tasks overestimate housework time because multiple tasks may be completed at the same time.

Because both partners were not surveyed, the data do not allow the comparison of housework reports within couples; however, because the ISSP is representative at the country level, I compare the average accounts of partnered men and women within countries. I distinguish between self-reports and partner evaluations, which are based on men’s and women’s report of their partners. Again, the comparison of men’s and women’s housework and other gender differences is at the aggregate level and does not refer to within-couple differences. For some of the analyses, I create measures of gender disparities by taking the difference of women’s self-reports and men’s assessment of female housework time. To create the gender gap measure for men’s housework time, I subtract women’s assessment of male housework time from men’s self-reported housework time.
Domestic Division of Labor: Task-Based Measures and Fairness

In addition to the question of overall time spent on housework, the ISSP surveys ask respondents questions about the responsibility for six different household tasks. They are asked to indicate: Who in your household does the following thing? For each task (laundry, small repairs, caring for sick family members, shopping for groceries, household cleaning, and preparing meals), respondents were asked to state whether it was “always” the respondent, “usually” the respondent, “about equal/both together,” “usually the spouse/partner,” “always the spouse/partner,” or whether the task is done “by a third person.” For the analyses presented in this chapter, I report the differences between female and male respondents in the proportion reporting that the female partner is “usually” or “almost always” responsible for laundry, shopping, and nursing the sick. For the male-typed task of household repairs, I report the differences between the proportion of male and female respondents indicating that the male partner is mainly responsible.

The study also includes a measure that lets respondents evaluate their housework contributions and the fairness of domestic labor arrangements. They are asked to indicate whether they do much more, a bit more, about their fair share of housework, or bit or much less than their fair share of housework. I distinguish between three different groups: those who do much more or a bit more than their fair share, those who indicate that they do roughly their fair share, and those who do a bit less or much less than their fair share. I calculate the gender gap in fairness perceptions by subtracting, for each country, the percentage of women from the percentage of men in each country who indicate that they are doing their fair share of housework, no more and no less, because this also implies that their partner is also doing her/his fair share.

Cross-National Variation in Gender Equality

I use three measures to account for cross-national variation in gender equality, broadly defined. First, I create an estimate of the average total housework burden, which is based on the total of average men’s and women’s housework self-reports. Although not a direct measure of (in)equality, this measure represents the overall centrality of domestic labor in a society. Second, I create a country-specific measure of men’s share of housework hours for this total housework burden. This measure of the average share of men’s housework participation captures the societal referent against which respondents may evaluate their own household work and the division of labor at home. Third, I use a measure of women’s status in society that is not based on housework; the gender empowerment measure (GEM) is compiled by the United Nations Development Program (2006) and is a composite.
that reflects gender inequality in parliamentary representation, economic participation, and women’s power over economic resources, measured by comparing female and male estimated earned income.

MEN’S AND WOMEN’S ACCOUNTS OF HOUSEWORK

In a first analytic step, I examine housework reports from all 35 countries to determine whether the gender discrepancies reported for the United States hold elsewhere. In all countries, women report spending more time on domestic chores than men. On average, across all countries, women spend about 19 hours per week on housework. Men, on the other hand, report doing housework for about 8.5 hours each week. The variation across countries is substantial. Women in Norway and France report spending the least amount of time on housework, with about 12 hours per week. Women in Brazil and Chile report the longest hours, a weekly housework total of about 28 and 29 hours, respectively. The variation across countries is smaller among men: Japanese men report the least amount of housework with about 3 hours per week, whereas men in Russia and the Philippines report the longest time doing housework of any men, at about 14 hours per week, on average.

Even more interesting than the differences in the self-reported housework time for men and women across countries is the extent to which men’s and women’s accounts differ when describing the housework of their partners within countries. Men, across all countries, estimate women to do just slightly less than the amount of housework that women estimate for themselves—around 19 hours per week (about 10 minutes less than women’s self-reports). Women, on the other hand, think that men spend about 7 hours, or about 1.5 hours less than men’s self-reported housework time. Table 11.1 provides a listing of the gender gaps for all countries, showing the differences between women’s and men’s reports regarding female housework time and the difference between men’s and women’s reports of male housework time.

There is considerable variation across countries in the gender disparities in housework reporting. Figures 11.1 and 11.2 compare the partner and self-reports for men’s and women’s housework hours. Countries that fall on the line show no difference between self-reports and partner reports. If a country is placed above the line, this indicates that self-reports are higher than the partner reports. Observations below the line show that partner evaluations are higher than self-reports.

As Figure 11.1 shows, in Slovenia, Hungary, Japan, and Flanders, the differences between women’s reporting of men’s housework and men’s self-reports are smallest; men’s reports are higher than women’s accounts of male housework performance, but this difference is less than 30 minutes
In seven countries, men overestimate their own contribution by 30 to 60 minutes (or women fail to give them credit for 30 to 60 minutes of their actual housework performance). In the remaining 22 countries, this difference is 1 hour or more. Only in West Germany and Poland are men’s housework self-reports lower than what wives and partners report; in West Germany, this difference is only about a quarter hour, but in Poland men’s self-reports are almost 45 minutes lower than what women report for their partners.

**Table 11.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women’s Housework Time (women’s reports - men’s reports)</th>
<th>Men’s Housework Time (men’s reports - women’s reports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average (across countries)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders (Belgium)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (East)</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-2.08</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 25,963.

Source: Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
The Evaluation of Cross-National Research on Housework

Figure 11.2 shows that across all countries combined, there are few differences between women’s housework self-reports and men’s accounts of women’s housework, yet there are substantial cross-national differences. In seven of the countries, women’s reports of their own housework exceed men’s accounts of female housework by 30 minutes or less, whereas this difference is less than 1 hour per week in another four countries. In another eight countries, however, this gender disparity in accounting of women’s housework exceeds 1 hour.

In the remaining 16 countries, women’s accounts of their own housework are lower than the partner reports. In four of the countries, the overestimation by male partners (or underreporting by women) is relatively small, with less than 30 minutes per week. In six countries, overreporting by women (or underestimation by partners) is between 30 minutes and 1 hour, and in another six countries (East Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, New Zealand, and Taiwan), this difference exceeds 1 hour.

To examine whether there is systematic cross-national variation in this gender reporting gap, I examine the link between gender equality measures and housework reporting differences. Table 11.2 outlines the direction of the associations obtained from bivariate regressions.

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**Source:** Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002

*Figure 11.1.* Men’s self- and partner reports.
Men’s and Women’s Reports about Housework

I find that there is a greater gender reporting gap for both women’s and men’s housework times in countries with a higher housework burden. Higher levels of gender empowerment are linked to fewer discrepancies for reports on women’s housework, but there is no such association regarding reports on men’s. This finding provides partial support of hypothesis H1a, which posits that gender discrepancies in reporting of housework are smaller in countries with more equality. However, more gender equality in the form of men’s participation in housework is associated with a larger gender gap in accounts of men’s housework time, providing partial support for hypothesis H1b.

The Division of Domestic Tasks

Having examined gender differences in reports on housework hours, I next turn to specific household chores. In line with the findings of prior research, reports regarding the domestic division of household tasks are gendered. Male respondents report that female-typed tasks are distributed more equally, whereas women’s accounts of the division of household tasks minimize men’s role. Laundry, cooking, and cleaning are activities heavily dominated by
women; according to both men’s and women’s accounts, these female-typed
tasks are “almost always” done by the female partner in the majority of
households. On average, the proportion of male respondents who indicate
that women are mainly responsible for laundry is about 7 percentage points
lower than for female respondents. The average gender differences for the
other tasks are even larger, perhaps because relative consensus on laundry
reflects a particular male aversion to this one task. The proportion of women
who report that they are mainly responsible for taking care of sick family
members and shopping is 15 and 11 percentage points larger than men’s
reports for these tasks.

The majority of men and women agree that it is mostly men who do
the repairs around the house, but there are substantial gender differences in the
proportions: about 81 percent of men indicate that it is usually or almost
always the male partner who does the repairs, yet only about 67 percent of
male respondents state this.

In a next step, I examine how the three gender context measures are as-
associated with the gender disparities in the reporting of the female and male
housework tasks. The results in the columns Female-Typed Tasks and Male-
Typed Tasks of Table 11.2 show that measures of context gender equality
are not significantly associated with the reporting gap for female housework
tasks. I do find, however, that higher levels of gender empowerment are
linked to greater disparities between men and women in the reporting of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Women’s Housework Time (women’s reports - men’s reports)</th>
<th>Men’s Housework Time (men’s reports - women’s reports)</th>
<th>Female-typed Tasks (women’s reports - men’s reports)</th>
<th>Male-typed Tasks (men’s reports - women’s reports)</th>
<th>Fairness Discrepancy (% men: do my fair share - % women: do my fair share)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total housework hours</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s share of total housework</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Because the GEM is not available for four of the countries, N = 31.
+ and – indicate positive and negative associations that are statically significant with \( p < 0.10 \). NS indicates that associa-
tions are not statistically significant at that level.
N = 35
**source:** Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
responsibility for repairs, the sole male-typed task available for investigation. This finding provides additional support for hypothesis H1b, which links greater levels of gender equality to larger reporting gaps.

THE FAIRNESS OF THE DOMESTIC DIVISION OF LABOR

Thus far, I have considered gender differences in housework efforts based on self- and partner reports. Next I investigate the extent to which men and women differ in their assessments of the fairness of their domestic arrangements and whether gender gaps in perceived fairness relate to societal gender equality. Overall, about 45% reported doing their fair share of housework. This proportion is somewhat larger among men (49%) compared with women (42%). More than half the women sampled (54%) think they do more than their fair share, whereas 43% of men admit that they do less than their fair share. Table 11.3 provides an overview over the discrepancies in fairness between male and female respondents for all countries and shows the substantial cross-national variation. In Taiwan, Japan, and Portugal in particular, women are more likely than men to report that they do their fair share of housework. In 10 of the countries, the gender disparities in fairness assessment are less than 5 percentage points. In Norway, the agreement between men and women is amazingly small: 47.55% of men indicate that they thought they did their fair share compared with 47.53% of women who did so.

In the remaining countries, a higher proportion of men compared with women state that they do their fair share of housework. Within this group, the range is wide. The countries with the largest gender disparities are the United States, Ireland, France, Australia, the Philippines, and Flanders, where the proportion of men who claim that their share is fair is between 18 and 23 percentage points higher than among women.

Analyses examining the link between the gender gap in fairness assessment and measures of inequality (see Table 11.2, rightmost column) find no association between the gendered fairness assessments and the overall volume of housework. I find that only the share of total housework taken over by men is positively associated with gender difference in fairness reports: In countries where men participate more, they may feel that they are doing their fair share, whereas women continue to report doing more than their fair share. These findings support hypothesis H2b, which suggested that greater gender equality is associated with greater gaps in men’s and women’s assessment of housework fairness. Similarly, higher levels of gender empowerment are also associated with larger gender differences in views about fairness in domestic labor arrangements. These results provide additional support for hypothesis H2b.
### Table 11.3
Country-level gender discrepancies in the reporting of division of housework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female-typed Tasks</th>
<th>Male-Typed Task: Repairs&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Fairness Discrepancy (% men do my fair share - % women do my fair share)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>Nurse Sick</td>
<td>Shopping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-country average</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>23.72</td>
<td>14.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>16.88</td>
<td>13.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>11.96</td>
<td>16.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>14.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>15.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>12.23</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>12.65</td>
<td>5.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td>12.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders (Belgium)</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>21.26</td>
<td>10.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12.55</td>
<td>13.97</td>
<td>15.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (East)</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West)</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>17.22</td>
<td>10.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>7.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>-4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>18.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>14.44</td>
<td>10.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>13.32</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>8.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>12.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>7.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>9.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>19.48</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>13.13</td>
<td>12.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>22.13</td>
<td>29.14</td>
<td>21.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>29.26</td>
<td>10.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>5.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>19.28</td>
<td>11.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>20.44</td>
<td>17.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>15.06</td>
<td>10.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>23.76</td>
<td>14.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Numbers indicate the percent of female respondents who report that they are almost always or usually responsible for the specific task less the percent of male respondents who report that the female partner is almost always or usually responsible.

<sup>b</sup>Numbers indicate the percent of male respondents who report that they are almost always or usually responsible for the specific task less the percent of female respondents who indicate that the male partner is almost always or usually responsible.

N = 25,963.

Source: Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
Multivariate Analyses of Reporting Discrepancies

In a final step, I examine how the various reporting discrepancies are related to each other as well as to what extent the association between contextual factors and reporting gaps remains stable after they are considered jointly. Table 11.4 shows five models for each of the five discrepancy measures. Model 1 examines the impact of the all three aspects of gender inequality context jointly; models 2 through 5 include other measures of gender gaps in housework reporting. Looking at women’s housework time, I find that total housework hours are a fairly stable predictor of discrepancies, supporting hypothesis H1a.

Table 11.4 further illustrates that the association between men’s share of total housework hours and the gender reporting gap for men’s housework is robust: The more men participate in housework, the greater the difference in men’s and women’s assessment of men’s housework time, once again providing support for hypothesis H1b.

The reporting gap for “female” tasks is linked to total housework hours, mirroring the results for the gender reporting gap for women’s total housework and supporting hypothesis H1a. However, reports of the division of labor for female-typed tasks are also positively associated with the other measures of reporting differences. For male-typed tasks, total housework hours are also fairly robustly associated with reporting differences, and higher levels of gender empowerment are linked to greater discrepancies, even when other factors are considered, further supporting hypothesis H1b. However, there does not seem to be a close link between reporting gaps regarding male housework tasks and reporting gaps in other measures of housework.

Finally, I examine gender differences in the fairness assessments, and I find a positive association with men’s share of total housework hours, even when other factors are included. Table 11.4 also shows that fairness discrepancies are not significantly linked to gender discrepancies in housework time or division of labor reports. My results provide no support for hypothesis H3, as I do not find that gender differences in accounts of men’s or women’s housework time are linked with gender disparities in fairness assessments.

Conclusion

Overall, I find considerable similarities between men’s and women’s self-reported housework time and the housework reports by partners. However, a number of revealing differences demonstrate that the male–female reporting disparities found in the United States exist in other countries as well. In all the countries examined in this chapter, women report spending more time on domestic chores than men. Across all countries, women’s accounts of their own housework time are very similar to men’s estimates of women’s
## Table 11.4
Multivariate analyses of reporting discrepancies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s housework time (women’s reports - men’s reports)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total housework hours</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s share of total housework</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Men’s housework time</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Δ indicates gender reporting discrepancy. + and – indicate positive and negative associations that are statistically significant with \( p < 0.10 \). NS indicates that associations are not statistically significant at that level.

\( N = 31 \).

Source: Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
Men’s and Women’s Reports about Housework

housework performance. For men, on the other hand, self-reports of housework time exceed women’s reports of men’s housework time by about 1.5 hours. If housework is a contentious aspect of gender relations, it seems that men’s, not women’s, contributions are at issue.

These averages obscure the considerable cross-national variation in gender disparities in reports of both men’s and women’s housework time. In eight countries, men’s reports regarding women’s housework exceed women’s self-reports by 1 hour. However, in the remaining 16 countries, women’s housework self-reports are lower than the reports from men. The gender disparities regarding men’s housework are 1 hour or greater in 22 out of the 35 countries. In four countries, however, men’s self-reports exceed women’s accounts of men’s time by less than 30 minutes, and in two countries (West Germany and Poland), men’s housework self-reports are lower than what wives and partners report.

As expected based on prior research, male respondents report that female-typed tasks are done more equally, whereas women’s accounts of the division of these tasks minimize men’s role. There is also a large gender disparity regarding home repairs—women paint a more egalitarian picture than men for this traditionally male chore. Similar to the findings for absolute housework time, there are considerable country differences in the disparities between men’s and women’s reports for the division of labor for specific tasks.

When asked about fairness of the division of labor at home, slightly less than half of respondents state that they do their fair share of housework, men more so than women. In most countries, a higher proportion of men than women state that they do the fair share of housework. In 10 of the countries, however, there are only small differences between men and women; in Taiwan, Japan, and Portugal, women are more likely than men to report that they do their fair share of housework.

Bivariate and multivariate analyses at the country level show that the gendered context at the societal level (in the form of average total housework load, men’s share of housework hours, or gender empowerment) is linked to the gender gap in reporting of housework and its fairness. I find that higher housework loads are linked to wider reporting gaps for women’s housework and the division of housework tasks. Greater participation of men in housework hours is associated with larger gender gaps in the report for men’s housework time and also increased gender gaps in fairness assessments. In addition, I find evidence that higher levels of gender empowerment are associated with gender gaps in the reporting of male-typed tasks.

Results largely support hypotheses H1b and H2b, which expected larger gaps in housework and fairness reporting in the context of greater gender equality. Higher levels of male housework participation are associated
with greater gender disparities in the reports of men’s housework (but not women’s) as well as fairness assessments. This indicates that in countries where men perform somewhat more housework, they may overestimate their housework performance because it deviates from “traditional” minimal participation; alternatively, women may underestimate their partners’ efforts perhaps to maintain that they are the ones who still do considerably more housework.

Higher levels of gender empowerment in a society may result in women taking more credit in the division of housework tasks, or not giving credit to men’s participation. Women may be more comfortable voicing frustration with housework arrangements and may not feel the need to sugarcoat their partner’s limited housework contributions in their reports of who does what at home.

My findings also provide limited support of hypothesis H1a, which posits that in the context of greater gender equality, housework reporting differences are smaller. I do find evidence that the gender reporting gap for women’s housework time is positively associated with the total housework burden (which implies smaller gaps in countries where couples do less housework overall). However, the link between the total housework burden and the greater gender gap in the reporting of the division of female-typed tasks only appears in the multivariate context. Moreover, the bivariate association between housework burden and the gender reporting discrepancy for men’s housework time disappears when considered jointly with the other context factors.

When I further examine the interrelationship of the various gender disparity in housework measures and fairness assessments, I find only limited evidence that they are closely linked. The results show that gender gaps in the division of labor for “female” tasks are linked with reporting disparities regarding absolute housework hours (for both men and women). Moreover, discrepancies in the reports for traditionally female tasks are also linked with gender differences in fairness reports. These findings suggest that perceptions of fairness are not directly linked to housework time and the division of labor, but perhaps are rooted in the extent to which expectations are thought to be met. The association between gaps in fairness reports and reporting differences regarding female-typed tasks may reflect women’s growing frustration with the division of labor in this domain and their expectation for men to step up in those traditional female domains.

The results presented in this chapter provide clear evidence that there are gender discrepancies in the accounts of housework time, division of tasks, and the fairness of the domestic division of labor. It is not surprising to find some differences between men’s and women’s reports, both because the data here are national averages, and because gender differences have
been reported for the measurement of other indicators that concern couples, such as fertility intentions or couples’ sexual activity.

However, both the magnitude and the considerable cross-national variation in these gender disparities makes the gender differences in the reporting of housework time, tasks, and fairness particularly noteworthy. The results from this chapter have a number of implications for future comparative research on housework. First, researchers who study housework information for both partners in a couple based on one partner’s reports may want to examine the aggregate gender differences in reporting for their sample of interest: How do average self-reports different from what is attributed by partners? My findings suggest that greater housework burden, men’s share of housework hours, and societal gender empowerment all may have some effect on gender differences in the perception and reporting of domestic labor and its perceived fairness.

Given a reported trend toward fewer hours spent on housework, concerns may become less pressing over time that higher housework burden is associated with greater gender reporting discrepancies for women’s housework time. However, the finding that greater participation of men in housework and women’s empowerment are associated with reporting differences in fairness and the division of labor are more troubling. At a time when men’s role at home is changing, and women’s positions in society are increasingly powerful, housework measures that rely on comparisons are more prone to reporting bias than questions about absolute time. When respondents are asked to compare their own contribution directly with that of their partner, frustrations and social desirability may more readily shape responses than when comparisons are more implicit.

This chapter demonstrates that gender differences in measurement are not exclusive to the United States and further shows that there are some systematic cross-national differences. Although the results from multivariate analyses especially need to be treated with caution, this study provides clear evidence that those who examine women’s housework in countries with high housework burdens should be aware of possible distortions of measurement. However, studies that focus on men’s housework time, the division of labor, and those interested in fairness issues may face higher levels of measurement bias in more egalitarian settings. These measurement concerns are not only important for comparative research and those doing research on housework. All researchers who study couples are reminded of the possible distortion of reports based on individuals’ expectations, frustrations, and other dynamics that can affect measurement. Although there is no easy solution to gather “objective” data for most researchers, awareness of possible distortions to the data are important to keep in mind. Those who are very concerned about differences between self-reports and
partner attributions may choose to base their analyses exclusively on self- (or partner) reports. Future research on these issues should examine the extent to which differences in fairness assessments and women’s housework time have changed over time. This would shed further light on the extent to which the gender disparities are the result of a lack of information, inflation of one’s own contribution, or other motivations that underlie the phenomenon.

NOTES

1. For some of the macrolevel analyses presented later in the chapter, I only have data for 31 countries.
2. Respondents in the Netherlands and Poland were asked whether the man or the woman was usually responsible.
3. The index includes gender inequality in the proportion of legislators, senior officials, and managers, as well as women’s representation in professional and technical positions.
4. It is important to emphasize that I compare the average accounts of partnered men and women to each other within countries, not within couples.

REFERENCES


In recent decades, numerous studies have consistently noted a sizeable gap between the changes in women’s paid employment, women’s political empowerment, and the shift toward more egalitarian attitudes concerning gender roles in contemporary industrial societies on the one hand, and the minimal change with respect to the division of unpaid labor at home on the other. Housework and child care remain primarily “women’s work.” Regardless of how household labor is defined, how it is measured, or in which country it is studied, research has consistently shown that women contribute a larger share of the household labor than men. Thus, change in gender roles has been asymmetric: By expanding their participation in the labor market and other public spheres, the roles of women have changed much more than the roles of men, who only modestly gained ground in household production.

Theories that aim to explain the division of household labor (see the summary in Treas, Chapter 1, this volume) have not been very successful in explaining the persistent patterns of domestic work. From the point of view of the new home economics, the resource-bargaining model, and the marital dependency model, the division of household labor in couples remains a puzzle. These theories adhere to the view that the relations underlying the division of labor in the household are fundamentally gender neutral. A change in time availability or the balance of resources, as well as change in attitudes, should produce a symmetric effect on men and women in heterosexual couples. Empirical evidence does not support such predictions, giving rise to a growing stream of research that frames housework patterns as “gendered.” Gender theorists argue that allocation of housework is much more than the reflection of time availability and rational choice. Housework is a symbolic enactment of gender relations. Its performance by either women or men helps express gender identities and reinforces gender relations within households. These theories locate gender itself at the core of the division of labor between men and women, and also predict asymmetric processes of change in gender relations in contemporary societies. They suggest that the
equalization of gender roles is a much slower process than assumed by economic and bargaining approaches, and consequently leads only to a modest change in the household division of labor.

Despite the ubiquitous effect of gender on housework, cross-national studies nevertheless display considerable variation in the amount and division of household labor. These studies point to the need to take social context into consideration systematically (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Bittman et al. 2003; Cooke 2006; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; Knudsen and Waerness 2008; Singelmann et al. 1996). As in the case of paid employment, where the welfare state regime characteristics (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001) and institutional factors, such as the availability of child care options (compare with Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1998), help to explain differences in women’s employment decisions and labor market participation levels beyond the individual-level factors, the unpaid work in the home is also highly contingent on the sociopolitical context. Countries vary in the degree to which they support and reinforce women’s responsibility for unpaid work in the home and their dependence on the male breadwinner. Societal factors may also interact with individual factors in the sense that men’s and women’s individual assets have differing effects on the division of housework. The chapters in this volume contribute to this growing field of comparative research by building upon, integrating, and extending various sociological perspectives; applying a variety of data sources and methods; and opening new directions in thinking about and analyzing the household work. Let us briefly summarize the various aspects that characterize this volume over and above the topics covered in the individual chapters.

First and foremost, the volume is a testimony to the value of comparative research in sociology. It underlines the importance of comparative analysis, understood as the description and explanation of similarities and differences of conditions and outcomes among large-scale units, such as nations, societies, and cultures. Cross-national research forces us to systematize the context of comparison, both with respect to selecting measurements and with respect to explaining comparative similarities and differences (Smelser 2003, p. 649). Only when comparing different societies does the importance of societal structures, policies, and normative expectations become visible, and only then can they contribute fully to the explanations for the behavior on the individual and household levels.

Some cross-national trend studies, such as Sayer’s Chapter 2 in this volume, have indicated a widespread pattern of men doing more housework and women doing less (Geist 2005; Gershuny 2000; Hook 2006). Nonetheless, much debate has been generated by conflicting interpretations of whether change among men is meaningful or whether the proportion of housework done by men is increasing as a consequence of decreased time spent on house-
work by women. The proponents of the thesis that gap in household work is narrowing emphasize the extent of change rather than contemporary levels of gender inequality in housework. Other scholars juxtapose women’s rapid movement into paid work and continued responsibilities for domestic work against the continuing low participation of men in housework.

A number of chapters in this volume show that a cross-national comparison is a necessary precondition to understand stability and variability in household work in contemporary societies, and the context in which these changes occur. Sayer (Chapter 2) presents an analysis that indicates that there is a general trend in the decline of women’s housework and men’s increase in housework. However, the levels of change and the timing of declines in women’s hours spent on housework vary cross-nationally. The situation in an individual country can be assessed and understood much better in a cross-national comparative framework than by studying it independently. In a similar manner, van der Lippe (Chapter 3) shows that examining similarities and variations across countries helps us understand the extent to which the institutional context influences women’s behavior and to what extent own employment hours, characteristics of women themselves, and their immediate family situations have an influence on women’s household labor. Cooke (Chapter 4) examines a narrow set of liberal countries that are in many respects “similar”—Australia, Great Britain, and the United States—and nevertheless shows that these countries each have distinctive policy packages and different mechanisms through which state policies affect employment and household organization of labor.

The policies that have been used to address work–family balance during the past decades in various countries are reviewed by Dex in Chapter 5. These policies, such as child care services, parental leave, in-work benefits, and tax credits, are an integral part of the “societal context” that influences individuals’ and couple’s time in paid employment and unpaid work in the home. Dex reasons along Gershuny (2000) that state policies are but one element in a huge range of policies, institutions, infrastructure, preferences, and behavior patterns that overlap and reinforce each other. One single policy may not make any demonstrable difference if the task of producing equality in the shares of unpaid work within households is too ambitious to take on with policy changes that are realistic and politically acceptable. Nevertheless, each policy can contribute to a small step in this direction, and a cross-national comparison can contribute to a realistic assessment of the situation in a particular country, to a diffusion of policies, and also to a better substantiated analysis of causal relationships between policies and behavior than the single-country research can accomplish.

Cross-national differences in the gender gap in the performance of domestic labor are also the topic of Chapter 6 by Gupta, Evertsson, Grunow,
The Evaluation of Cross-National Research on Housework

Nermo, and Sayer. The focus is on economic gaps in women’s housework time. By comparing Germany, Sweden, and the United States, the authors find that inequality in women’s earnings translates into a gap in their housework time. The findings raise a question of whether the detected relationship points to a more general link between class and gender in the sphere of household work, an indication that might easily be overlooked in a single-country study.

Welfare state policies and, in particular, policies on child care in European societies are used by Pfau-Effinger (Chapter 7) as an illustration for her argument that arrangements of family and work can be comparatively analyzed and classified by the dominant family models upon which they are based. In this way, the macrolevel focus on cultural models can be used to analyze cross-national variations in care and—to a lesser extent so far—in housework. Similarly, cultural ideas of motherhood are explored by Charles and Cech in Chapter 8. Comparing attitudes toward maternal employment across 32 countries, their results suggest that institutional and social policy structures influence cultural understandings of motherhood, childhood, and the state, and that these understandings in turn help sustain state policies and their path-dependent developments. In single-country analyses, such highly powerful, but taken-for-granted, cultural ideals remain, for the most part, hidden and unexplored.

In a similar vein, Yodanis (Chapter 9) examines the relationship between beliefs about marriage and the division of housework across cultures. She demonstrates the link between the values of closeness and communication in marriage and gender equality in the division of housework. This line of examining differences and changes in marital ideals and family cultures is further pursued by Röhler and Huinink (Chapter 10) in their study of East and West German couples. In addition to demonstrating the value of comparative research, their chapter also raises the question of the relationship between attitudes and behavior in view of the persistence of traditional gender-skewed housework patterns in the face of modern or postmodern gender ideologies. Last, Geist (Chapter 11) resumes a large-scale comparison of almost three dozen countries to examine reporting discrepancies on the amount of household work by men and women. Examining these measurement issues in a comparative perspective provides the unique opportunity to situate the gender discrepancies in reports of housework and fairness in a larger context and may also provide a reflection on how contested the domestic division of labor is in different countries.

In this volume, analysis and discussion of the organization of household labor is for the most part limited to advanced economies of Europe, North America, and Oceania. Although a truly global perspective on domestic labor
Concluding Thoughts on the Societal Context of Housework

is beyond the scope of this volume, several chapters in this volume (Chapters 3, 8, and 11) include data on Asian and Latin American countries, which have been less often studied. In terms of female employment, attitudes toward maternal care of young children and gender discrepancies in reporting of housework time, these countries do not differ fundamentally and systematically from western market economies. However, similar to western countries, variability can be found within other societies that corresponds to local, cultural, economic, and institutional factors. Although it is not clear how the results in this volume might apply to countries with fundamentally different welfare, political, and familial structures, the limited results here suggest that it would be useful to extend sociological analyses to a broader range of societies.

To date, if comparative research on paid and unpaid work—much less the interaction between work and family—has been conducted, it has typically been limited to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in North America, Europe, and advanced Asian and Pacific economies, where suitable data and research expertise are more readily available. But a more diverse range of countries and an analysis on a truly global level is essential for better understanding the national-level conditions and experiences of families as well as global processes and policies (Heymann, Earle, and Hanchate 2004). A particularly important aspect is the dramatic worldwide increase in the demand for domestic helpers and live-in workers. As the number of dual-earner couples has increased in the affluent countries, so, too, has the demand for domestic workers who carry out the household chores and caring tasks in private households. Domestic work is a large growth industry worldwide for migrant women (Anderson 2000; Kofman et al. 2000; Zimmerman et al. 2006), and this complex phenomenon has an impact on housework production in sending countries as well as in host countries.

The authors of all the chapters in this volume adhere to the value of cross-national comparative research. However, with the proliferation of cross-national data and the number of cases that are being compared, it becomes increasingly difficult to discern patterns and systematize findings in sociological research, even when only “comparable” western societies are included in the comparative analysis. One solution has been sought in grouping the countries according to various types of welfare regimes. Regime here refers to the typical ways in which welfare production is allocated between state, market, and households, as suggested in the seminal three-cluster typology of conservative, liberal, and social–democratic states by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). This typology has been fruitfully used by several authors in this volume, and its most important aspects for the housework allocation are outlined next.
The conservative welfare regime supports women—in particular mothers—who give priority to family activities. National policies are generally family oriented in the sense that they favor women’s economic dependence and stimulate them to choose domestic responsibilities in the household over paid employment. In other words, this welfare state regime tends to uphold the male breadwinner family model and gendered division of labor in the household. The social–democratic welfare regime emphasizes the principles of “egalitarianism,” “decommodification,” and “defamilialization” (Esping-Andersen 1999). It supports entitlement to certain rights (e.g., welfare) that are not dependent on one’s market position and alleviates the household’s caring responsibilities through welfare state provisions. Thus, a defamilializing regime seeks to unburden the household and diminish individuals’ dependence on kin for their welfare. The social–democratic welfare state radically increases women’s choices in favor of employment, decreases her economic dependence, and provides the basis for more egalitarian domestic role sharing by diminishing the resource gap between the spouses. The liberal welfare regime emphasizes the principle of individual freedom and responsibility, accepting the distributional consequences of market forces in terms of class and gender inequalities. Although its market orientation may prompt women’s employment, the liberal regime does little to stimulate it directly through public policy measures. Thus, this type of welfare state is less egalitarian and decommodifying than the social–democratic welfare state, but it, too, is defamilialistic. The market provides services that allow families to outsource child care and household chores, which lightens the family’s responsibilities for its dependents and the burden of household work.

There is a prevailing agreement that institutional and policy regulations that we associate with welfare state regimes have a strong effect on women’s paid work. However, there has been much less interest in the effects of those factors on household work and the division of unpaid work in couples. Certainly, there is no one-to-one relationship between ideal welfare regimes and individual welfare states, and a country might in some aspects significantly digress from a “pure” welfare regime model. In fact, the strongest challenge to Esping-Andersen’s typology has come from feminist scholars who criticize its failure to address issues of gender. Nonetheless, this volume shows that a typology of this kind is a useful heuristic in cross-national comparative research on household work. Women in conservative welfare regimes do spend more time doing housework compared with women in other countries. And, the housework gender gap is smallest in the more egalitarian, social–democratic countries and largest in the conservative countries, with the gap in English-speaking countries at intermediate levels. In this volume, Sayer, van der Lippe, Cooke, Gupta et al., Pfau-Effinger, and Charles and Cech all use the welfare regime typology to organize and frame their findings.
However, the chapters in this book also demonstrate limitations of this typology, in line with previous critiques that the welfare regime typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) does not sufficiently correspond to cross-national variation in gender inequality. Again, this critique emerged particularly from the feminist perspective (see Lewis 1992; Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1999). To accommodate the countries that do not fit into the three-world typology, van der Lippe extends the liberal, social–democratic, and conservative regimes by adding the Mediterranean, postsocialist, Latin American, and Asian cluster. Cooke finds distinctive patterns and differences among Australia, Great Britain, and the United States—that is, countries that belong to the same liberal welfare regime. Also, Pfau-Effinger’s cultural model of the family does not map to standard typologies of welfare regimes. She therefore introduces four family models prevalent in contemporary European societies: the male breadwinner/female part-time care provider model, the dual breadwinner/dual care provider model, the dual breadwinner/external care model, and the dual breadwinner/extended family care model. It remains to be seen which typology or which combination of models provides the most useful framework for studying housework and gender relations in the household. Nonetheless, the quest for organizing framework is an important task to which the authors of this book contribute.

Third, although the chapters in this book systematically cover the aspects that have been identified in the research literature as relating to housework, they are also innovative in opening the field to promising new directions of research. For example, class inequalities and disparities in housework volume are two areas that demand further attention.

Class inequalities in the burden of housework are one new focus of analysis, particularly by Gupta et al. and Cooke. Whether families with an economic advantage simply have homes that are better arranged to stay clean (e.g., equipped with washing machines, free of mold and peeling paint, without messy children) or outsource more housework to paid helpers, the chapters in the book show that more prosperous women have a time use advantage vis-à-vis the poor when it comes to housework. Perhaps it is our own middle-class standpoint that has led female sociologists to focus on gender inequality to the neglect of class inequality in housework. Historians (Cowan 1983) have had a keener appreciation of the drudgery confronting working-class mothers, who struggle with overcrowded dwellings, the lack of labor-saving appliances or even running water, and no servants. In the United States, qualitative accounts also point to this problem today. One journalist writes of the mother in a deteriorating public housing project in Chicago who washed the dishes in the same bath tub used by her large family, because the kitchen sink was always broken (Kotlowitz 1992). Because in the analysis by Gupta et al. it is the United States—with its unequal wage
structure—that shows the greatest class disparities in the burden of housework, their chapter reinforces the book theme of macro/micro linkages and shows that the crossroad between class and gender merits significant attention from the perspective of household labor.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the volume of housework matters, although nearly all the research has focused on the division and sharing of housework in couples. The variability in how much housework is carried out in the household may systematically depend on the welfare regime, gender culture in the country, and the social class of the household. Sayer confirms that the volume for women has dropped more than the volume for men has increased, with a subsequent decrease in the overall work being done in the house. Geist shows that perceptions of how much work a spouse does around the house differ between countries with a high volume of housework and a low volume. Van der Lippe shows that macrolevel indicators, such as enrollment in child care facilities, higher gender empowerment, and gross domestic product also determine the absolute time spent on housework. Undoubtedly, there are important macrolevel differences in housework needs and demands, in the availability of appliances, in domestic standards of cleanliness, in work processes, and other factors that invite further exploration, such as the outsourcing of housework and the provision of household services by (immigrant) domestic workers.

Fourth, this book is a testimony to the value of different methodological approaches to cross-national research. Large-scale, multilevel analyses allow us to pursue cross-country differences systematically, detect patterns at the individual and country levels, and explore the micro/macro linkages. However, a strategic, three-country case study like Cooke’s reveals associations and details that a multilevel analysis of three dozen countries cannot. Most chapters use quantitative methods. However, theoretically informed insights into the meaning that couples give to their relationships is offered by Röhler and Huinink on the basis of qualitative interviews. Their analysis nicely shows how historical legacy and current joint institutional structures affect coping strategies of the individuals in the household, although qualitative studies are necessarily limited in the number of “country contexts” that can be considered.

A wealth of data sources are used in the book: time diaries, surveys, interviews. Each has its strengths and limitations. Time diary studies offer superior data on time use over time, but the long series tend to measure fewer covariates than cross-national surveys. Cross-national surveys are rich in individual-level data, but until recently they covered relatively few countries. Furthermore, cross-national survey analyses that aim to wed the macro to the micro are often constrained because institutional indicators are not com-
parable and available for all countries. Despite these frustrations, it is important to remember that there simply were not enough data three decades ago to support the sorts of quantitative analyses represented in this volume. The rapid development of new cross-national data—offering greater variation in contexts and additional time points—bodes well for future analysis. A mixture of various data sources is required for an optimal exploration of the complex organization of family life. Besides the sorts of data used in this volume, comparative ethnographies of housework, consumer expenditure data linked to time use information, and even natural experiments formulated around the introduction of new household products could all enrich our understanding of household labor. Again—particularly when very different family systems and national contexts are involved—each of the data collection methods in cross-national comparison requires careful consideration of measurement issues and conceptual definitions of housework. As pointed out by Eichler and Albanese (2007), implicit assumptions that underline much of the empirical literature on housework have to be revealed and reexamined. Possibly activities that go beyond repetitive physical tasks should be recognized as important dimensions of housework, such as providing emotional support; maintaining contacts with kin and friends; resolving conflicts among family members; managing financial and health issues as well as planning and managing the overall organization of the household. Certainly, the articulation of housework with household management, child care, elderly care, and emotional support activities warrant more attention. Furthermore, the changing nature of housework over the life course should be acknowledged and studied accordingly.

Finally, the household division of labor is ultimately about intimate relationships and linked lives—the mother–child relationship, the father–child relationship, the husband–wife relationship—as aptly demonstrated by Chapters 7 through 10. Particular cultural understandings have long stabilized what we take to be the traditional gendered division of labor, but these understandings are being rewritten as much as behavior is changing. This is illustrated by women’s increasing employment and the subsequent reduction of women’s housework hours. As Dex suggests, the father–child relationship has been identified with Daddy Leave policies as being a relationship suitable for state management. To the extent that chores are incidental to child care, more intimate relations between fathers and children may pay off not only in child outcomes, but also in more egalitarian divisions of housework. Thus, turning the lens on housework implies exploring national contexts that harbor institutional and cultural arrangements, public and private policies, complex relationships between individuals, as well as micro/macro linkages.
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